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Berisha Addresses EU on 'Massacre'

AU1304213194 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] President Sali Berisha held a meeting with His Excellency Claus Vollers, German ambassador in Tirana and a representative of the troika of the European Union [EU] in Albania.

I have invited you to this meeting, President Berisha addressed Vollers, as a representative of the EU troika. We will send the same report to the Foreign Ministry of Belgium with the request that you inform the governments of the EU member countries as follows:

Albania has the necessary documentation to prove that the Greek terrorist unit came from Greece and that after the crime—the massacre in the recruits' barracks in Peshkepi e Siperme in the early hours of 10 April, which resulted in the killing of 33-year-old Captain Fatmir Shehu, born in Tepelene, and 20-year-old soldier Arsen Gjini, born in Seman, as well as the wounding of several other soldiers, three of whom are in serious condition—turned back toward Greece in the direction of the Argjirohor border post.

The Greek military uniforms that the criminals were wearing, the professionalism of the crime, and the objects that were found, which are all part of the special units' equipment, speak in favor of the argument that the Greek unit belongs to Greece's special units and is subject to special treatment.

In its note dated 10 April addressed to the Greek Government—in which the Greek Government is held responsible, since the terrorist unit came from Greece—the Albanian Government asked the Greek Government to find and convict the culprits, as it may not be directly responsible for the event.

However, from the press statements of the Greek Government, we have not only heard about its regret over the event, but we have learned that this responsibility of the Greek Government was interpreted as a contradiction of the Albanian note by the Athens government.

As in the cases of the Greek warship firing on an Albanian motorboat in our territorial waters in Sarande Bay on 4 January 1994, the violation by the Greek minesweeper of our waters near the Qefal Cape on 10 March, the entrance on 12 March of two armed Greek soldiers in Vidohov, who threatened the Albanian citizens, or the murder of 20-year-old Alfred Muco by a Greek patrol on 21 March, Greece has followed the path of denying the facts and washing its hands of it by giving no official response.

As revenge against the departure of the person appointed by Athens as a consul general in Gjirokaster, who was not only exerting indecent behavior that was incompatible with that of a diplomat but was also carrying out the duties of a consul without having the documentation [ekzakuature] accorded by the receiving country, which is in flagrant violation of Article 12 of the Vienna Convention, Greece did not expel our consul in Athens but rather the first secretary of our embassy in Athens.

Under these conditions, Albania does not intend to seek revenge by expelling Greek diplomats from Tirana. However, based on Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, which states that due to the lack of a clear agreement on the mission's staff, the receiving state can request that this staff be kept at a limit it considers reasonable by considering the circumstances and conditions that exist in this state and the needs of the mission in question, Albania therefore asks the Greek Government to take all measures so that within 10 days, it will have the same number of diplomats in Albania as Albania has in Athens—that is, six diplomats. This number could also be defined on the basis of a bilateral agreement.

Albania requests the EU Council of Ministers to ask Greece to provide an official response to this event. Albania is for dialogue, but it will not accept the meetings offered without having an official response by the Greek Government on this Greek terrorist act. Albania asks the EU Council of Ministers to set up a commission to verify all the aforementioned terrorist acts and expresses its readiness for full cooperation with this commission.

We add that we have no objection to trust this duty to the existing commission of the EU monitors who are supervising our northeast border, but as the commission chairman for this six-month period is a Greek official, according to a known principle of the right, he cannot represent a party in the judgment.

We also ask the EU Council of Ministers to demand from Greece to put an end to these acts condemned by the UN Charter and which fully violate the Maastricht principles, which Greece has committed to keep and develop. We want to assure it that Albania is determined to cooperate with the European Union and the member countries, the regional countries, and Greece, as well as all the other countries who are interested in decreasing tension and contributing to peace and stability in the region.

Minister Briefs Attaches, Diplomats on Attack

AU1404073194 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Report by Gezim Qinami]

[Text] This morning Public Order Minister Agron Musaraj and Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova summoned the military attaches and diplomats of foreign embassies in our country to inform them about the criminal act of the Greek special commando.

Describing the circumstances of the criminal act on the basis of the evidence and presenting those present with the facts and indisputable evidence, Musaraj cited arguments to show that this act was committed by a Greek commando unit. He stressed that proceeding from the way the crime was committed, the number of the participants, the automatic weapons used, which resulted in the killing of two militaries, the wounding of three others, and much material damage, it is clear that we have to do with a terrorist act organized and committed by Greek special forces.

Starova informed the military attaches and diplomats about special aspects of the Albanian Government's position on Greece's serious act of infringing Albania's sovereignty and territorial integrity. He stressed that the Albanian Government has not yet received an official response from the Greek Government.

Regarding the statements of Greek Government spokesman Venizelos, Starova said that these cannot be considered a response. He pointed out, however, that in his second statement Venizelos finally remembered to console the families of the dead.

He added that we are expecting an official response from the Greek Government on this criminal act committed by the Greek special forces. Without this, it is difficult to conduct a dialogue between the Albanian and Greek sides. Starova also stressed that the only answer from the Greek side has been the expulsion of the first secretary of the Albanian Embassy in Athens, a vengeful and very unfair action.

Musaraj and Starova answered many questions. At the end, the military attaches and the diplomats of the embassies expressed their condolences to the dead and wounded in this criminal act committed by the Greek special forces.

Ministry Says 'Greek Army' Behind Attack

AU1404073294 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Report by Sokol Balla]

[Text] Representatives of the Public Order Ministry gave a news conference this afternoon on the results of the investigation into the murders by the Greek commando.

[Balla] This afternoon, in one of the halls of the Palace of Congresses, Colonel Agim Shehu, director of the order police, and Colonel Vexhi Mucmataj, director of the investigative police, gave a news conference on the murders by the Greek commando on the Greek border.

After describing the event again on the basis of the facts and the evidence, Shehu said that the evidence regarding the objective, participation, way of committing the action, etc. shows that we are dealing with forces that are constituent parts of the Greek Army.

Reporters asked a number of questions about the expertise, armament, level of responsibility and authorship of the crime, and about the measures taken by the Public Order Ministry.

Colonel Vexhi Mucmataj said that three employees in the Public Order Ministry have been arrested: the inspector of border police in Gjirokaster, the supervisor of the border post, and the training chief. We will forward their documents to the Investigation Office.

Regarding a report carried by several news agencies on a Greek request for a joint investigation commission, Shehu said that no such request had been received.

Greek Embassy Given 10 Days To Reduce Staff

AU1304193794 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] On 13 April 1994 Khristodhoulos Tsalikis, Greek ambassador in Tirana, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and was handed a note saying that owing to the lack of an agreement on the necessary personnel of the diplomatic staff of the Republic of Albania in Athens and the Republic of Greece in Tirana, the Albanian side considers that these staffs should each be reduced to six diplomats.

The Embassy of the Greek Republic in Tirana should take the necessary measures to send home, within 10 days, all diplomatic staff in excess of this number.

Greek Terrorists Claim Responsibility

AU1304203694 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 13 Apr 94 p 1

["p.re." report: "'We Carried Out the Massacre'"]

[Text] Tirana—Those responsible for the serious terrorist attack last Sunday morning [10 April] in the village of Peshkepi near the Albanian-Greek border have now become known. An ultranationalist Greek group, the self-styled "MAVI" (Northern Epirus Liberation Front), has claimed responsibility for the victims—two dead and three wounded—at the Albanian military barracks. The motives behind the massacre are explained in a communique sent last Sunday evening by the previously entirely unknown MAVI to the Athens newspaper ELEFTEROTHYPIA, well-known as the leading mouthpiece of Greek nationalist circles.

The link between the slogans shouted by the members of the terrorist group and the motives behind this serious incident have also become entirely clear. According to the ultranationalist group, the attack was a response to "the criminal indifference of the Greek state," which, according to them, "has failed to act properly to prevent the expulsion of Greeks from Albanian territory, thus helping Tirana in its ultimate objective of eliminating the Greek element from Albania. Our action was intended to change the disastrous attitude of the Greek

Government toward Vorioepiros [Northern Epirus]," the communique concludes.

The news of the serious border incident prompted a wave of protest from the Albanian authorities and political forces. In a statement addressed to the international community, an Albanian Foreign Ministry spokesman held the Greek Government responsible for the attack: "It is beyond all doubt that the attack was prepared by special Greek forces." President Berisha and Prime Minister Meksi also responded with indignation. Meanwhile, the Albanian ambassador in Athens was urgently recalled to Tirana on Monday for consultations. Kastriot Robo, first secretary of the Albanian Embassy, confirmed this news, calling the incident "very serious and unprecedented."

For their part, the Greek authorities have disclaimed all responsibility for Sunday's attack. Athens spokesman Evangelos Venizelos called the charges in the Albanian Foreign Ministry's protest note groundless. "Greece will not accept any provocation or charge without documentary evidence. Greece is against any kind of act of violence." Just a week earlier, the Greek Government had addressed a warning to Tirana, reminding the Albanian capital of the "inviolable nature" of the rights of the Greek minority, who are "indissolubly" tied to Greece.

The Greek press has to some extent left Sunday's news in the shade. Some newspapers, such as the progovernment Athens daily TA NEA, have even put forward a theory that this was an action by "the Albanian mafia." Only LAIKO VRIMA, the newspaper of the Greek minority in Albania, has come out against the attack. A letter sent urgently by its editorial board to President Sali Berisha expresses sorrow over the victims of the tragedy.

Greek nationalism and the problem of Northern Epirus have in the past led to a deterioration in relations between the two countries, but the incident last Sunday was the most serious since the fighting on the border in August 1949. Greek nationalist groups have for a long time been agitating for the union of "Vorioepiros" with Greece. Greek political figures, including former ministers such as Sotiris Kouvelas, have called this area "unliberated territory." Sebastianos, the Orthodox bishop of Konitsa, has had a radio station with five repeaters installed at the border; these send nationalist messages to the Greek minority in Albania. All this activity has not led to the slightest response from the Greek authorities, which are on the contrary always ready to make a fuss about the "irredentist propaganda" of neighboring countries such as Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Turkey, and Albania.

Communique From Greek Embassy Criticized

AU1304160894 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Report by Arben Karapici]

[Text] [Announcer] Radio Tirana has today received a press communique from the Greek Embassy. Regarding this, our reporter Arben Karapici has prepared the following report:

[Karapici] Three days after a hostile incursion of Greek military forces into the barracks in the village of Peshkepi, which resulted in two Albanian officers being shot dead and three wounded, the Greek Government has tried to convey only regret for the victims. This is expressed in a press release distributed today by the Greek Embassy in Tirana.

In a totally unacceptable way, the document rejects the full responsibility that the Greek Government bears with regard to this act of anti-Albanian state terror. The Greek press release pretends that the executive power in Athens has only Albanian protest notes, which it claims are insufficient to verify the facts and reach a conclusion.

Formulating the only official stance issued so far, the document distributed by the Greek diplomatic representation adds that its government is not prepared to accept any accusations and considers them as baseless. The communique is silent about the fact that it is now accepted in Athens that there exists a terrorist organization acting under the name of the Northern Epirus Liberation Front that carried out the anti-Albanian terrorist attack last Sunday. This was made known by ELEVTHEROTIPIA itself, one of the largest and most widely read newspapers in Athens.

Anyway, the criminal hand of the Greek state's terrorist acts against Albania and the Albanian people should be cut off, and only the government of Andreas Papandreou can do this.

The members of the terrorist group who violated Albanian territory and shed Albanian blood were wearing Greek Army uniforms. In the same uniform there are a commander, a chief of staff, and a defense minister. Together with and alongside them stands the clergy of (Fanar) and Hellenistic (Asfavi) [not further specified], because, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Greece, the church and the state are one and indivisible.

Matinchev Says Berov Quarantined for 7-8 Days

AU1304184994 Sofia Bulgarska Televiziya Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Interview with acting Prime Minister Evgeni Matinchev by an unidentified correspondent in Sofia on 13 April—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The Government Press Center has announced that Prime Minister Professor Lyuben Berov is in quarantine and is not allowed to have any contact with other people over the next few days.

Professor Berov took part in the work of the cabinet on 7, 8, and 10 April, but on 11 April developed clinical symptoms that aroused suspicions that he had hepatitis. Laboratory tests are now being conducted to confirm this, and the results will be announced tomorrow or on the following day, the Government Press Center announced.

According to acting Prime Minister Evgeni Matinchev, Professor Berov will be in quarantine for seven or eight days. He said that Professor Berov's state of health did not prevent him from having two lengthy conversations with the prime minister today.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] If I may comment on the delicate fact of the deterioriation in the prime minister's health, in this aspect, was the decision for him to come back to work not made somewhat prematurely, so as to serve a particular political situation?

[Matinchev] I always maintained that what Professor Berov wanted to prove was beyond his powers. He is a man who during the period of his recuperation —even if the process is 90 percent complete—a man must always take account of the fact that in such a case, anyone's health is extremely fragile.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, the public has been left with the conviction that it was not a question of his own decision but a decision imposed from outside.

[Matinchev] Precisely in connection with everything that people have started saying about this, I can tell you that it was the prime minister's own personal decision. If you were to ask me what my own personal attitude is, I advised him that he simply must limit his contacts to a minimum and leave to me and my colleague the matters concerning the administration of the Council of Ministers.

[Correspondent] It would follow that his return to work simply saved the cabinet.

[Matinchev] No, I would not say this is so. [end recording]

Paris Club Talks 'Ended With Complete Success'

AU1404071494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0500 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Text] I would first like to remind our listeners that we are awaiting confirmation of a piece of news that we received from a source close to the Government Commission on the foreign debt negotiations, namely that late last night, at 0130 in the French capital, the talks with the Paris Club of official creditors ended with complete success. According to the same source, an formula was agreed for rescheduling repayments of the debt for 11 years, with a seven-year gratis period.

More on Berov's Health, Paris Club Talks

AU1404094394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Telephone report by Kalina Stancheva from the Council of Ministers building in Sofia—live]

[Excerpts] At the start of today's cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov telephoned from the Lozenets Hospital to order a glass of cognac for the cabinet members to mark the success of the Bulgarian delegation in Paris. The cabinet members broke into applause and the news of the result achieved by their colleague Finance Minister Stoyan Aleksandrov.

The first member of the government to comment on the news in an interview for national radio was Deputy Finance Minister Svetoslav Gavriyski. He interpreted what he called this logical result by saying: From now on the ball is in our court; it is our job to implement the remaining elements presented in the government program so as to get the money. According to Deputy Minister Gavriyski, after the expected foreign financing is received and added to our foreign currency reserves, the country will have about 2 billion dollars at his disposal, which will be sufficient to service the deal with the London Club and to stabilize the country's balance of payments. We may expect Bulgaria to be treated more favorably within the frameworks of the bilateral treaties with the member countries of the Paris Club, Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov added as his own comment on the news. From the upcoming visit this evening of his German counterpart Klaus Kinkel he expects to find solutions to the topical problems recently under discussion, such as the balance of the former GDR [German Democratic Republic]. Minister Daskalov also expects that during this visit Germany will demonstrate a greater commitment to encouraging investments in Bulgaria and to opening up the European markets for Bulgaria. [passage omitted on other matters discussed at cabinet meeting]

The team of consultants treating Prime Minister Berov is expected to meet at 1300 today. After examining the results of the laboratory analysis, the consultants are expected to make a final diagnosis on the Prime Minister Berov's state of health. Everything else is whistling in the wind, Health Minister Tancho Gugalov said regarding the various stories being circulated by certain media. In the health minister's words, this morning's information indicates that the clinical picture is returning to normal extremely rapidly and that the patient has no typical symptoms of hepatitis. We expect that the health minister and chief doctor will give a news briefing this afternoon.

Confrontation Between Zhelev, Berov Viewed

AU1304114094 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Apr 94 p 12

[Commentary by Plamen Enchev: "Military Games"]

[Text] "A la guerre comme a la guerre," (in war as in war) Prime Minister Berov said one year ago, and until today he remains loyal to his slogan.

God and history could testify that the Professor was not the one who started the war. Unlike his predecessor, Lyuben Berov was also the target of the other institutions. However, a real war has been conducted in the last week only on one front—the presidential front.

Bulgarian, and probably many non-Bulgarian, factors claim a part in the big game.

The reconnaissance view of the battlefield produces the following picture: On one side there is the cabinet, which relies on insecure and even conditional parliamentary support. On the other there is the figure of the supreme commander in chief—a rather lonely figure, unless one also notes his advisers and controversial military office. Only conventional means are used—the one gives interviews, the other responds through statements. Behind-the- scenes maneuvers are not revealed to the public at large.

The presidential salvo began with the conclusion that Berov's cabinet must go because it threatens civic peace. Despite his four by-passes the prime minister countered in a direct manner—he accused Dr. Zhelev of violating his constitutional prerogatives and interfering in places he has no business. The Presidency did not react to this blow. It lowered its profile and apparently awaits support from outside.

The outcome of the games that are taking place, is unpredictable, especially when one realizes that one side is motivated by interest, the other—by honor.

Performance of Defense Minister Criticized

AU1304114194 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 8 Apr 94 p 3

[Commentary by Colonel (Res.) Purvan Tonev: "Defense Minister's 'Bayonet Charge' Against Cabinet"]

[Text] Mr. Aleksandrov has now been in office for 15 months. Therefore it was impossible not to admit that he contributed to the absurd inflating of the payrolls of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Supposedly, it is only now that the defense minister has understood that dozens of colonels with or without trouser stripes, were carrying files from one room to another and did not know what to do all day. For a whole year DEMOKRATSIYA has been writing about the arbitrary rule of the Defense Ministry leaders and the lack of prospects for the honest Bulgarian officers. Although somewhat late, the gentleman who filled our ears with talk about cardinal and fundamental changes comparable to those in the most modern armies finally understood this.

The balance is more than sad: dilapidated equipment, obsolete structures, a paralyzed General Staff, insecure military personnel, unprecedented corruption, lack of realistic reform ideas, and infighting within a group of Aleksandrov's friends and neighbors, called, God knows why, "the leadership of the Defense Ministry."

It is not a secret that the minister failed in his attempt to assemble a team capable of proposing ideas and advancing the changes. He also failed to give a personal example with his morals. On the contrary, he introduced threats and penalties, endless talk to a selected group of journalists, demagogy, and theatrical effects. Is the dismissal of the 87 office colonels not a cheap gesture? It is obvious even to the colonels themselves, that the Army does not need them, but where were the minister and the chief of General Staff until now? Is it only 87 colonels in the two Defense Ministry buildings that are expendable?

The recent statements of the defense minister about early elections indicate not only his tactic of turning to the direction in which the wind blows, but also prove the well-known thesis that this cabinet is becoming dangerous for the country's security.

Aleksandrov Defends Policy of Army Cuts

AU1304192994 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Apr 94 pp 1, 3

[Report by Colonel Vladi Vladkov: "Reform in Cadre Policy—On the Basis of the Law"]

[Text] At the beginning the defense minister called the meeting a conversation rather than a news conference, about certain things which are happening in the army, and others which will happen soon, and which were broadly reflected in the press before they even took place.

It is natural that the topic of the officer corps occupies an important place in the newspapers. According to Minister Aleksandrov he had seldom encountered such unanimity in the criticism of him as on this issue.

At the last meeting of the Consultative Council on National Security at the Supreme Command the defense minister reported on the cadre situation in the army.

He told journalists that since December 1991 there had been no cuts at the Ministry of Defense and stressed that no cuts are being made now or in the future. Military personnel are simply being retired. One must distinguish between cuts that are made on the basis of a certain criterion, and applying the existing law.

Minister Aleksandrov said that the cadre issue is a basic issue in the army. The first civilian team that entered the Ministry of Defense more than two years ago found that there a serious anomaly. Many jobs in many structures of the ministry were being done by people with various qualifications. In other words, many officers were involved in inappropriate activities. In addition, during the tenure of Minister Aleksandrov a study has been implemented, which has shown that "our family" had increased by 1,500 members since the beginning of the reform. Naturally, this took place at the expense of new structures, which did not exist before, but without whom work under the new conditions in anything related to the legal and social aspects and certain units of the Ministry of Defense would have been aggravated.

After many academic talks and discussions the situation with the cadres has been analyzed and one factor unfortunately inherited from an incorrect cadre policy has become obvious. This prompted the decision to restore the pyramid in the command structure. It is well known that most officers in the army must be junior officers—lieutenants and captains. The pyramid becomes narrower at the higher echelons, and at the top there are a few generals. Minister Aleksandrov pointed out that at present we have an accumulation of senior officers in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and in all the administrative structures and commands. At the same time there is a serious shortage of combat officers in the units. At present 55 percent of the officers have the rank of major and above. Obviously, the model has been turned upside down.

Afterward, the minister informed journalists about the results of several very important sociological studies. The basic dissatisfaction of the officer corps relates to the low wages and social status. However nothing more could be done under existing conditions. The second cause of officers' dissatisfaction relates to the lack of prospects regarding a career as commanders. This is the results of two factors: Either the cadre selection is incorrect, or senior officers have "plugged up" the central leading units.

Personnel not related to combat units can be reduced. As an example Minister Aleksandrov pointed out the decrease in the personnel of the Ministry of Defense General Chancellery, which was brought down from 33 to 11. On 6 April Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, signed a decree that all colonels from the Ministry of Defense and the Military-Economic Bloc over 50 years old who have been on active service for 20 years must retire according to the requirements of Article 71 of the current law. This applies to 87 people and does not affect colonels performing generals' duties.

Decreasing the personnel of the General Staff will be a gradual process, Minister Aleksandrov said. This is a result of the simple fact that the members of the General Staff have great responsibilities. It is there that operational plans are worked out, strategic deployments decided, and their responsibility is for anything related to the troops' combat readiness. The officers of the General Staff are highly qualified and not mere clerks.

This only is the beginning of the process. The transition toward the corps-brigade organization will reduce in the future the personnel of many staffs. We planned this for 1995-97, the minister said, but the aggravated economic situation and the iron framework of the budget compelled us to hurry. The Bulgarian Army General Staff fully supports this position. The necessary retirements and changes in the officer, sergeant, and enlisted men corps will be effected by the summer, in accordance with the existing law, the code on the military service of the officers and sergeants, and the Labor Code. By 30 April the structures of the administrative units General Staff, and the commands of the troops and the detachments will be optimized. We will not allow the combat command personnel to be painfully affected by the reforms, the minister said. In May the changes and optimization will be discussed by the Military Council of the General Staff and submitted to the minister of defense. Afterward, the payrolls of the approves structural changes will be worked out. Thus the cadre issues will finally be resolved, Defense Minister Aleksandrov said.

The goal is to complete the cadre reform by July and August. By about 1 September, when the graduates of the military schools receive their posts and the others climb one stage higher in accordance with the approved structures and payrolls, one will be able to determine the number of people who have not received and will not receive a new post and will be released from the army. However, all this will only be done according to the law in anything related to the post, age, years of service, and rank. The sergeants, military employees, and other civilians without a post after the structural changes, will be released after 1 June in accordance with the law and the Labor Code. Minister Aleksandrov pointed out that there are 2,886 officers who do not correspond to the requirements of Article 71 of the law. Those people will have to leave the army during this period. The issue will be resolved in an easier manner concerning sergeants. About 1,500 of them do not have a high school education.

Minister Aleksandrov announced his decision that military doctors-colonels and graduate military personnel of military- scientific units could serve until the age of 60, because they are first rank experts and the army needs them.

The minister of defense also answered many questions from the journalists.

Diplomats' Visits to Border Zones Examined

AU1304114694 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 8 Apr 94 p 11

[Article by Miladin Khadzhikonstantinov: "How Our Border Became Diplomats' Favorite Place"]

[Text] If silence was golden, the Foreign Ministry's safes would look like the Bulgarian National Bank vaults.

A strange bustle of foreign diplomats has been evident along our southern border in the last months. They like the Arda River bed and the location near Ivaylovgrad most of all.

At various times and for various reasons this beautiful Bulgarian corner was visited in only one year by former U.S. Ambassador Hugh Kenneth Hill, British Ambassador Sir Richard Thomas, several French diplomats, and Erduan Odabash [name as transliterated], Turkish consul in Plovdiv.

The record holder is perhaps Funda Tezok [name as transliterated], Turkey's general consul, who knows all the mayors in the area.

Sometimes, the diplomats travel with the necessary permits from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs. However, sometimes it appears that they have never heard about such documents.

The problem, as all problems, has several aspects. First, one must note the habits of the foreign diplomats who undertake the shuttle along the border, especially those of the 12 EC states, who are not used to border bureaucracy. The word border is alien to them. It does not appear in their modern dictionaries, and they cannot imagine the concept of a border. Sometimes they err precisely because of their habits.

Perhaps such was the case with the French military attache in Sofia and two companions, who were accidentally stopped by a police patrol prior to entering Ivaylovgrad.

The French are certainly fans of the excellent Ivaylovgrad wine. Perhaps, they were also enchanted by the wonderful landscape and headed off for a weekend without the necessary permits. This is normal, and the fact that the French citizen in question was a military attache could be accepted as accidental.

However, is it normal that our Foreign Ministry did not say a single word about the unexpected visit to Ivaylovgrad? This was more than two weeks ago.

According to the 1961 Vienna Convention, foreign diplomats who want to visit restricted border areas must have special permits from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs.

Greek Military Attache Stelos Kastrandos [name as transliterated] obtained such permits prior to his visit to the Momchilgrad border unit. However, precisely when the Greek diplomats was talking with the unit commander, Colonel Angel Krivorov, the French culture attache, Jean-Jean Paysan, was roving near Benkovski village. He was there for a normal and logical reason—the Muslims celebrated their Ramadan-Bayram.

This is fine, but why were the authorities not informed about the distinguished guest's visit? Neither Mayor Menderes nor the police knew about Mr. Paysan's visit.

Since there are relevant international agreements and the visits of foreign diplomats are subjected to certain regulations, it is logical to ask whether a law has been violated.

If there is no violation, the Foreign Ministry must calm everyone and officially announce that the diplomatic visits to the border regions are normal goodwill visits that do not threaten the country's security.

However, if this is an inadmissible interference in the country's internal affairs, why is the Foreign Ministry keeping silent? The normal interpretation of this should be that if the Foreign Ministry is keeping silent it means that nothing unusual or irregular has happened. Simply, the Vienna Convention has become an obsolete and expendable bureaucratic remnant of the Cold War.

In addition, if there is nothing irregular, then why did Khaskovo Oblast Administrator Tenyu Delchev request the Presidency and the government to announce that every visit of a foreign diplomat along the border must be accompanied by a representative of the local administration?

The request has been supported by the oblast administrators of Plovdiv, Ruse, and Lovech.

The silence, called diplomatic tact at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has often caused us troubles. Let us recall the silence that facilitated the tearing down of the 100-year old Bulgarian school in Istanbul. And let us not mention the Euro-observers along our western border, who were accused by our border guards of "collecting illegal information regarding the protection of our border." In other words, the Euro-observers, frankly, were spying. The Foreign Ministry kept silent for a while, and then conveyed a protest note to the Euro-observers.

If we could rely on the tradition, we must admit that when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs keeps silent a blunder is behind this silence.

'New Policy Center' Leader on Early Elections

AU1404110994 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 6 Apr 94 p 3

[Interview with Dimitur Ludzhev, "leader of the New Policy Center," by Milko Nedyalkov; place and date not given; "The One Who Lies Is Capable of Organizing a Putsch"]

[Text] [Nedyalkov] Mr. Ludzhev, are you disturbed by the article in a Sofia weekly, according to which you serve foreign national interests?

[Ludzhev] The article is a total fabrication and it is a part of the election campaign aimed against the New Policy Center and myself. I do not want to insult the press, but it appears that Petyo Bluskov is everyone's servant. Willingly or unwillingly, he has now joined a game Andrey Lukanov and his friends are waging against President Zhelev and other political figures who do not obey the staffs of Positano Street [headquarters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party-BSP] and Rakovski Street [headquarters of the Union of Democratic Forces-SDS]. Everything in the article is fabricated. For example, it is claimed that the pictures were made on 15 September 1991. This is impossible, because Mr. Montgomery and his family left Bulgaria in May of the same year, and in September he was not in Sofia at all, thus no pictures could have been made. Most probably, the pictures were made before Dr. Zhelev's visit to the United States in 1990, when as his adviser I coordinated with the U.S. Embassy the text of the future joint documents.

[Nedyalkov] The same weekly compares you to Zhirinovskiy and identifies you as a supporter of Zhelev's thesis on the transition to democracy through a dictatorship.

[Ludzhev] Bulgaria needs a strong government; however, one could not speak about a dictatorship under the existing conditions. We developed activity throughout the country, effect relations between our clubs and the center, support the introduction of a new election system and holding early elections, and submitted a new elections law to the parliament. Those are democratic actions which have nothing to do with a dictatorship. It is rather the person who lies who could organize a putsch and establish a dictatorship.

[Nedyalkov] How do you view the statements of the president on restoring the old parliamentary majority? Do you see a place for yourself in that majority?

[Ludzhev] During our meeting with the president we expressed the categorical opinion that there is no place for the old majority in this parliament. We even view his position on this matter as his contribution to preserving the bipolar model in our political scene. Furthermore, the same persons whose presence in the state structures we eliminated with great difficulties in 1992, still rule the SDS. On the other hand it is a total illusion to think that the New Policy Center could form a new cabinet.

[Nedyalkov] If we head toward new elections would you accept the old proposal of the president to head a caretaker cabinet?

[Ludzhev] I will not accept the proposal to head a caretaker cabinet. Indeed, there is no such offer on the part of the president. In the past a statement of his by which he wanted to support me was interpreted as a proposal to form a caretaker cabinet. In fact this was a doubtful service under the conditions that existed at that time in the SDS parliamentary faction.

[Nedyalkov] Will the deputies of the center support an eventual no-confidence vote in the cabinet proposed by the SDS?

[Ludzhev] First, I doubt very much that the SDS parliamentary faction will propose a no-confidence vote. Second, our center expressed its clear position already one month ago, namely, that this cabinet has exhausted its possibilities and should resign. Afterward, the script is clear: Adopting a new elections bill and early elections. If the SDS proposes a no-confidence vote we will not support the cabinet, but will also not support the SDS. The reshuffling of the cabinet, about which people talk now, can be approved in the parliament only through the votes of the BSP and the SDS. It is my opinion that the two political forces are not interested in new elections, and especially not in the adoption of a new elections bill which guarantees the participation of clear professionals in the future management of the country. Changing our system now means replacing the deputies, including myself.

Attitudes Toward CSFR Split, Slovakia Noted

AU1304124694 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Beata Pavlovova, of the Center for Empirical Research (STEM): "Slovakia Through Eyes of Czech Public"]

[Excerpt] According to a public opinion survey carried out by the Center for Empirical Research (STEM) under the title "Trends," more than one-half (54 percent) of the Czech public expressed regret at the beginning of this year over the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The proportion of Czech citizens who expressed regret in May 1993 was 62 percent.

Those who do not regret, in hindsight, the division of the common state mostly subscribe to two views. First, they are convinced that the independent Czech Republic can achieve economic prosperity sooner. This is borne out by the 69 percent of respondents who said last May that economic reform would progress faster in the independent Czech Republic. The second group of those who do not regret or no longer regret the division of the common state is convinced that the Slovak nation had to undergo the process of self-realization that culminated in the assertion of independent statehood. A total of 35 percent of respondents in the Czech Republic wish for the reunification of the two republics.

Other questions in the STEM survey, which was carried out in February of this year, concerned assessment of the Czech Republic's relations with other states, including Slovakia [SR]. The respondents were asked to try to grade their personal attitude toward individual states by means of school marks [on a one to five scale used in Czech schools]. With regard to the SR, most respondents, a third, gave their own attitude toward the SR a two. About a quarter gave it a three, and one fifth a one.

The public's assessment of the dynamism of the evolution of the Czech state's attitude toward the SR was the aim of STEM's question in the February 1994 survey on whether the Czech Republic's relations with the SR have improved in the course of the last year, have remained the same, or have deteriorated. Some 56 percent of citizens believe that these relations have deteriorated, 37 percent assume they have remained the same, and 5 percent are convinced that they have improved. [passage omitted]

General Staff Commander Nekvasil Interviewed

On Reform of Army

AU1304124394 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 6 Apr 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with General Staff Commander Jiri Nekvasil by Petr Bakovsky; place and date not given: "Our Army Has Never Developed Bacteriological Weapons"]

[Text] In connection with the Army, various affairs, small or great, have been discussed recently. General Major Jiri Nekvasil, General Staff commander, answered our questions about topical issues regarding the Army.

[Bakovsky] Has our Army ever developed bacteriological weapons?

[Nekvasil] Our Army has never developed bacteriological weapons. Our Army has never had carriers of bacteriological weapons, and I do not understand the hysteria that has been launched regarding this matter in certain mass media. In 1992, we declared in the United Nations that we were not violating any treaties on bacteriological weapons. Foreign specialists who conducted control checks here were informed about everything, and they even appreciated the order we have here. It is difficult to understand because we had viruses here for several years, and we wanted to normalize the situation. We knew that we were not violating any international conventions. We did not need them for diagnostic and preventive reasons, so we wanted to get rid of them. After the check was made in all military hospitals, we do not have anything anywhere.

[Bakovsky] How does the professionalization of our Army proceed?

[Nekvasil] Professionalization does not mean counting the ratio of officers to conscripts. I believe the main goal of professionalization is to install professionals in positions for which it does not pay off to train soldiers who are serving for only 12 months. They are mainly troop commanders, specialists in the artillery troops, and tank commanders. In this way, a new category of soldiers should be established. We want to start with this system in the Fast Deployment Brigade, where we want to have only professionals in the future.

[Bakovsky] What is the current progress in establishing the Fast Deployment Brigade?

[Nekvasil] This establishment should be completed on 30 June 1994. The situation progressed last year, when we trained our people, commanders mostly. Our principle is to accept the people who want to join the brigade and apply to do so. The main slogan of the brigade—"Our place is where others cannot keep up"—makes service in this unit more attractive. It should be an elite unit that will fulfill tasks on our territory, as well as peacekeeping tasks outside of our territory.

We want to transfer the experience we gained during the training of the brigade to another two brigades—that is, the brigade in Kromeriz, which is now being transformed, and the mechanized brigade in Susice. When we compared our training methods, which we plan to use in the Rapid Deployment Brigade, with the training of Dutch soldiers, it became obvious that we were going in the right direction and that, after six months in service, our soldiers proved to be comparable with those professionals.

[Bakovsky] What will be the situation in the Air Force after the MiG-23 planes are put out of service? Will the Army have enough planes to bridge the period until the purchase of new ones?

[Nekvasil] We have 28 SU-22 planes that are almost new, and their type is not that old. We will try to keep them. They have a long life span and are relatively modern. They have laser-controlled aiming devices. We also have SU-25 planes that are expected to last beyond 2005. They are interceptor-bombers and combat planes. As far as interceptors are concerned, for the time being we will have to stick to recent modifications of the MiG-23 ML planes as long as possible. We have enough MiG-21 MF planes. At present, we do not need supersonic planes. The guidance system and weapon systems are the most important things.

It is a difficult thing to reduce the Air Force. Our Air Force must become a good-quality Air Force, above all. We cannot let the pilots fly only 50 hours. This was enough in 1991 and 1992, when the Army was in a difficult period. If we want to have a well-trained Army, our pilots must fly 90, 100, or even more hours.

I do not support the idea that our Air Force should only be able to fly. Our Air Force must also be able to fulfill any defensive tasks that are given to it.

If we have such an Air Force, we need fewer planes, but well equipped with good guiding systems and weapon systems. With the current ammunition, you need four planes to fulfill a task that could be fulfilled by one plane equipped with such a system. This became evident in the Persian Gulf war. The Air Force should be reduced and its quality improved. We should also have fewer types of planes. We have too many of them. After such a reduction, the Air Force will become more capable of combat.

[Bakovsky] The Military Air Force will use five permanent airports. What will be the situation during a possible military threat to the state?

[Nekvasil] We will have the airports in Kbely, Pardubice, Namest, Caslav, and Prerov. We are not going to abandon other airports completely. The offer we received for renting the airports contains certain conditions that will allow us to use them during mobilization. In a few countries, the air forces use civilian airports. By reducing the number of airports, we want to accumulate funds for the purchase of equipment, so that pilots, technicians, and service personnel might work in conditions corresponding to European standards. This also applies to guards.

[Bakovsky] What is the situation in missile testing? Where will it be conducted?

[Nekvasil] After so long, for the first time we will conduct the testing in Poland. This will include Air Force, Air Defense, and short-range missiles, specifically the Neva system.

[Bakovsky] Did the deployment of our troops change after the division of the Republic?

[Nekvasil] Since 1990, troops have been uniformly deployed over the entire territory. The main goal was to uniformly deploy troops over the territory and to allow the soldiers to serve closer to their places of residence. In that way, the soldiers are less anonymous. The attitude of the public toward the Army has begun to improve. For the time being, transformation has not been completed, and some soldiers from Moravia have to serve in Bohemia. Their number is constantly declining, however. In 1995, the deployment of the troops will allow the soldiers to serve within 100 km of their homes.

On Education of Army Commanders

AU1304170194 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 11 Apr 94 p 3

[Interview with General Staff Commander Jiri Nekvasil by "(bak)" in the "We Have Asked" column; place and date not given]

[Correspondent] What is the education of the General Staff members like?

[Nekvasil] Currently, there are 34 graduates of former Soviet universities, and, of these, 14 are graduates of the General Staff Academy of the former USSR. Some of them are graduates of two schools. At present, we are not sending our experts to Russian schools. Nineteen people have graduated from foreign military academies (in the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, and Poland). Twenty are still studying there. The difference is that formerly people who had some languages were sent to schools abroad, while now we are organizing courses for people in whom we are interested. They are people who have the ability to command and the moral qualities to be useful in the Army.

Army Proposes Changes to Air Defense System

AU1304124094 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by "(km)": "Ground-Air Missiles To Be Put To Rest"]

[Text] The Army Command has proposed to the government to abolish the ground-based air defense of Prague, Brno, and Ostrava by 1995, when the transformation of the armed forces is expected to be completed.

"The Army believes that it is inefficient to constantly keep the so-called positional defense of objects in a state of alert," Vladimir Novak, commander of the Air Defense Department said. "This is why the Army wants to replace this defense system with a concept that would include the defense of important regions. Important regions would be designated as such depending on where the threat would be coming from."

The air defense missiles deployed in the vicinity of Prague, Brno, and Ostrava, which can be immediately launched at any time, would not be in a state of combat alert in the future. The Defense Ministry proposes that the air defense emergency system should be secured only by communication troops and fighter aircraft troops.

Air defense missiles would be put in a state of alert only in case of a military conflict.

Air defense is being secured by the Air Defense Brigade and the Air Defense Regiment—the exact deployment of which the Army declined to reveal—communication troops, and other units. An elite fighter aircraft regiment is in Ceske Budejovice, an independent fighter aircraft troop in Prerov, and a communication brigade in Klecany. The Air Defense Command is based in Stara Boleslav.

The first stage of air defense transformation began this year and will continue in the next year. Another two stages are planned for 1996 to 2000, and 2001 to 2005.

Kukan on Policy With Neighbors, Talbott Visit

AU1304204794 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 Apr 93 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan by Josef Horsky; place and date not given: "Reality Is More Difficult Than I Thought"]

[Text] The head of Slovak diplomacy, Eduard Kukan, is an experienced diplomat and has been employed by the foreign service for almost 30 years. It would certainly be interesting to talk with him about a wide range of problems in our foreign policy, but, during our short meeting, we limited ourselves to the most topical problems connected with his assuming the office of foreign minister.

The new government, as you said, is considering dealing with our relations with our main neighbors, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The government believes it is our main task.

[Kukan] Of course, our relations with the Czech Republic are being built now. To normalize them—in which we are interested, as is the Czech side, I believe—we have to sort our problems that have remained open. When we start again with a clean sheet, so to speak, our situation will be easier. I am not going to speak about details, but you know that the problem of gold and other issues is involved, as is quite well known. We are conducting complicated and difficult negotiations, and it is our concern not to damage Slovakia's interests. We will not be able to sort out many of the problems within six months, but we do not want to wait. We must devote our full time to them.

Both successor countries to the former CSFR must learn how to live in the new situation and adjust to it because there are historical links and interests, in my opinion. The real situation will force us to cooperate in the future. But then, our cooperation will have a new quality, based on the decisions of both countries.

[Horsky] As regards our relations with Hungary, the chief of Slovak diplomacy confirmed that he wants to create a peaceful atmosphere without emotion, which is needed to keep the dialogue running.

[Kukan] We would be happy if there were a similar reaction in Hungary. We expect no miracles because our relations are complicated and burdened by the past, but there are things we can solve within six months. They are contained in the government policy statement. The most important thing is that we do not want to lose communications with Hungary.

[Horsky] When asked whether there is a real possibility for a treaty on good-neighborly relations being concluded with Hungary, or at least its principles, Kukan provided a diplomatic response.

[Kukan] I do not see it as unrealistic. I do not mean the treaty itself. Regarding these principles, there is such a possibility.

[Horsky] The second problem of our foreign policy is that we want to integrate into Western political and economic structures. In this connection, we are interested in what you are going to discuss tomorrow with [U.S.] Deputy Secretary of State for Eastern Europe Talbott.

[Kukan] As you know, Mr. Talbott is very close to President Clinton. They studied together and have personal contacts. This is not the only reason we believe his visit is so extremely important. His visit is a certain signal in the situation that has arisen in Slovakia. According to our information, he wants to explain to us thoroughly and analytically the current position of the United States toward the countries of Central and East Europe because it has recently changed slightly after being criticized. On the other hand, he will certainly listen to our opinions on our integration into Western structures. Apart from this, he will be interested in the development of the economic situation in Slovakia and in conditions for the arrival of entrepreneurs from the United States and the influx of U.S. capital. These two issues are his priorities.

[Horsky] But the United States is only one of the NATO pillars, albeit the stronger one. What will the situation look like with respect to the European Union [EU] and its military component, the Western European Union [WEU]?

[Kukan] In the political sphere, we are interested in EU membership. Our association treaty has been ratified by two countries, and our task is to have the other EU countries do the same so that we might do the same thing that Hungary and Poland did on Friday [8 April]—submit an application for EU membership.

[Horsky] As regards security matters, Minister Kukan said: Our signature on the Partnership for Peace plan is a step toward full membership in NATO. Only reality will show us how this mechanism will function. As far as the WEU is concerned, we are interested in permanent observer status.

More Deputies Expected To Defect From HZDS

AU1404134494

[Editorial Report] Slovak newspapers have recently carried several items dealing with the possibility of another group of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) deputies leaving the formerly ruling movement, thereby securing for the current government coalition 90 votes needed to pass constitutional laws.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 9 April on pages 1 and 3 carries a 1,100-word interview with Vladimir Bajan, former deputy chairman of the HZDS Club of Deputies in the Slovak Parliament and now a leader of Prime

Minister Moravcik's "Alternative of Political Realism," by Martin Krno entitled "Blow Below the Belt." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Bajan denounces the "StB [communist-era secret service] methods" practiced in the HZDS Club of Deputies and indicates that another nine deputies are to defect from the HZDS parliamentary group.

In the PRAVDA interview, Bajan reacts to the "publication in the press" of "sworn statements" signed by HZDS deputies at a meeting of the HZDS leadership at Horne Plachtince in November 1993, in which they pledged that they would relinquish their mandates as deputies if they ever leave the HZDS. Bajan confirms that he signed such a statement "under threats" last November but denies that he had violated it by retaining his seat in parliament: "I kept it [the sworn statement] because I did not leave the HZDS. I was expelled from it." Speaking about the circumstances of the Horne Plachtince pledge, Bajan says: "All day long we were clarifying the position of confidence, and, in the evening, they presented a statement they had brought finished from Bratislava in the morning. We considered this a blow below the belt. First, 21 persons, including Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the parliament, refused to sign. We considered this quite normal. Gasparovic is a lawyer and knew that this is outrageous. Then Meciar said he would resign along with the whole government. He said he would call upon his people to take to the streets and oppose the deputies." After the "prime minister's threats," Bajan continues, Gasparovic asked the deputies "not to be foolish because the declaration has no legal validity, and if it calms the situation in the HZDS, it is necessary to sign it." According to Bajan, the statements were then entrusted to Gasparovic in a sealed envelope. Because they have now appeared in the press, Bajan says, "I would like to ask Gasparovic whether someone has broken into his office." Bajan views the publication of the statements, which include the home addresses and phone numbers of the signatories, as "illegal" and a "dangerous precedent" and announces that he will ask the General Prosecutor's Office to investigate the leak: "All day long scores of people are calling, threatening the deputies' wives and children. If the HZDS wanted to achieve this through these StB methods, it really succeeded," Bajan says.

In one part of the interview, Bajan confirms that HZDS ranks might be left by social democratically oriented deputies. The passage reads: "[Krno] We have learned from various sources that eight more deputies might leave the HZDS Club of Deputies and establish a Social Democratic Club and that one deputy is planning to reinforce Cernak's National Democratic Club of Deputies. Can you confirm these rumors?

"[Bajan] It is difficult to accurately estimate their number. But I do not rule out that your figures might be close to the reality. The Social Democratic current has so far remained in the HZDS parliamentary club. It is only a question of time when these deputies will publicly confirm their disagreement with the policy of the present leadership of the movement. This is connected with the crystallization of the political scene.... Our former HZDS colleagues have one last chance to join parties with a future."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 9 April on page 2 carries a 100-word interview with Ivan Laluha, a parliamentary deputy for the HZDS who is considered to be the leader of the "Social Democratic" current, about the possibility of more defections from the HZDS parliamentary group. The interview, the place and date of which are not given, reads: "[SME] Before the HZDS Assembly in Presov [held on 26-27 March], it was expected that you would establish there a Social Democratic Platform within the HZDS or that you would leave the movement. Why did these expectations from behind the scenes not come true, all the more because it was rumored that you would contest the elections jointly with the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia? How likely is your departure from the HZDS?

"[Laluha] If you allow me, I will make a statement on this at a later date."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 12 April on pages 1 and 3 carries an 800-word interview with Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the parliament, by Martin Krno entitled "No One Has Broken Into My Office." In the interview, which was conducted on 11 April, Gasparovic responds to the interview with Vladimir Bajan in Bratislava PRAVDA on 9 April. He describes how the "sworn statement" of November 1993 came about, stressing that "it is binding morally rather than legally." He also explains the circumstances under which the signed statements became public: "After several deputies left our Club of Deputies and formed the Alternative of Political Realism, Mr. Cabaj, chairman of the HZDS Club of Deputies, came to see me. I handed him the envelope at his request. I did so because it was property of the HZDS and did not concern the National Council. Therefore, no one has broken into my office and, I hope, never will." Asked about the expected departures from the HZDS Club of Deputies, Gasparovic says: "There exist certain indications of that. But even if some more deputies leave, this need not be considered a tragedy. We have clearly stated that only those should remain in our club who trust the HZDS program and want to implement it to the last degree. It would make no sense for people to remain among us who disagree with this program."

Deputy Prime Minister Discusses Economy

AU1404111094 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "is": "The Development of the Economy Is Worse Than Expected"]

[Text] Bratislava—Provided that the talks with the International Monetary Fund are successful, the first approximately $110-million installment of the standby credit from the IMF should be released before the end of the year. The drawing of the standby credit should be followed by the drawing of the second installment of the STF [strategic transformation facility] loan of approximately $90 million that Slovakia obtained last year. The second installment of the standby credit would then represent the sum of $60-$70 million. This was stated by Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmognerova in connection with the current 10-day visit by an IMF mission.

According to Schmognerova, her talks with the mission's representatives did not concern the creation of the social fund or the introduction of wage regulation. Wage regulation should be introduced only in the event of a marked widening of the gap between the growth of wages and the decline in labor productivity. As for the social fund, she said that it will be created; the only question is how. "It will most probably be created only at the beginning of 1995." The government is also considering increasing the number of products that will be subject to the higher value-added tax rate. Brigita Schmognerova voiced the assurance, however, that the increase would not concern products of everyday use. Measures to retain budget balance should not affect the level of transfer payments, according to her words. "Our endeavor is to distribute social burdens evenly so that the weakest social groups are not affected," the deputy prime minister added.

As she went on to say, the development of the economy this year is worse than originally expected. The government therefore has some crisis measures in reserve. "We would like society to realize that we need support and that the implementation of the set targets will establish better prerequisites for the future. We have opted for measures that will not concern the budget alone and that will lay the foundations for positive developments and will have the least social impact," Schmognerova stressed. According to her, the IMF mission appreciated the fact that a new government was formed in a very short time and that this government was able to prepare its economic program quickly. The mission also appreciated the government's endeavor to accelerate privatization and make it more transparent and the [planned] launching of the second wave of coupon privatization. Referring to the suspension of talks between the former government and the IMF, the deputy prime minister said that the former government had implemented virtually nothing of its commitments toward the IMF, though these have been known since December 1993, which makes the starting position of the present government all the more complicated.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 6 April on pages 1 and 2 carries a 600-word Igor Zvach article on Deputy Prime Minister Schmognerova's comments on her talks with the IMF mission. The report includes the following passage: "Asked whether the talks concerned devaluation or the measures adopted by the previous government to limit some imports, Schmognerova said that they did not. The Slovak Republic's foreign exchange reserves are developing so that devaluation is not necessary. The import surcharge had been introduced temporarily and following consultations with GATT, and it is therefore pointless to talk about it. Asked by NARODNA OBRODA whether some tough IMF demands were discussed, such as measures in the sphere of taxation and prices or cuts in the social sphere, the deputy prime minister admitted that some IMF recommendations are heading in this direction. The issue will be how to minimize their impact on the population. No general tax or price increases or drastic cuts in the social sphere are in the offing. It is possible, however, that it will be necessary to reconsider the tax burden with respect to certain groups of merchandise. However, this will not concern articles of everyday use."]

Horn Outlines Steps To Improve Slovak Ties

AU1304102194 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Apr 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Julius Gembicky in Budapest; date not given: "If I Win, I Offer Reconciliation"]

[Text] The Socialists' enormous edge in the latest polls on party preferences prior to the May elections in neighboring Hungary comes as a surprise, to say the least, to many competitors. For the right-wing government coalition and the Christian Democrats it is downright devastating. The election campaign proper starts on Friday, 8 April; in the course of the campaign, there will be a moratorium on press, radio, and television interviews with the parties' electoral leaders. NARODNA OBRODA has therefore asked Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], to reply to our questions now.

[Gembicky] Mr. Chairman, to what do you ascribe your position as the favorite?

[Horn] After 1990, several parliamentary parties tried to isolate the Socialists. Our reply was an intensive dialogue with society. In Parliament we concentrated only on specific solutions to society's transformation. Why was this important? The fact is that we did not inherit the new social and political configuration from Rakosi's regime. Quite the contrary, Kadar's barracks were regarded even in the West as the merriest in Central and Eastern Europe. Even under Kadar's regime, there existed elements of the market economy and its management. As early as January 1988, we passed in Hungary the law on the freedom of private enterprise, which would have been inconceivable in Slovakia at that time. We ourselves enabled, by means of law, the emergence of a multiparty society and maintained open contacts with Western democracies. This distinguished us from the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] and the other countries of this region. Hence, there was something to build on. The new government that emerged from the elections in 1990 tried to change all kinds of things. Unfortunately, it did not focus on economic transformation but on ideological issues and the unproductive reassessment of the past. This was not all that interesting to ordinary people, who want to know how they are going to make a living. We therefore decided to deal precisely with those issues that are of interest to the broadest sections of society. That is one of the main causes of our party's popularity. We purposefully refrained from personal invectives against political adversaries In Parliament. Simply, we dealt with the down-to-earth problems of our country. And, last but not least, it needs to be said that we have a competent team of politicians and experts to translate those principles into reality. I myself was a member of Nemeth's cabinet, which had a European hallmark [punc] abroad as well as at home.

[Gembicky] Even though you top the pre-election polls with between 30 and 33 percent of the vote, it could happen to you that your competitors join forces and push you into the opposition once again after the elections. With whom would you be ready to form a post-election coalition, should a coalition be necessary?

[Horn] That is the most frequent question I have been asked recently. The reply? It will be given by the two-round elections. We will see then with whom we can cooperate and with whom not.

[Gembicky] Mr. Horn, can even a coalition with the right-wing Liberals from Fidesz [Federation of Young Democrats] be considered?

[Horn] I do not know what Fidesz is up to because it changes its opinions every month. But we do consider the possibility of a coalition with Liberals, particularly with the Free Democrats [Alliance of Free Democrats—SZDSZ].

[Gembicky] A few days ago the parties making up today's government coalition pushed through in Hungarian Parliament the adoption of a screening law. An important, and perhaps sole, reason for the passage of this law was the endeavor to eliminate the most formidable competitor—Gyula Horn. Will the law apply to you, in view of your participation in Ministry of Interior units in 1956? Do you have a chance to successfully defend yourself against this accusation and those pressures?

[Horn] This law was not passed personally against me. It should affect, above all, hidden resident agents. There are no secret spots in my biography, neither in the fifties, nor in the sixties or later years. Besides, the screening law does not provide for any sanctions. Its sole aim is to make the past of Hungarian political officials more transparent.

[Gembicky] What is the Hungarian Socialists' recipe for reducing tension in Slovak-Hungarian relations?

[Horn] I do not think that the Hungarians and Slovaks as nations stand in opposition to one another. We want to push for historical reconciliation with neighbors and, therefore, we must not allow nationalist politicians to take the helm in any of our countries. Therefore, there is no need to deal primarily with the past, with the burden represented by historical treaties. That is of no real significance. Should we become a government party, we would want to conclude a large general agreement with the Slovak Republic that ought to be the first big step toward building up mutual trust. On the part of Hungary, this agreement must chiefly contain the element of unchangeability of current borders. At the same time, the two sides should pledge to observe the rights of ethnic minorities living on their territories. This commitment would apply to both Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary. The other element should be a general activation of mutual relations because, in my opinion, little has been done in the economic sphere although both Slovakia and Hungary acutely need new markets. The clarification of neuralgic points in the past should be left to historians, instead of drawing into them politicians, who keep reviving them and highlighting their relevance as its suits their needs. That is pointless. As regards matters that introduce neurosis [neurotizuju] into our mutual relations, such as military issues, we must establish a system of mutual consultations. It is simply not true that Hungary is building up its army against Slovakia or that Slovakia is building up its army against Hungary. There are several such mutual problems that would require very intensive bilateral talks.

It would be very unfortunate if the practice of relations introduced by the present Hungarian Government and the former cabinet of Vladimir Meciar were to be perpetuated. Whenever any Hungarian nationalist made any oblique remark about Slovakia, Meciar immediately reacted to it. And the view of a narrow group was presented as the official Hungarian position. Let me say one more thing in conclusion. In my opinion, Hungary must support all efforts aimed at Slovakia's integration into European structures—naturally, under conditions as are applicable to everyone. And, as far as you are concerned, I would recommend that you leave in peace the question of bilingual city and village signposts and constitutionally guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities. We also do not consider right all your ideas about Slovakia's territorial and administrative division and the reorganization of state administration and local self-administration, because the intended arrangement does not sufficiently accommodate the demands of Hungarians living in Slovakia.

[Gembicky] What significance do you attribute to cooperation among Visegrad countries from the long-term viewpoint?

[Horn] Visegrad needs to be kept alive, even though, to be honest, I do not think that this cooperation has any great prospects. I prefer the enhancement of bilateral relations between the member countries of this group.

[Gembicky] One bone of contention in our relations is the Gabcikovo hydroelectric project and the demand that we increase the flow of water in the old riverbed of the Danube. Do you think that you will be able to find with the provisional government, or with the government that will emerge in Slovakia after the fall parliamentary elections, common language and a compromise even in this matter?

[Horn] Results can only be achieved by means of compromise. This problem, too, needs to be consistently depoliticized and its solution must be left to experts. The Hungarian side's demand that Slovakia secure sufficient flow of water is justified. Therefore, this is not a political but a practical problem for experts. Not only the present Moravcik government but also the one that will be appointed after the fall elections must be a true partner in solving this problem.

[Gembicky] A broad-coalition government has taken up office in Slovakia. Is there, in your opinion, a chance, and does the political will exist, for a historic Hungarian-Slovak settlement in the near future?

[Horn] I assess the first steps of the Moravcik government positively. He wants to negotiate and cooperate, which is encouraging. I therefore think that it is worthwhile to negotiate with Mr. Moravcik even in the brief period prior to the elections.

[Gembicky] Mr. Horn, do you not think that the present government coalition headed by the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] might try to make up for all the missed opportunities in Slovak-Hungarian relations even before the elections, only to reverse the preferences indicated by pre-election polls?

[Horn] Such a reversal cannot be party business. Even if we have some disputes with the MDF in the way we view bilateral relations, bilateral relations represent state interest and, therefore, I do not believe that the MDF could change the existing trend in bilateral relations in some radical way before the elections. The opposition parties maintain good relations with their Slovak counterparts, so that they would be capable of securing continuity in Hungarian-Slovak relations even after the elections.

[Gembicky] Mr. Horn, do you think that the Hungarian nation is prepared to accept a socialist government or a socialist prime minister?

[Horn] Let this be determined by the voters. We have a chance to win, we have many sympathizers, but I do not know whether this will be enough. I only know that many are ready to accept a socialist government, not only in our own country but also abroad, including large financial institutions. As the Polish example has shown, a left-wing government can manage to conclude agreements abroad that are very advantageous for the country. I do not see any problem for the Socialists to participate in a coalition government either.

[Gembicky] What is the nature of your relations with the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] of Peter Weiss? Wherein do your views coincide and wherein do the views between the Hungarian Socialist Party and the SDL differ?

[Horn] We have very good contacts with the SDL and with Peter Weiss personally. We also have identical views on most problems. If differences appear, it is always in connection with our views on how to deal with the position of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Slovakia. But we will be able to come to an agreement even on this issue. The SDL's policy is in conformity with European criteria and I am therefore an optimist even with regard to the Hungarian minority. I have only the best things to say about Peter Weiss. If we, but also the SDL, became government parties after the elections, it would have a positive influence on bilateral relations and their improvement.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 9 April on page 3, under the headline "What Has Remained in the Notebook; Mass Media and Government Propaganda," carries the following 200-word report:

["Recently we published an interview that was given by Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn to our editor Julius Gembicky. One question from that interview, which is topical in Budapest and Bratislava alike, remained in the notebook:

[[Gembicky] "During its reciprocal visit to Budapest, a delegation of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists familiarized itself with the situation in Hungarian Radio and Television in the wake of the March personnel purges in these two most important media, which had been initiated behind the scenes by the government. What is the Hungarian Socialists' attitude toward these events, which took place shortly before the elections?

[[Horn] "We consider it unacceptable for the government to try to bring large media under its control. Regrettably, the enforced changes have already made themselves felt in programs, which are dominated by government propaganda. This is undemocratic and a gross violation of the principles of freedom of speech. After the elections in May it will be necessary to pass a big media law and establish a nonpartisan body to oversee the electronic media so that they do not depend on a single political party."]

Minister Kadar Views Path to EU Membership

AU1304122094 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 12 Apr 94 p 21

[Article by Bela Kadar, Hungarian minister for international economic relations: "A Few More Obstacles Have To be Overcome Along The Long Road Toward The European Union"]

[Text] Hungary, situated between the East and the West, has had an economic, political, and cultural relationship with Western Europe for centuries. After World War II, the Yalta accord determined the country's economic direction—two thirds of Hungarian trade went to the CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] countries. No impulses for economic development were to be expected from these countries. The turnabout came in 1989. Hungary's opening toward the world economy, to be seen as a shift in the fulcrum of its foreign trade, was, together with the change in political regime and economic system, one of the cornerstones of a comprehensive systemic transformation.

One illustration of the success of this transformation is the fact that between 1989 and 1993, Hungarian exports to the countries of the European Union [EU] rose from 24 to 47 percent. At the same time, the involvement of Austria and the Scandinavian countries in Hungarian foreign trade rose from 6 to 12 percent. In 1995, about 60 percent of Hungary's exports will go to the European Union.

Forty-three percent of the $7 billion that has been invested in Hungary comes for the European Union. EFTA countries that are waiting for EU membership have invested 14 percent. These countries provide more than 70 percent of Hungary's tourist income and 90 percent of the income we earn from other services, and they permit us to finance over 50 percent of our debt repayments. These figures show that Hungary is already closely integrated with Europe.

It was not easy to leave behind the restrictions of CEMA and join the rest of Europe. It was a difficult road. The most important milestones along this road were: The establishment of diplomatic relations between Hungary and the European Union in 1988; the first comprehensive accord on trade and economic cooperation, otherwise known as PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary], designed to promote the economic restructuring of Poland and Hungary and concluded in Brussels on 16 December 1991; and the treaty on associate member status with the European Union that came into force on 1 February 1994.

Following a resolution by the Hungarian parliament, Hungary submitted its application for full EU membership on 1 April 1994. In accordance with an already-established schedule of Hungary's European strategy, there will be a government-level conference in 1996 in order to decide on the European Union's future geographic expansion. Only after this decision has been reached can negotiations on Hungary's full EU membership commence in 1997.

Hungary's road of re-integration with Europe can be divided into clear stages. The period between the end of 1989 and the end of 1993 marked the most difficult stage of transforming the economy. Over 90 percent of prices and imports were released from control, the number of private enterprises quadrupled, the private sector's involvement in Hungary's GNP rose to over 50 percent, and the forint achieved partial convertibility. All these are clear signs of the Hungarian economy's world market maturity and its openness in this direction.

Between 1994 and 1996, Hungary's European strategy will release the country from the last shackles of the state-controlled system and prepare it for the EU negotiations. Between 1997 and 1999, the prerequisites for EU membership will be created. The democratic rights that are enshrined in the Hungarian Constitution and the implementation of these rights already conform to the political conditions of the European Treaty and the 1993 Copenhagen Resolution.

Hungary is now faced with the difficult task of adapting its legislation and its rules governing finance, environmental protection, health protection, and technology to EU norms. A particularly difficult task will be the subsequent fulfillment of the macroeconomic conditions of the Maastricht treaty regarding inflation, budget equilibrium, and the national debt. These objectives can be attained if the economy picks up in 1996 and economic growth exceeds the EU average. Thus, our country will be ready for the EU talks by 1997, and ready to become a member by 2000.

The inevitable difficulties and sacrifices caused by this process can be alleviated by new forms of cooperation that will arise during the period preceding full EU membership. These forms of cooperate could contribute to an acceleration of Hungary's economic growth, recovery, and adaptation. But Hungary's membership of the European Union represents no burden and sacrifice on the part of existing members; instead, it represents a dowry. In economics, politics, and security, European interests, even international interests, involve the need to show that the path of comprehensive systemic change is justifiable.

Hungary has a good chance of presenting the first successful transformation for everyone to see. This is also a major impulse for the remaining countries in the region. Full EU membership permits EU enterprises to avail themselves of Hungary's historic role of mediator in Eastern and Central Europe in order to develop relations even further. The 20,000 foreign enterprises in Hungary and 1,500 Hungarian joint ventures in the neighboring countries also encourage closer links with Western Europe in this region.

Over the past four years, Hungary has become an extraordinarily extensive market for Western European goods, a market that is still expanding. The capital investments that have been made so far clearly show that Hungary has become a very attractive industrial location in the new European Economic Area on account of the progress in free trade, its qualified and cheap manpower, and the motivation of its work forces.

FYROM Delegation Discusses Cooperation

AU1204074394 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 11 Apr 94

[Unattributed report: "Intensified Economic Cooperation With Hungary"]

[Text] A delegation of the Macedonian Foreign Ministry, led by Under Secretary Dmitar Belcev, held talks in Budapest on coordinating the Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Hungary. The agreement specifies ways to intensify and develop economic cooperation, especially in the field of metallurgy, chemical industry, and the agriculture. Belcev informed in detail of the damages caused by the Greek embargo against Macedonia.

Difficulties of Coexistence in Vojvodina Noted

LD1304193994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] The coexistence of Hungarians and Serbs in Vojvodina is growing more difficult, since nationalism has further increased. This is what Andras Agoston, chairman of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, told Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn. Andras Agoston expressed hope that in the future a clear and verifiable system will be established in the mother country to support the organizations of Hungarians beyond the borders.

Gyula Horn considered it important that the Hungarian political forces, independent of their party political affiliation and ideology, should be united in support of the Vojvodina Hungarians.

Paks Nuclear Plant Preparing To Store Waste

AU1204105394 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Apr 94 p 5

[Correspondent's report: "Reserve Storage for Nuclear Fuel at Paks"]

[Text] Officials in Paks hope that, in accordance with the signed agreement, Russia will take the spent fuel from the nuclear power station in Paks. At the same time, due to the uncertain domestic situation in Russia, officials in Paks began preparations for the construction of a temporary storage facility, to make sure that there will be no need to stop the power station in case of obstacles in the transportation of spent fuel.

Although environmental protection experts in Moscow argue about the agreement to transport the spent fuel rods to Russia, Paks officials hope that the Russian side would abide by the agreement after all. At the same time, Balazs Kovacs, head of the information office of the nuclear power station in Paks, told us that, due to the uncertain situation, they are already prepared for the construction of a temporary storage facility. The fuel rods must be placed to lie dormant for five years in Paks prior to transportation to Russia. If they only keep adding spent fuel to the storage facility, it will become full by 1995, and if there are no other possibilities of storage, the nuclear power station will have to be shut down, a power station which supplies almost half of Hungary's need for electric power. It is not expedient to take such a risk and, therefore, preparations are under way in Paks to build a temporary storage facility.

As is well known, the joint English-French consortium Alsthom, a firm that has gained considerable experience in the construction of such facilities, won the right to construct the storage. The necessary environmental study has been done, and its evaluation is currently under way. Power station experts expect an answer in about one month. The technical plans are also being drawn now, but construction has not yet been started because there is no authorization yet. Only the land is being prepared for construction.

The experts are also conducting information activity among the people living in 12 settlements around the facility. Several people oppose the storage, and a civil movement against the storage has been formed. However, officials in Paks hope that they will succeed in convincing the opponents of the project that the facility is not dangerous. The hearing of the population is still pending, something required by law; no power station in Hungary can be built without this.

Radio Vice President on Dismissals, Political Views

9494CH0196A Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 5-6 Mar 94 p 3

["Exclusive" interview with Laszlo Csucs, vice-president of Hungarian Radio, by Zsolt Mester; place and date not given: "Change of Regime at the Hungarian Radio"]

[Text] [Mester] The government approved a request for special assistance in providing lump-sum settlements in connection with downsizing; thus, the last obstacle was removed before the planned measure can be carried out. The people concerned in the case were given notice. Who are you dismissing in the end?

[Csucs] I will not publicize a list, because it could be regarded as branding the people in question, and it could injure their personality rights.

[Mester] However, I have seen a list which included, among other people, Akos Mester, Istvan Bolcs, Henrik Havas, Sandor Szenasi....

[Csucs] I will not play guessing games.

[Mester] ....that is to say, star reporters, professionally recognized radio personalities with great experience.

[Csucs] This is a matter of opinion. It is one thing how well one knows the ins and outs of the profession, and quite another what he does with his expertise and talent. If he carries out his job in a way which is ethically reprehensible, he is not suitable to hold a public service position.

[Mester] On 3 March, two demonstrations took place in front of the radio station. In one group, the radio employees gathered, and in the other, the followers of Istvan Csurka who were cheering for you. The radio employees saw a perfect proof in this that you are supported by the extreme right. Csurka's group had also announced earlier that in the district in which you run for parliament, they will not have a candidate.

[Csucs] If any segment of society supports such initiatives in such a critical situation, which is at the same time a nearly historical moment, I will gratefully acknowledge it, and have no intention of refusing it. It would be absurd to pick and choose whose sympathy I am counting on, and whose I am not. Concerning my running for parliament, it is true that in Baranya county, in district five, in Mohacs and environs, several voters and parties solicited me to become a candidate. In the beginning I was inclined to do so, because I have ties to this region; I know the problems of the people who live there, and I know that I could effectively contribute to solving them. Unfortunately, my present task, just like that of a parliamentary representative, requires my complete attention. I decided that as long as the powers that be do not prevent me, I will try to carry out the task I undertook at the Radio with the greatest devotion and honesty. Thus, to my great regret, I cannot undertake to run for parliament.

[Mester] With what kind of a program, on which platform, would you have run?

[Csucs] On the one hand, I consider the concord of national forces important, because in our past, in our history, the reason for defeat could always be pinpointed in discord. I wanted to work for concord, on the basis of Christian values, which for me do not mean only a kind of religious commitment, but also honoring the natural and social laws formulated in the Ten Commandments. On this basis, I wanted to implement my primarily economic program, which includes budget reform, a complete refurbishing of the budget, the overhaul of the system of taxation, the examination of the acute problems of agriculture, and so on. I think this program could be made credible by my professional career and my past, rather than by unsubstantiated promises.

[Mester] Let us return to the Radio. Earlier you said that when it comes to dismissals one must think of the group of people who refuse to support the transformation of the radio. How did this resistance manifest itself?

[Csucs] When Csaba Gombar left and it was incumbent on me to carry out the tasks of president, I initiated the transformation of the Radio so that it would function as a national institution, and would fully carry out its public service task, especially in the area of objective, all-round information. My task was made considerably more difficult by the fact that in 1990 there was no change of regime at the Radio, and thus the people devoted to the previous regime were strengthened. It is not a well-known fact how we probed behind the scenes, how we tried to find points of contact with decisive forces in the Radio, including the star reporters, in order to get along. I am not interested in their past—which is, incidentally, universally known; I am not interested where they are coming from, only where they are going. If they leave their political affiliation outside the gate, they can continue working; they cannot be harassed, moreover, we can fully utilize their expertise. A very long series of experiments were conducted, in which I was able to make use of the past of chief editor Jozsef P. Szabo, who used to be a diplomat, and who is not only an extremely talented and experienced radio personality, but also, on account of his human capabilities and attitude, was a perfect mediator, should direct contact with the decisive elements fail. My only request was to discuss without screaming how we could make the Radio even better. Unfortunately, the people in question did not think that this was possible. At the same time, they expressed their aversion at every turn, also in their programs. No self-respecting management can tolerate such behavior. I tolerated it for more than a year. Now the cup is full. The change of regime must take place.

[Mester] Many people consider your measure to be an act of the government. Are the remaining radio employees supportive of the government?

[Csucs] One can hardly find journalists who are supportive of the government, especially not in the political programs on the Kossuth station which can be regarded as decisive. And anyway, it is no criterion whether someone is supportive of the government. The ethical code is still in force, and I hope the remaining employees will keep to the norms.

[Mester] If it is a change of regime that is taking place in the Radio, as you formulated it, is it not too late for that? Was it worth embarking on it before the election? Some people think that if the government falls, the dismissed employees will return.

[Csucs] It is too late for a change of regime, because it should have been done four years ago. But not to take steps on the pretext that it is too late would not only be a crime against the listeners, but also, we are simply not in the financial position to maintain the current situation. I find it despicable that the budget does not finance the public service tasks, but rather we must rely on subscriptions which are an uncertain source of income. Namely, this forces us to increase our commercial activities, while the rules and regulations stipulated by the government oblige us to carry out public service tasks. But they don't give us any money. What can I do in such a situation? Should I decrease the power of the Kossuth station, so the Hungarians beyond the border could not hear it? Should I cancel the Bartok station, which broadcasts the brunt of cultural and artistic programming? Or the foreign language programs from abroad? Downsizing is the only possible solution, and the State Accounting Office pointed this out to me as early as 1992. And as far as the return of the dismissed is concerned, it is hardly likely that there would be a radio president who would re-hire them in this financial situation, especially the ones who did not keep to the ethical norm.

[Mester] Are you not afraid that the dismissed Radio employees will become martyrs?

[Csucs] I am certain they will. They will make sure that they will get a monument. But it will be a monument carved in ice, and the first spring rays of sunshine will melt them.

Government Decrees on Radio, Television, MTI

94CH0222B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Mar 94 p 5

[Article by S.A.: "Radio, TV, MTI: Special Legal Provisions"]

[Text] The government has promulgated three decrees regarding the implementation of the public employee law. As published in MAGYAR KOZLONY, the decrees contain special provisions to be applied at the Hungarian Radio, the Hungarian Television, and the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency [MTI].

With respect to public employees of Hungarian Radio, the decree states among other things that fixed-term employment relationships established for the purpose of substitution may exceed the five-year period. At the same time, appointments to higher-level management positions and assignments involving leadership positions may be made for a period up to five years.

Insofar as rules of work performance are concerned, the decrees state that additional legal relationships for the performance of work are inconsistent with the legal relationship of public employees if such legal relationship violates or threatens the objectivity and impartiality of information broadcast by Hungarian Radio. (According to experts questioned in this regard, this provision rules out the possibility of, for example, an employee of the Radio acting as the spokesman for one or another political party—editor.) A public employee of the radio must not establish additional legal relationships for the performance of work with other employers except if such relationship does not violate or endanger the appropriate business interests of the Hungarian Radio.

The government decrees take effect on 30 March.

Third Channel Planned for Hungarian Television

94CH0222C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Mar 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The TV May Begin Enterprising; Has the Issue of the Third Channel Been Decided?"]

[Text] NEPSZABADSAG has been informed that as part of a so-called "3000 series decree" (not published in MAGYAR KOZLONY) the government has concurred with the idea that the Hungarian Television establish a business organization for the operation of the planned third television channel.

We have already reported earlier of a plan to make available to Hungarian Television the vacated Channel 58, (which in earlier days carried the programs of Moscow Television). According to information leaked, this frequency would be used by the MTV [Hungarian Television] to broadcast educational programs in the morning hours, and commercial television programs in the afternoons. A corporation—with MTV holding a large proportion of shares—would be established to operate the commercial television, and the cabinet has granted the needed permit at its 3 March session. Some professional and financial investors would also become involved in the corporation, and these would include, for example, Gabor Koltay and Levente Szorenyi.

The financial concerns of the television and the radio will once again be discussed at tomorrow's cabinet meeting. Three weeks ago, at their 3 March meeting, the ministers have already dealt with this subject, but the proposal was rejected at the time. This subject was supposed to be discussed again at their meeting last week, but this did not take place, supposedly because of the trip abroad by its proponent, Gyorgy Schamschula. Media executives cannot count on much money, of course, even though the MTV has asserted a claim for about 7 billion forints in subsidies (based on expenditures to be incurred as a result of the mandatory transition to the SECAM broadcasting system). NEPSZABADSAG was informed that the MTV may hope for a grant of 1 billion forints at most, and those funds should also be used to settle the MTV's 500-million-forint indebtedness to the state.

Defense Expert Views NATO, Russia, Security

WS1304140094 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 16 Apr 94 p 18

[Article by Antoni Z. Kaminski and Lech Kosciuk: "The Polish Wedge; If Policies Vis-a-Vis the West Eliminate Chances in the East, That Means They Are Bad"]

[Text] *Lech Kosciuk is chief expert at the Defense Ministry's Department of Strategic Studies, while Antoni Z. Kaminski, a professor at Warsaw University, used to be a director at the same department. While writing about Poland's security, they are making unpopular arguments, the most important of which is the following: A position based on making claims is the worst way of conducting foreign policy. We do not share the authors' suppositions that Poland's joining NATO would be disadvantageous to the West.*

While making efforts to join NATO, one should remember that Poland is just an element of the European security arrangement. Such a perception of Poland was the foundation for the recent decisions made in Brussels. The collapse of the bipolar system has not resulted in an elimination of dangers. The scale and nature of the dangers have changed, and they have become less clear, but, nevertheless, they continue to exist and to be a challenge for individual countries of the continent, as well as for international institutions. These circumstances make it imperative to maintain a global perspective while thinking about the foundations of European security.

The world order, including the European order, is based on the strength and efficiency of institutions that constitute its foundation, regardless of the fact that those institutions were established in the period of the Cold War. Careless manipulation with institutional structures creates the danger of destabilizing the international order, and, consequently, of destabilizing also the global arrangement of forces. In other words, the disappearance of the bipolar world did not eliminate the need for thinking along the lines of a global arrangement of forces, and also along the lines of a feeling of responsibility for the fate of the world. This has important implications for both our membership in NATO and Russia's place in the European security arrangement.

In the eyes of the West, the problem of Russia is linked to the dangers that are a consequence of that country's huge nuclear potential and numerous nuclear power stations, whose disastrous condition may lead to results that could be similar to those after nuclear weapons are used. It is unacceptable for Russia to give up its cooperation with the West by taking a hostile position and by becoming, for instance, an ally to countries ruled by irresponsible leaders (Iraq, Libya, North Korea) or by involving itself openly on the Serbian side of the Yugoslav conflict. This becomes a global strategic imperative. A development of uncontrolled processes inside Russia may bring about different, although equally disastrous for the world, effects—for instance, as a result of extremist elements seizing control of nuclear weapons. It may also bring about the danger of an uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear technologies and of nuclear weapons themselves. Polish people must be aware of all these problems while developing their relationship with the West.

From the standpoint of the degree of advancement of transformations of the political and economic system, and also from the standpoint of the degree of coming close to the Western world, postcommunist Europe may be divided into four groups: 1) The Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary; 2) The Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Slovak Republic; 3) Russia; 4) Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova.

The first four countries listed are the most advanced in the process of building democratic structures and market economies. With regard to those countries, one can assume that the processes are irreversible and that the countries' institutional integration with the West will be accomplished relatively soon, through which the area of stability on the European Continent will be widened.

The second group of countries listed will also most probably go down the same road, even though the countries' starting point is less advantageous than in the case of the first group. In particular, the countries face a much bigger danger of involving themselves both in domestic and external conflicts. The remaining two groups constitute special cases.

Russia at a Crossroads

Russia continues to be facing the choice of its way of development. In comparison with Ukraine and Belarus, Russia is still more advanced in the process of market transformations. It also has reached a certain level of stabilization and of strengthening its state structures, which cannot be said of the other two countries. It is worth stressing that, with its experienced diplomats, clerical personnel, and various experts in the field of international relations and strategic issues, and also having been a member of the world configuration of forces for hundreds of years now, Russia, the widely accepted successor to the USSR, has been handling its sovereignty much better than the other post-Soviet republics.

Unless Russia falls apart, it will definitely retain the status of a world superpower. The question arises: What will its nature be? Will it be a civilized power, characterized by restraint, or will it be an Eastern despotic country? So far, it can be seen that Russia strives at incorporating the big Slavic republics and also at making the Baltic states dependent on Finland, to say the least.

Russia's protest against Lithuania's joining "Partnership for Peace" is a clear sign of the above. Political destabilization in Ukraine, caused by the state's weakness, economic collapse, or by both factors at the same time, may lead to the Yugoslav scenario repeating itself on a much bigger scale and in a much more strategic part of

Europe, not to mention the fact that nuclear states will be involved in these events. So we are witnessing strife that may lead to a serious change in the arrangement of forces in this part of Europe, and that may also result in major political destabilization and a consequent threat to security.

Russia's turn in the imperial direction being described here is not irreversible. There is an awareness visible in Russian political circles that a reconstruction of the empire and market transformations are two separate and contradictory options. Symptoms of that are visible in responses to the Belarusian affair [not further specified]. It is not the case that the West errs in principle by thinking that it has the power to influence events inside Russia. The influence is not of course determinant, but, in a situation where Russian reformers remain a significant political force, the factor should not be ignored. One can agree with the view that the reformers also want Russia's position as a superpower to be rebuilt, but there is no doubt that they want to achieve this through different means. Leading Russian reformers are aware of a dilemma that exists between implementing imperial goals through political and military means on the one hand, and a continuation of the process of rebuilding the Russian economy, using the free market as foundation, on the other. A strong response by the West, primarily by the United States, may perform a sobering function.

Intentions and Costs

Postcommunist countries undergoing reforms began, naturally, to look for ways of linking themselves to Western political, economic, and defense structures. The countries wanted to gain, first of all, support for the reform process, as well as a minimum degree of protection. So they addressed the EC—currently the European Union [EU]—and also NATO. Those efforts caused a number of serious dilemmas for both of these structures. One of the more popularly debated dilemmas was the issue of a possible widening of the Community, which dominated its meetings in 1991 and 1992.

As a defense structure established in the Cold War period, NATO was suddenly faced with extremely complicated problems of adaptation. The decrease in international tensions led to a reduction—an excessive one, according to some—in defense expenditures. Political pressure is increasing in the United States, aimed at reducing the U.S. military presence in Europe. True enough, NATO did introduce a number of major changes in its functioning: A "New Strategic Concept" was elaborated, the defense system has been reorganized, and, most importantly, an effort was made to open up the alliance to its former enemies. But the issue of accepting new members into NATO is a qualitatively completely different kind of decision. Technical obstacles, which are being considered by NATO member states and which are impediments to widening the organization, require a serious approach.

Trevor Taylor, a British security expert, can see the following obstacles:

—First, a negative impact of the decision to widen NATO on the political situation in Russia.

—Second, a disorganization in the area of NATO's doctrine, structure, and development of forces.

—Third, under conditions of economic recession, tensions would increase in the area of assets that have been excessively reduced to begin with.

—Fourth, even debates on the granting of observer status in NATO to countries of East and Central Europe caused sharp differences of opinion among the alliance's members. If the issue of membership were to be debated, these discrepancies would definitely increase even more. As a result, a weakening of NATO's coherency would follow.

—Fifth, given that countries with unstabilized political and economic structures would become NATO members, one could fear that the alliance would not be able to effectively influence the countries' behavior. Another problem along the lines of the Greek-Turkish one would weaken NATO significantly.

—Sixth, other postcommunist countries with even more troublesome legacies would line up to become NATO members, and that would put in question the credibility of NATO's security guarantees. Finally, along with the withdrawal of Russian troops from East and Central Europe, the military threat was radically reduced, which means that these countries do not need to be NATO members to increase their security level.

Some of the above arguments, especially the first and the last, could be subjected to well-justified criticism. But on one fundamental issue, the arguments remain valid: One cannot weaken the institutional structures on which West Europe's stability is based. Maintenance of the structures' strength and coherency is also in Poland's interest. That is because it is beyond any doubt that acquiring membership in an alliance that has lost its identity and credibility will fail to increase our security to any significant extent.

It was only in January that Poland, which has fought for NATO membership in the most vigorous manner, has attempted to evaluate the costs of its participation in Partnership. It was soon discovered that the necessary funds are lacking, and a conclusion was drawn from that: The West should bear at least part of the expense of our participation. It also turned out that we cannot afford to have more than one company participate in joint maneuvers. That is not serious, given statements by some politicians that Poland's participation in NATO would greatly strengthen its defense capabilities.

So NATO was faced with a fundamental question—how to respond to this situation in a way that could contribute to an increase of European peace and security, while satisfying the needs of the new democracies, while not losing its positive elements at the same time. The maneuvering room is delineated by the following fundamental conditions: involving postcommunist countries in political and military cooperation and providing the European Continent with a minimum degree of security; stabilizing and making permanent political and economic transformations in the area, which make East and Central Europe occupy a special position; preventing of the establishment of new divisions in Europe and not allowing for an uncontrolled collapse of the Russian state. "Partnership for Peace" is exactly NATO's response to these challenges.

Partnership does not result in security guarantees that are provided for by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (allies' obligation to mutual armed assistance in cases of aggression from the outside), but what it does do is create an opportunity for partners to conduct consultations with NATO members, as provided for by Article 4 of the treaty. The partnership formula does not formally discriminate against any European country, but it provides for a de facto diversification, depending on the extent of real involvement of the partner countries in cooperation with NATO, and also depending on the capability of meeting expectations associated with that cooperation. In other words, the Partnership formula creates an opportunity to create a material and functional association of ties that would closely link those countries that have the will and the capabilities to meet NATO's expectations. According to some representatives of the U.S. Administration, the decision on achieving NATO member status will be of a purely formal nature once a certain stage of cooperation has been reached.

Partnership Is Not Bad

Russia adopted an ambiguous position on the initiative (in the end, it decided to join the Partnership on 21 April). On the one hand, there were numerous statements by Russian politicians concerning the country's will to participate in the Partnership, and even concerning a possible joining of NATO in the future, provided it undergoes deep transformations. But, on the other hand, Russia took a negative stand concerning a widening of NATO to include countries of East and Central Europe, and even concerning participation of the republics of the former USSR in the Partnership. At the same time, Russia is making efforts for a widening of military cooperation among the member states of CIS, and to have them join the Collective Defense Treaty signed in Tashkent in May 1992. This means the creation of a new political and military arrangement on the territory of the former USSR, which has far-reaching consequences for European security. The possibility cannot be ruled out that, by playing this double-standard game vis-a-vis the West, the Russian leadership is hoping for a chance to recreate the division of Europe on currently the most advantageous terms, from the standpoint of Russia's imperial interests. But, even given this scenario of events, the Partnership concept is not bad because it enables the West to flexibly adapt itself to the circumstances, while not blocking any options, including those expected by the countries of East and Central Europe.

Even in the case of the Partnership, the maneuvering room for Russia, which uses military instruments of foreign policies, is limited. This has put Russia in a dilemma: to join the Partnership or not?

From Poland's perspective, participation in the Partnership will not be an easy task, taking into account both the financial standpoint and institutional adaptations. A paradox became visible here. As John Roper, a famous expert on international security, has noted, an increase in a country's feeling of security should lead to a decrease in the country's defense expenditures. But, in the case of postcommunist countries making their cooperation with NATO closer, an increase in the feeling of security must be accompanied by costly adaptation measures. It is an unavoidable price for joining West European security structures. Plus, one has to be honest: The rate of our preparations for making cooperation with NATO closer is not at akk impressive.

In the context of the issue of cooperation with NATO, we must, in Polish policies, draw a few fundamental conclusions. So let us stress the fact that seems to be ignored by a majority of participants of debates on the Polish Republic's security policies: Poland is a country of key importance for Europe's future shape and for the future balance of power on the continent. So its geographical location is Poland's asset—that is, if the development of events in Europe facilitates creation of a common political and economic order. It is not the case that we have no impact on these events, but, if the situation develops unfavorably from our standpoint, we will be the first to suffer as a result of a possible European conflict.

Mutual coordination of measures undertaken in the East and the West is a test for the quality of Polish policies in the area of international security. If political activity vis-a-vis the West reduces our chances of implementing our interests in the East, that means that either the strategic concept is mistaken or it simply does not exist. One has a feeling that this is exactly what we are dealing with right now. It can be seen particularly saliently in our relations with Ukraine. Poland, because of its geographic location, must conduct an active policy in all directions.

Establishment of European security on a continentwide basis is in our strategic interest. This implies a need to widen the area of stability and cooperation as far to the East as possible. The "Partnership for Peace" proposal creates precisely such an opportunity. Moreover, in case events in the East take a turn that would be disadvantageous to us, the Partnership creates a chance for gaining the necessary protection against possible dangers.

We for Ourselves

While striving to be integrated with the West, we must show our understanding for the complexity of the circumstances surrounding policies of the countries that make up the West, and also of some international coordinating mechanisms. The West will only be able to meet our expectations if it manages to maintain its coherency and identity. This applies to both the EU and NATO. So Polish people must have a lot of understanding when it comes to resistance from the Western countries on the issue of a too rapid granting of member status to new democracies, and they must overcome the resistance in a skillful and very thought-through manner. It is a fact that the West's position often has particular interests of individual countries hidden behind it, but the West's position also includes some arguments of a general nature that would be hard to dispute. So a strong and integrated West is in our interest, but also a West that would be flexible and open enough to widen the system of its institutions to cover countries that, while striving at making use of the opportunities that participation in these institutions creates, are ready to observe the required rules and to take upon themselves responsibility for the continent's fate.

The scale of the transformations going on in Europe is comparable to those that took place after World Wars I and II. The fact that we are creating this order without having waged a war, in the strictest sense, before that creation is a distinguishing trait of the current situation. Careless political measures can make such a war likely. The establishment of the new order in Europe is taking place under conditions of a high degree of uncertainty that, among other things, is a consequence of a diversification or unclear definition of interests and of perception of problems by the participating parties, as well as of a high risk factor for global and European security.

So, before we ask "What should the West do for us?," let us ask "What can we do for ourselves?" and also "What could we do or propose to our neighbors and to Europe?" In the long run, a position based on making claims, especially in the area of security, is the least efficient method of conducting foreign policy.

Defense Affairs Committee Formed, Chairman Named

WS1304131894 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Ma.S.: "Pawlak Government Currently Proposes: Defense Affairs Committee, Not a Council"]

[Excerpt] The Pawlak Cabinet established the Committee of Defense Affairs of the Council of Ministers [KSORM] on Tuesday [12 March]. The ministers also accepted a bill on managing immovable property left over by the Russian Federation troops. Tuesday was the deadline for the government to take a stand on the demands of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity. The union demands, among other things, that the budget law be amended. However, the Council of Minister first wants to adopt a program of socioeconomic policy for 1994-97.

National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk said after the government session that the president had promised to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal against the already signed budget. What he wants changed is the commitment of the National Defense Ministry to earmark 300 billion zlotys for the purchase of Iryda [Polish aircraft]. Minister Kolodziejczyk believes that maintaining this paragraph of the law with such wording would be a dangerous precedent. He also announced that he would not meet this commitment unless Iryda satisfies Army requirements.

The issue of establishing new defense structures has already been discussed once at a Council of Ministers' session. Toward the end of November, the National Defense Committee [KOK] decided that the National Defense Council [RBN] would be set up as "the supreme state organ in the area of defense." This would call for amending the law on general defense duty and the Small Constitution. The Basic Law envisions the existence of the RBN, but as an advisory organ of the president. Lech Walesa is trying to ensure that the council decisions are binding for everyone, including the government. For the time being, there exists KOK, a structure that coordinates the activities of state authorities in defense issues.

In December, when the Pawlak Cabinet had already dealt with these issues once, it was officially announced that "interministerial agreements still need to be reached." Unofficially, there was speculation that the government "became frightened" of giving all of the powers in defense issues over to the president.

The newly established KSORM is supposed to be a collective, internal organ of the government, with a structure similar to the already existing committees of the Council of Ministers: the Economic and Sociopolitical Committee. The chairman of the committee is the prime minister. During natural calamities and mass catastrophes, the new body is supposed to coordinate all government activities.

Minister Kolodziejczyk evaluated the establishment of KSORM as an opportunity to reform the Army. He added, however, that he had supported a different order: the establishment of the RBN first. Contrary to initial proposals, KSORM does not include National Security Office Secretary Jerzy Milewski. [passage omitted]

Returning Pre-1989 Officials Profiled

PM1404085094 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish 6 Apr 94 pp 3-4

[Article by Elzbieta Graczyk: "It's Our Turn Now"]

[Text] Work on the organization of an apolitical, loyal, and professional civil service corps has continued since the end of 1989. All successive prime ministers, from Mazowiecki to Suchocka, believed that the head of the Council of Ministers Office [URM] should not be involved in any way or degree in the shaping of any personnel policies in the state. However, thus far none of the government teams has made an effort to make any radical moves. During the election campaign, parties belonging to the present government coalition had very little to say about their proposed personnel policy. However, it was possible to predict their appetites when, immediately after the announcement of the election results, the winners let slip a resounding, triumphant cry: "It's our turn now!" And that was heard not only among the so-called grass roots, but also in the ranks of experienced politicians. For example, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz soon demanded that immediate changes be made in the Polish National Bank [NBP] and the Supreme Chamber of Control. Although the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] leader Aleksander Kwasniewski tried to tone down such utterances and persuade people that the alliance wanted to form a government of experts and did not intend to make profound personnel purges, even though it did mean to put an end to the Solidarity tradition of a "buddies' republic," he did not give the impression that he himself was convinced by his arguments. At that time, the peasants kept quiet, but, as soon as the coalition negotiations gave them the prime minister's chair, they began to implement the principle "it's our turn now" quickly and consistently.

The prime minister's first office appointments turned out to be quite significant. He gave Ewa Wachowicz, a student from a farming background and a former Miss Polonia, the post of prime minister's press assistant. During her very first press conference, Miss Wachowicz disclosed with a charming smile that she could say "I love you" in several European languages. Furthermore, the prime minister appointed the Polish People's Republic's [PRL] blue-eyed boy Ireneusz Sekula to the office of head of the Customs and Excise Office, while the post of voivoda of Olsztyn went to Janusz Lorenz, who was introduced there as "currently director of a meat-processing plant and author of a scientific dissertation on the quality of Polish export ham." Needless to say, Lorenz is a member of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. Already during his Sejm preliminary hearing, the URM boss Michal Strak (Prime Minister Pawlak's most trusted colleague and former cabinet director at President Wojciech Jaruzelski's Chancellery Office) asserted that pre-1989 activists would prove to be better stewards to the country than their predecessors, and that the coalition parties would refrain from demanding voivodas' posts for their own members in only 10 voivodships. All announcements made by Strak are extremely important. At one time, personnel decisions were made by the Central Committee, while, after 1989, the role of URM head increased so much (he handles the civil service attached to the prime minister, the government, and all of the state administration) that, after the president and the prime minister, he is practically the third-most-important figure in the state.

The Office of the Council of Ministers employs 600 people directly and 900 in so-called ancillary enterprises. During the 17 months of the so-called system transformation, Tadeusz Mazowiecki dismissed 293 URM employees and appointed 304. On leaving office, Strak's predecessor, Jan Maria Rokita, had prepared a complete draft program of a transformation of the URM structure and organization. The present incumbent has no intention of implementing Rokita's program or even reforming it according to his own concepts. "On assuming office, our new civil servants do not need to memorize room numbers or acquaint themselves with the telephone system. These are people who know very well how to move around the URM."

New appointments to the URM include one secretary of state, six under secretaries, and five directors general. The posts of secretary of state and secretary of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers [KERM] went to Andrzej Zor, a 54-year-old philologist, formerly (1978-82) departmental director at a ministry, later in other high-ranking URM posts, then Polish Republic ambassador to Malaysia. He has had no party allegiance since the dissolution of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR].

The posts of under secretary of state were offered to Kazimierz Korona, a graduate of the Main School of Planning and Statistics [SGPiS], an activist of the agricultural circles movement, a member of the supreme administration of the United Peasant Party [ZSL], an URM official since 1984, a ZSL and Polish Peasant Party [PSL] adviser to deputy prime ministers, and deputy director at the State Treasury Agricultural Property Agency since 1992; and Stanislaw Dobrzanski, a graduate of the Maria Curie-Sklodowska University [UMC], former deputy director of the National Library in Warsaw, subsequently director of the Sugar Refineries Industrial Bank's East Poland Division, and a member of the PSL. The posts of URM under secretary of state and secretary of the Council of Ministers' Sociopolitical Committee went to Grzegorz Rydlewski, a graduate and member of the Institute of Political Sciences and a high-ranking official of the Office for Religious Denominations during the 1980's, since 1990 a member of the Public Initiatives Foundation, and a PZPR member until 1990. He is directly responsible to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Another under secretary of state is Jan Zagajewski, a former employee of the Spolem [food retail] cooperative and later an official at the City Office in Pruszkow. He was URM director general during Pawlak's 33 days [first term of office as prime minister in 1992], and has returned to URM now.

Two more appointees to the office of secretary of state are prime minister Pawlak's advisers Andrzej Wieczorkiewicz and Franciszek Mleczko. The former has no party affiliation and is a professor of economic sciences; the latter, also a nonparty member (but a PZPR member until the party's dissolution), is a sociologist, formerly a lecturer at the Main School of Rural Economy [SGGW] and the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the PZPR Central Committee [KC]. He was deputy director at the Ministry of Culture and the Arts in the years 1974-78. He collaborated with Michal Strak and was author of election forecasts and analyses for the PSL.

The post of URM director general was offered to Andrzej Piwowarczyk, former teacher and later a high-ranking official at the Voivodship Office in Siedlce, who, tragically, died recently in a car accident. Another URM returnee is Jan Guz, a graduate of Leningrad University, an employee of the PZPR Central Committee Planning and Analysis Department and a long-serving adviser to former prime ministers in the 1970's and the 1980's; and Marian Wegorowski, also a long-serving and high-ranking URM official, a PZPR member from 1951 until the party's dissolution, currently of no party affiliation. He now runs the URM personnel movements department. The post of head of the Public Administration Office was won by Marek Ungier, political scientist and activist in the Union of Socialist Polish Youth [ZSMP], and then (from 1974 to 1990) in the PZPR. He was later a partner in a light-clothing business, a member of the Supervisory Board of the ATU Insurance Society, an activist in the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], and an adviser to the SdRP chairman.

The following have returned to active politics (not only as high-ranking officials but also as advisers to the prime minister and the URM boss): Wladyslaw Szymanski, former member of the Council of State and ZSL and PSL expert; Marek Ksiazek, deputy chairman of the Cepelia [Central Office of Folk and Artistic Crafts] cooperative; Tadeusz Materka, retired leader (active since 1952) of the peasant movement, former voivoda of Piotrkow and Rzeszow, former deputy chairman of the Samopomoc Chlopska [Peasant Self-Help] cooperative, and former deputy chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control. He held the office of domestic trade vice minister during and after the martial law period. Finally, Jan Bisztyga, former PZPR Central Committee press spokesman and author of the party's new information policy advising "throwing open the doors to party committees" following the 12th PZPR Congress, previously under secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry and ambassador to Greece. Until his retirement (in 1992), he was active as an adviser to Wojciech Jaruzelski.

There have also been many changes among high- and middle-ranking officials at all ministries. By the end of January, new appointments were made for six secretaries, 37 under secretaries, and eight directors general at 16 ministries and two central administration offices. Here, as at URM, the new appointees are drawn mainly from the "pool" of former PRL officials returning to their previous—or higher—ministerial offices. At the Construction Ministry, the post of secretary was given to Tomasz Lodeczka, until recently chairman of a housing construction cooperative in Bielsko-Biala (SdRP member), and that of secretary to Wojciech Rzepka, who has been associated with that sector since 1978. AT the Ministry of Ownership Transformations, appointments to the post of under secretary went to Jozef Kowalczyk, a journalist writing for CHLOPSKA DROGA [Peasant Way] and ZIELONY SZTANDAR [Green Banner] and head of the ZSL Supreme Committee Press Office, and Andrzej Zebrowski, a lawyer at the Main School of Commerce and chairman of the Profit company.

At the Ministry of National Education [MEN], the posts of under secretary of state were given to the following: Tadeusz Pilch, philosopher and PSL member; Danuta Grabowska, the ministry's schools superintendent in Radom, formerly a PZPR (later SdRP) Sejm deputy; and Kazimierz Dera, director of the MEN Personnel Department from the imposition of martial law until 1990.

Appointments to the post of under secretary of state at the Ministry of Culture and Arts [MKiS] were given to Waclaw Janas, who was MKiS vice minister in the years 1983-90, and Zdzislaw Podkanski, longstanding Rural Youth Union [ZMW] and ZSL activist in voivodship structures. Two new under secretaries of state at the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Economy began their careers at posts with the State Agricultural Farms [PGR]. They are Jerzy Pilarczyk and Ryszard Smolarek. Pilarczyk, who belongs to the SdRP, later represented the PGR Association at the Agency for Agricultural Marketing [ARR] Council; Smolarek, who for many years represented the ZSL in the Sejm, managed his own farm after leaving the PGR.

Jacek Buchacz, a new appointee at the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, was active on the board of the Dairy Cooperatives Association and in the Juventur [student travel agency] until 1986, and then held the post of secretary at the Polish Embassy in Morocco until 1990. New vice ministers at the Justice Ministry are Grzegorz Ciecierski (PSL), formerly an official at the Finance Ministry, and Bohdan Zdziennicki (no party affiliation now), a member of the Bench at the Supreme Administrative Court [NSA] since 1981.

Jerzy Szreter is back at the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, where he has been employed since 1978. As secretary of state, he took part in the Roundtable Talks; still earlier, he worked at the PZPR Central Committee Economic Management Department. Another returnee is Leslaw Nawacki, who was employed at the Labor Ministry until the end of 1991.

Following the successive dismissals of Stefan Kawalec, Marek Borowski, and, recently, even Witold Modzelewski, the Finance Ministry suffers from an unstable personnel situation. In practice, it is currently headed by Henryk Chmielak, director of the Planning Commission 1987-89, later under secretary of state at the Central Planning Administration, and, still later, deputy chairman of the [Government] Committee for Radio and Television Affairs. He describes himself as "an expert with no party affiliation."

Henryk Jasik is new under secretary of state at the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. A chemist by profession, Jasik was employed at the scientific and technical directorate of the intelligence service between 1970 and 1990; later, he held the post of director at Department I—that is, the Intelligence Service—and also worked for the State Protection Office [UOP]. The MSW gains Jerzy Kozminski (transferred from URM) and Stanislaw Szymanski (from a succession of diplomatic posts). CUP gains Jozef Zegar, professor of economics at the Main School of Planning and Statistics, formerly chief editor of WIES WSPOLCZESNA [Contemporary Rural Community], deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers Planning Commission (1986), and a PSL activist.

The new head of the Office for Veterans Affairs is Adam Dobronski, historian of the peasant movement. He owes his appointment to the support his nomination received from veteran soldiers of the People's Army [AL] and the Peasant Battalions [BCh].

A proposal offering the post of chairman of the General Savings Bank-National Bank [PKO-BP] Supervisory Board was extended to Marian Krzak, currently chairman of the Union of Polish Banks [ZBP], former finance minister (1980-82) and PKO-BP chairman (appointed 1988), dismissed by Prime Minister Bielecki in 1991.

Zbigniew Sobotka, PZPR Central Committee member since 1986 and Politburo member since 1988, is to represent the government coalition interests in the president's office.

In addition, a wholesale exchange of heads of the government's local administration structures was carried out until quite recently on a nationwide scale. "We have reached a situation where the personal composition of the voivodas' corps is almost settled. We are a stable and cohesive team," Michal Strak said during a recent meeting with voivodas. Of the total of 49 voivodas, 27 were dismissed from their posts. Strak also added the following remark: "The transfer of power was effected in a pleasant atmosphere, and I was even posing for photographs with the former Lodz voivoda," who is a Christian National Union [ZChN] member. Asked about the new voivodas' party membership profiles, Strak admitted that the PSL took advantage of the changes to a much greater extent than the SSLD. During the aforementioned meeting, voivodas were asked to evaluate a proposed parliamentary bill on the Council of Ministers, which provides for the automatic dismissal of voivodas following each successive change of government unless the new prime minister chooses to extend their "contracts." In Strak's opinion, such contracts will serve to stabilize the administration system and, at the same time, highlight the principle that a voivoda represents the current government in his administrative area.

We note that a pattern of civil servants returning to office according to a specific political key applies not only at URM. Notably, the Ministry of Culture and the Arts—or, more specifically, its head, Minister Dejmek—is eager to spend 20 billion zlotys to sponsor publication of a new periodical devoted to cultural affairs and edited by Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz. The periodical is likely to be a weekly, with a print run of 50,000. As yet, its future chief editor has no blueprint for the periodical's program or the composition of his editorial team. But he has the money: the taxpayers' money.

SLD Sejm Deputies Seek Removal of MON Chief

WS1404114294 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 14 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "Leaving Because of Iryda? SLD Sejm Deputies Want Dismissal of MON Chief"]

[Text] *Roman Nowicki and Stanislaw Janas, Sejm deputies for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], announced during a news conference yesterday that a motion will be prepared to have the chief of the Defense Ministry [MON], Piotr Kolodziejczyk, recalled from his post. According to Nowicki and Janas, the minister humiliates the Sejm and acts against the interests of the Polish defense industry.*

In Nowicki's view, he will have no problem finding 15 members of parliament ready to support such a motion.

The affair began when Sejm deputies made a decision to include a provision in the budget that MON will have to purchase Iryda aircraft costing 300 million zlotys [Z] each.

"I have a copy of a letter addressed to the Mesko plant in which the minister justifies a decrease of orders with a decision by the Sejm Budget Commission regarding the purchase of Iryda," Nowicki displayed a pile of documents. These were confidential expert opinions from which it could be concluded that the Iryda is a good aircraft. Nowicki complained that, in his recent statements, Minister Kolodziejczyk "made fools of the Sejm deputies."

The Sejm deputies also pointed out that, under the "Expenditures" section of the MON budget, a sum of Z400 billion is listed as being devoted to the purchase of 152 passenger cars, 150 terrain-passenger cars, and 10 buses, among other things. "Perhaps the ministers would like to be driven around in Mercedes cars. But they have no right to complain they have no money for equipment," Nowicki concluded.

Through the president, Minister Kolodziejczyk has addressed the Constitutional Tribunal with a question of whether forcing MON to make these kinds of purchases is in accordance with the legal system. He also voiced the reservation that, even if the Tribunal disagrees with him, he will not buy the Iryda aircraft in the version proposed by the Mielec-based plant.

"We want to purchase about 40 pieces, but they must be the kind of equipment that would present combat value. For the moment, Iryda is just a training and educational type of aircraft," said Colonel Wieslaw Rozbicki, MON spokesman, in a determined manner.

General Henryk Mika, the director of MON's department for arms and military equipment supplies, was surprised by the Sejm deputies' accusations. "We are devoting Z120 billion for cars, and these are financial means that the Army itself has come up with. The only Western-made vehicles we have are the 16 Peugeot 405's that were manufactured in Lublin and are being tested now because, in general, we purchase [Polish-made] Polonez cars," he explained to GAZETA WYBORCZA.

According to a high-ranking MON official, the confusion caused by the SLD Sejm deputies is "the communists' revenge for the failure of Zbigniew Siemiatkowski's candidacy for the post of deputy minister in MON."

Christian, Social Democrats Form Alliance

PM1404092694 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 6 Apr 94 p 5

[Interview with Jan Plawnicki, general secretary of the Christian Social Union, by Wieslaw Marnic; place and date not given]

[Text] [Marnic] Christians in alliance with communists? We have not had that before. So what does it mean?

[Plawnicki] I have always believed that GAZETA ROBOTNICZA is a trustworthy and credible newspaper that does not yield easily to fashion or public mood shifts. But you seem to want to make me change this opinion.

[Marnic] Not at all.

[Plawnicki] So why do you use terms that are surely closer to the outlook taken by GAZETA POLSKA rather than GAZETA ROBOTNICZA? After all, to define the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] as postcommunist is to engage in a blatant falsehood. In addition, our alliance involves mostly Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]. Let us then move away from using derogatory terms—although there are some who will not like the idea of an accord between Christians and Social Democrats—and toward specific facts.

On 7 March, we signed an interparty agreement between the Wroclaw SdRP office and our division of the Christian Social Union [UChS] here. Similar agreements were also signed in Lodz and Bialystok.

[Marnic] What are the provisions of these agreements?

[Plawnicki] As regards organizational issues, they will involve mutual contacts, exchange of information, and support. As far as practical operations are concerned, we intend to give support to each other's candidates in the forthcoming local self-government elections.

[Marnic] Does this mean that the UChS will enter the structure of the Democratic Left Alliance?

[Plawnicki] It does. The present left-wing group is different from the previous one in that it is not oriented toward orthodoxy. This change in its nature enables us to find a place for ourselves within the SLD. This is because, fortunately, the left-wing camp is made up of people with a fairly wide spectrum of political outlooks who are brought together by their propublic interest orientation.

[Marnic] I understand that the UChS will take advantage of relying on the highly organized SLD structures, but how will the Left benefit in its turn?

[Plawnicki] It will expand its sphere of influence to include a whole range of people associated with the UChS. You cannot fail to notice that even Pope John Paul II spoke of the grain of good present in the system of real socialism. We do not engage in wholesale condemnations of everything and anything whose roots reach back to the Polish People's Republic. We also have a group of people who enjoy a high degree of authority in the eyes of the public. They can turn out to meet the needs of our society.

[Marnic] I understand that you are referring to the forthcoming local self-government elections?

[Plawnicki] We will run in them within the SLD bloc. We intend to nominate four candidates in Wroclaw and one each in Trzebnica, Olesnica, and Olawa. Our candidates will be such people as Jerzy Janoszka, chairman of the Well-Wishers' Club, and Tadeusz Pluzinski, director of the Value Energy Fund.

[Marnic] Under what election slogans will they fight for their nominations?

[Plawnicki] Tolerance, respect for differences, and antinationalism. We want to fashion a climate of tolerance and acceptance of people who have different views, backgrounds, or traditions. Our fundamental motto is respect for every human person.

[Marnic] And what will your candidates oppose?

[Plawnicki] They will stand against the misuse of Christian ideas for the purpose of sowing hatred and xenophobia, and against selective interpretation of the Holy Father's words. Christianity entails the concept of serving others, not fighting them. Our candidates want to make use of their talents to serve society, and the choice of the SLD as allies is a natural consequence of the fact that, of all political groups, it was the SLD whose program is most society-oriented.

[Marnic] Thank you for talking with us.

Pawlak Invites Unions to Government Meeting

WS1304144194 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by PAD and B.I.W.: "Solidarity 'Omitted' by the Government"]

[Text] Roman Adamczyk, chief of the Prime Minister's Office, forwarded a letter to Solidarity ["S"], in which he stated that, "during its Tuesday [12 April] session, the Council of Ministers will discuss the motions resulting from the negotiations and the talks of government and union experts, and the talks with employees' organizations held so far." Similar letters were sent to the chairpersons of 17 other unions. At the same time, the prime minister invited the chairpersons of the unions to a meeting in the Office of the Council of Ministers that is to be held this afternoon. "S" Head Marian Krzaklewski announced that he will not participate in the meeting; however, the union will send an observer.

On Tuesday, the Presidium of the "S" National Committee [KK], which had a session in Gdansk, waited for the government reply as to how it was going to implement the union demands. KK Press Spokesman Piotr Zak said that "S" will wait for this reply only until the KK starts its session—that is, until this morning. The KK will make a decision concerning the further course of the "S" protest action.

Unofficially, Pawlak's letter was interpreted as an attempt to bypass the deadline, set by "S" for 12 April, for forwarding the reply to the union. The letter does not say that the government has taken a stand on the "S" demands and that it will make a decision; it merely says that it will "discuss the motions." Despite the announcement made toward the end of March that the protocol of the talks between the government and union experts would be discussed at the nearest session of the Council of Ministers (incidentally, the nearest session was held earlier), such an item did not appear on yesterday's agenda of the session of the Council of Ministers. In the Government's Press Office, we were told that "it may be under the 'various issues' item, and the 'various issues' may include various matters of the last moment."

The union spokesman announced that "S" will protest against the new version of the new popiwek [tax on excessive wage increases] law.

The KK Presidium believes that the Sejm "should complete the proceedings against Wojciech Jaruzelski and Czeslaw Kiszczak, so that those responsible for imposing martial law can be judged by both the Constitutional Tribunal and general courts." "S" believes that the Sejm "should also represent the stand of the extraparliamentary opposition on this issue."

The KK also criticized the work of the Selection Committee of the National Investment Fund [NFI]. According to the "S" leadership, most of the candidates for members of the Supervisory Boards of the NFI selected by the committee are people who have their roots in the former party *nomenklatura*. "S" believes that, in the Supervisory Boards, there should be room for delegates of representative unions.

Daily Views Pawlak Statement, Unions' Stands

WS1404103094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Apr 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Bernadeta Waszkielewicz, Piotr Adamowicz, and JBL: "Trade Unions After Meeting With Prime Minister; Pawlak: We Can Live Without Popiwek"]

[Text] "Talks with employers and trade unions suggest that it is possible to maintain the stable situation in the economy without a law on wage controls," said Waldemar Pawlak after yesterday's meeting with 18 trade unions, the Confederation of Polish Employers, and the National Chamber of Commerce. He explained that, as a result of changes in the style of managing enterprises, "the popiwek [tax on excessive wage increases] will be unnecessary." He will submit the conclusions from these talks to the Council of Ministers. "There is a certain risk, but I believe that we are prepared to take this risk because we can count on responsible cooperation on the part of trade unions and managers."

As the prime minister wants it, the government will probably decide not to submit a new popiwek bill to the Sejm. Even though Pawlak did not tell journalists directly that he would not forward the new popiwek bill for the time being, Ewa Spychalska, chairperson of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ], stated that he had admitted that would retreat from this idea. He will not forward this bill to the Sejm for a month, unless some violent wage increases are observed during that time.

According to Pawlak, the road to maintaining a stable economy without controlling wages is "accelerating the work on laws concerning collective agreements (wages would be negotiated in them), legal regulations concerning the status of the Trilateral Committee for Socioeconomic Affairs, including the issue of the representativeness of trade unions, and accelerating the commercialization of companies manufacturing goods for the Polish market." "In the first order, we should commercialize enterprises that are in good financial shape. We will try to implement these processes as fast as possible, so that, in companies that are in a position to increase wages, the founding organs will be able to control these processes efficiently," said the prime minister.

He also stressed that it is important to "maintain the special character of a public company, mainly in the area of services, such as the railroads or post offices." "I am counting on a responsible attitude of trade unions and managers. For the time being, there is no danger of an uncontrolled wage increase. If we take advantage of a frank and open exchange of views, we will be able to go further and introduce solutions that are effective and proven in countries characterized by well-organized cooperation of social partners. The Council of Ministers will discuss the conclusion of our meeting—that one can live without a popiwek as well."

Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, press spokesman of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], stated that, before the consultations in the SLD leadership, he could not comment on the statement by Prime Minister Pawlak. Most of the trade unions were nicely surprised by the prime minister's decision to retreat from the new proposal on wage controls.

OPZZ: A Meeting a Month

Leaving the Office of the Council of Ministers, Spychalska reported that, on 15 April, a meeting would be held on the governmental program of socioeconomic policy for 1994-97. On 14 April, there will be a meeting on the final version of the Labor Code. On 27 April, the government will submit the main points of the reform of social insurance. According to the OPZZ chairperson, the prime minister also assured the trade unions that the labor minister had given up the changes in family allowances—"their size will depend on a given family's income, not on the number of children." "In the middle of each month, consultation meetings, similar to the one held on 13 April, will be held with representatives of trade unions and employers," said the OPZZ head.

Solidarity ["S"]: Prime Minister Speaks About Our Proposal

"I will not beat around the bush and say bluntly that the government has not implemented most of the "S" demands; however, we are satisfied with the prime minister's announcement of departing from the new popiwek law, which is in line with the opinions of experts," Marian Krzaklewski commented on the government's stand on the "S" demands. "We have always thought that wage regulation should be conducted through a system of collective agreements; now, because there exist enterprises of a monopolistic character, which may raise wages by setting higher prices, there should be some kind of control system. It seems that the government will agree to our proposal that, in those enterprises, wages not only be regulated in collective agreements but also be confirmed in the Trilateral Committee. A list of such enterprises should be drawn up by the Antimonopoly Office," stated Piotr Zak, press spokesman of the "S" National Commission [KK].

The KK hoped to receive a reply from the Council of Ministers before the session—the council discussed the "S" demands on Tuesday [12 April]. It did not receive a letter from the prime minister, and it learned about the government's stance from a reporter. Asked after the meeting with trade unions about the "S" demands, the prime minister dodged the question, drawing attention to the fact that it was a meeting with many unions and employers and that the conclusion was different. Stanislaw Alot, KK secretary delegated to yesterday's meeting with the prime minister, stated that the government had actually answered only two demands: that it will depart from the popiwek, and that it will review earlier agreements with "S" over the next two weeks. It opened itself, to a certain extent, to other demands—among other things, the government intends to implement a law on collective agreements, representativeness, and the Trilateral Committee within a month. Alot also wanted an answer to the other demands, but he did not receive it, or, as he says, the answer was unsatisfactory.

The Strikes Are Dying Down

The "S" head announced that the strikes would be continued. "It is not a matter of fighting during the next days or weeks but months. In the fall, price increases will be the most numerous, which will cause an outbreak of strikes," stated Krzaklewski. Earlier statements by "S" leaders suggested that, if the talks with the government failed, one should expect, if not an escalation of protests, at least their continuation. During their session, most KK members were unanimous in saying that the entire action and the talks with the government held so far were not a spectacular success. "The strikes made it possible to regulate the legal status of the Trilateral Committee for Socioeconomic Affairs and the issue of the representativeness of unions," said Maciej Jankowski. The Mazowsze leader, who is said to be the greatest radical, admitted that strikes were dying down and that "today there is not a good atmosphere for strikes." Similar views were expressed by other KK members. "The union has regained a good position in society. The protest should be continued; we should fight for public support. We should keep pointing to the discrepancies between pre-election declarations and the activities of the government coalition. In the fall, price increases will be most numerous; this is when a wave of strikes will surge. Let us use this time to collect strike funds," appealed Jacek Rybicki, of Gdansk. According to "S" Spokesman Piotr Zak, it was finally decided that the protest action would not be discontinued; but, at the same time, no serious strikes should be expected. He announced street demonstrations and "a major propaganda campaign." The fundamental goal is still collecting money for the strike fund.

Most of the "S" decisionmakers believe that a meeting with President Lech Walesa is necessary—skeptics believe that only after Walesa defines his intentions, others that cooperation is needed because both Walesa and the union would like the present postcommunist government to step down. There was not much enthusiasm over the recent proposal by Zbigniew Religa; he proposed that the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] become a political representative of "S" in the Sejm. "Many BBWR activists are antiunion," some said. The KK decided that the Sixth National Congress of "S" delegates would be held between 30 June and 2 July in Mielec.

Spokesman Favors 'Negotiated Solution' for B-H

AU1304205094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] [Announcer] The subject of Romania's stand toward the latest developments in Bosnia was brought up at a news conference held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today. Here is a report from our correspondent Doina Saiciuc.

[Begin Saiciuc recording] The issue of the Bosnian conflict was brought up at this news conference, in the wake of the latest reactions of the North Atlantic Alliance. Journalists asked Spokesman Mircea Geoana to present Romania's comments on the latest developments. Before relaying his statement, I would like to emphasize that another indication of the Romanian diplomacy's initiative in the region is that an agreement has been reached in principle for Bosnia's President Alija Izetbegovic to pay an imminent visit to Bucharest, a visit that the Romanian side is looking forward to with great interest.

As I said before, Mircea Geoana, spokesman of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented on the situation in Bosnia, which reiterated Romania's position.

[Geoana] Everybody knows of the actions undertaken by NATO in Gorazde, following a decision made by the UN secretary general in this respect and in accordance with certain known UN Security Council resolutions. You are familiar with the position promoted by Romania, that the main goal and the only way to solve the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is through the determination of all sides to engage in political dialogue and reach a lasting and substantial negotiated solution to the conflict in that region. It is obvious that the main thing now is to bring all the sides back to the negotiating table and to ensure their cooperation. We are firmly convinced that this is the only possible solution. At the same time, we believe that the existence of certain UN Security Council resolutions and the prevalence of certain realities in the field should not be neglected when analyses are made and decisions are taken by all the sides involved in the conflict. I particularly refer to the Gorazde town area and the latest developments of yesterday and today.

Therefore, we continue firmly to advocate a political and negotiated solution there and we are striving, to the best of our rather modest possibilities, to contribute to such a solution. We are keenly waiting to see and seriously examine the impact of these actions and of the official positions of various important capitals on the progress of the negotiations. [end recording]

Melescanu Views NATO, EU, Yugoslav Conflict

AU1304135194 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 13 Apr 94 p 5

[Andreas Schwarz report: "Romanian Declaration for NATO; Vienna Is Eastern Europe's 'Ally' in European Union"]

[Text] Vienna—Romania is preparing for membership of NATO, albeit in the distant future. Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, who paid a 24-hour visit to Vienna and met with the foreign minister and the chancellor, said in an interview with DIE PRESSE: "In a transitional period, the so-called 'Partnership for Peace' is important for states that want to become NATO members, this is quite certain. One cannot go to bed as a Warsaw Pact member and wake up as a NATO partner."

"Moreover, we know exactly that a larger NATO would be regarded as a threat in certain Russian circles and an important part of the military establishment." This will not be the case with Partnership for Peace, to which Russia has also been invited, Melescanu said. He explicitly stressed that Russia does not have any right whatsoever to veto entries into NATO.

Regarding nationalism in Russia, Melescanu is not dismayed at Vladimir Zhirinovskiy—"he is only a person"—but at the support for this course. This has to be counteracted by strengthening the democratic elements.

Romania itself is striving for entry into the European Union [EU], the foreign minister announced. However, it will only apply when the association agreement with Romania has been ratified by all the EU states, seven of which have not yet done this. "I only tackle things that have reasonably realistic chances of success," Melescanu said. After the present round of accession, the enlargement of the EU will probably be postponed for some time. However, when Austria is in the EU, the Eastern European states will have an "ally in Brussels."

"Violence cannot solve a conflict, it can only influence it in one or another direction. Only negotiations can solve it." In this way, Melescanu commented on the NATO air strikes against Serbian positions in Gorazde. If detente, the abandonment of fighting in favor of negotiations are a consequence, the action can also be regarded as a success, he said.

NATO's threats finally also led to something like a cease-fire in Sarajevo. "Any pressure is important and has to be welcomed, one only has to calculate the consequences."

Have the international community of states made mistakes in dealing with the Yugoslav conflict over the past two years? It is easy to judge afterward, but it was altogether a "period of missed opportunities," the Romanian foreign minister said. He mentioned as an example the proposal that Slovenia and Croatia made to Serbia to form a loose federation, which was rejected by Serbia. Europe tried to do its best, but it always lagged behind developments. Europe's mistake was that it was not quick and determined enough.

Melescanu does not want to say whether an early threat of force would have prevented some developments. It might have also had negative consequences. However, pressure in all forms that are permitted and agreed upon in the UN Charter is one of the most important things to solve a conflict.

At present, he is "moderately optimistic" regarding the Yugoslav conflict"; at any rate, a positive development can be noticed: for example, the Croats' agreement with the Muslims, the negotiations of the Krajina Serbs with Croatia; now it is important "also to involve the Serbs again."

Why did Romania receive Slobodan Milosevic, head of state of an internationally outlawed country, with all honors and in a remarkably cordial way last week? "Let us say: We received him because it is important to talk to everyone," the Romanian minister said to tone this down. However, Franjo Tudjman has been received before—"with all honors," as Melescanu stressed now—and a friendship treaty was concluded with Croatia. Bosnia's Izetbegovic will come next week.

Why is a friendship agreement with the rest of Yugoslavia, which is outlawed by the UN, being developed? "It is being prepared," but it will only come into force after the ending of the UN sanctions, he said.

Official Describes Talks With Iraq on Debt

AU1304132594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Marcel Dinu, secretary of the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry, returned to Bucharest today together with the four Romanian citizens who had been pardoned and freed from prison in Iraq following a request by Romanian President Ion Iliescu.

Talking to our correspondent at Otopeni International Airport, Dinu said that on that occasion he also held talks with Iraqi authorities regarding the payment of the debts owed by Iraq to Romania, which amount to $1.8 to 1.9 billion. The Iraqi party asserted that after the lifting of the [UN] embargo it will look for possible ways to pay its debts.

Talks were also held to establish contacts between Romanian and Iraqi economic companies, while observing the UN Security Council resolutions.

Dinu mentioned to our reporter that there are three other Romanian citizens held in Iraqi prisons, who were arrested for stealing. Diplomatic steps are being made to obtain the reduction of their prison terms, Dinu said, as Iraqi laws do not allow for the annulling of their punishment.

'Catastrophic' Year Predicted for Agriculture

94P20625A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 30 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Tlie Stefan: "A Catastrophic Year is Expected for Romanian Agriculture"]

[Text] Recent data from the National Statistics Commission on the development of the Romanian economy during the month of February and during the first two months of the year are extremely somber on the current situation in agriculture. The year 1994 is expected to be the most dismal year for Romanian agriculture which continues to suffer a real tragedy.

The situation is alarming in the vegetable sector. According to statistical data, as of 21 March, 469,000 hectares still had to be plowed—remember, this is plowing for spring planting!. Only 415,000 hectares had been sown—only 7 percent of the planned area. The situation of the sugarbeets is the most serious one: Only 16,000 hectares, 6 percent of the planned area, have been sown.

Of course, some plowing and sowing has been done since 21 March so the present figure is 10 percent. But the situation in agriculture gets worse with each passing day. This is all the more serious since no one, neither the government nor the Ministry of Agriculture, wants to take this year's special weather conditions into consideration. We are referring, in particular, to the drought which has persisted for more than 100 days throughout the country, which has reduced the water reserves in the soil to zero. It is a very unusual situation which required immediate measures to ensure that the irrigation system would begin operating a month earlier than in previous years. According to our information, if it does not rain more regularly, in the plains, for at least two weeks, the grains, the wheat and the barley will be completely lost and will be dried up.

Last year 2 million hectares of crops were lost because of lack of water. This year, if there is no intervention at the twelfth hour to provide irrigation, it will be even worse. Faced with this state of affairs, the ministers of agriculture plead lack of money but, as spokesmen of the government, they continue to promise that they will provide the necessary funds for irrigation. When? No one knows, as long as the 1994 budget has not been approved yet. At present, only 10 billion lei have been allocated of the 25 billion lei which are absolutely necessary for putting into operation the irrigation systems promised for the first quarter. In television broadcasts, the ministers of agriculture say that this year's drought took them by surprise. However, we do not know the official viewpoint of the government or its intentions. It would be normal, at least, for the government to openly admit: "We do not have any money for irrigation, we are hiring rainmakers."

Meanwhile, it is highly likely that Romania will import not only wheat and sugar this year, like it has been doing up to now, but also the entire range of agricultural products, imports which will fatten up the ticks which are on the backs of the governing officials and ruin Romanian agriculture.

Efforts of 'Grain Mafia' To Destroy Agriculture

94P20633A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 1 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Ion Marin: "What the Grain Mafia is Pursuing"]

[Text] Immediately after the revolution, a strange phenomenon occurred in Romanian agriculture. Wishing to lend credence to the idea that the figures of the Ceausescu era were inflated not one or two times but 10 times, the postrevolutionary government, with its spearhead, the Ministry of Agriculture, began to systematically reduce the areas sown to crops and to resort to massive imports through specialized firms—that is, by means of a network of a few magnates with an influence on some parties in power. The result is well-known. The individuals concerned became rich in defiance of the people, who were subjected to a slow but certain process of starvation.

In 1992, the grain yield was only 10.5 million tons. The technique perfected by the importers is simple: the reduction of the sown area from more than three million hectares to less than two million hectares, under conditions in which sowing was executed only after the best period. At the same time, the merry-go-round of imports was accelerated by an average of $1 billion a year! Wheat was imported—from one West European country, in particular—at $155-160 a ton. When there was no need for wheat—in 1990, for example—the magnates contented themselves with importing fodder, for which $800 million were paid. This is how they arrived at the incredible amount of $3 billion, which was paid by the Romanian state for wheat and fodder in 1990, 1991, and 1992 alone, a sum which represents 80 percent of the total accumulated foreign debt. This debt paid by the Romanians was for commissions of about 5-10 percent, which went into the bottomless pockets of the big importers and their accomplices who governed the country in the respective years. Instead of being held responsible for this pillage and for the deliberate destruction of agriculture, these people still occupy important positions or comfortable seats in Parliament where they continue to boycott agriculture.

A bank director who was recently removed from his position has begun to make statements in various newspapers about the pressure exerted on him to initiate letters of credit for the import of millions of tons of grain, which were not needed, as he maintains now and as was well-known then. However, it seems that no one from the General Parquet or from the government or the Parliament paid any attention to such statements. Instead, there has been a lot of talk about some more or less obvious abuses occurring in some hamlet or some former agricultural production cooperative for which the current leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture is blamed! The fault of the minister is indeed great in the eyes of those who make such claims since the current minister of agriculture, with the support of the prime minister, has categorically refused to take into account the blackmail, exercised by all economic and political means, for continuing the import of grain and further indebting the country's treasury. In addition, he has undertaken to increase the areas sown by more than a million hectares, resulting in grain yields of more than 15.5 million tons in 1993, over 5 million tons more than in the year, which was most profitable for the mafia of importers. In this situation, which was so disastrous for it, the importers' union, which has as its eminence grise the father-in-law of an influential politician who is highly regarded by the voters, was fully mobilized by some trade union organizations and by the lobby in Cotroceni Palace [presidential office] and Victory Palace [headquarters of the government], with a great chance of success. Last year, this trade union of the grain mafia, presenting data collected by American satellites, called upon the Government of Romania to import 1.5 million tons of wheat, but when it realized that it could not force the hand of the government it brought tractors into Victory Square and unleashed a wave of protests by means of a "peasant" trade union composed of city-dwellers. The current mobilization of the grain mafia has been prompted by the obstinacy of the government officials who have decided to double the area sown to sugarbeets, making it impossible to import sugar, which has brought so many millions of dollars of profit to these greedy racketeers. These gentlemen also received support, intentionally or not, for the destruction of the country's agriculture, from the banks, which loaned money, in dribs and drabs, at an exorbitantly high rate of interest. As a result, interest fees represent 60 percent of the cost of a ton of agricultural product and the animal husbandry sector has been destroyed.

What is under discussion now is not the exchange of one team for another but the return to the rudder of agriculture of those who have shown that they have no other interest besides driving agriculture to the ground. In future issues of the newspaper we will provide documents and name the people involved.

Hashish Found in Maramures, Giurgiu Customs Point

94P20636A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 29 Mar 94 pp 1

[Article by Nicolae Militaru and Petre Popa: "Hashish Ring in the Iza Valley"]

[Text] In the middle of last week, antidrug brigades in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands arrested 79 persons during a raid carried out on the border between the three countries. They were carrying large quantities of drugs. The nationality of the traffickers is not known yet but it is known that some 500 vehicles and 1,500 persons were searched and 50 traffickers will be appearing before a Rotterdam court this week.

Seemingly without any connection to the above, some 315 kg of hashish was found concealed in the house of 39 year-old Ioan Covaci in Salistea de Sus, Maramures County, in the Iza valley. Placed in several hundred packages wrapped in tin foil, labeled in Italian, put in packages and then in cloth bags, it was buried in the ground in burlap and polyethylene sacks. A large quantity of empty burlap sacks were ready for use in packing.

In another Maramures locality, Dragomiresti, also in the Iza valley, a machine, made in the Netherlands, for packaging drugs, in bulk form, by vacuum method, was found under the kitchen floor of a countrywoman, M.M. In the same hiding place, a number of plastic and polyethylene bags were found, along with boxes with various foreign inscriptions.

The criminal investigators discovered a whole network of drug traffickers. As of now, it has been established that four more Maramures citizens—from Salistea de Sus, Bogdan Voda, and Baia Mare—are involved in the operation of processing and clandestinely transporting large quantities of hashish which were shipped to the port of Constanta from Lebanon. After a short stop at the Dutch packaging machine in Dragomiresti, the drugs were sent to the Netherlands. They crossed the border in trucks, nestled among crates of apples and bottles of wine. It is believed that about 5,000 kg of hashish was delivered to the Netherlands alone, in three trailer trucks.

The activity of breaking up the ring of traffickers continues, with the arrest of some of the persons implicated.

In the meantime, we have learned that 18.5 kg of heroin was discovered at the Giurgiu customs inspection point on 25 March. It was hidden in the doors and on the floor of a "Scania" 38-HT-657 truck belonging to the Tekin Uluslarasi company from Turkey, which was transporting packages of cot ton thread. The driver, 31 year-old Yesil Erdojan, and his assistant said that they were delivering the "goods" to a citizen in Innsbruck, Austria. Both are being interrogated by the police and the procurator.

UN Post in Tuzla Hit by Serb Artillery Fire

AU1404124494 Paris AFP in English 1235 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Text] Sarajevo, April 14 (AFP)—Serb forces shelled the airport and town of Tuzla in northern Bosnia Thursday after an observation post of a Nordic UN battalion there came under brief artillery attack, a United Nations spokesman said.

Eleven shells fell on the airport mid-morning and three fell on the market in Tuzla, said Major Dacre Holloway with the UN Protection Force. There were no injuries, Halloway said.

He said the Nordic UN troops' observation post was hit with artillery fire early Thursday but gave no other details.

Elsewhere Thursday, Serb forces seized 17 UN peacekeepers guarding a weapons stockpile at Cifluk, northwest of the capital Sarajevo and just inside the heavy weapons exclusion zone around the capital ordered by the UN in February.

Tuzla's airport, closed since the start of the conflict two years ago, was opened under the threat of NATO bombardment of Serb positions only last month, allowing UN relief flights to bring humanitarian aid to hard-hit northern and central Bosnia.

Serb Forces Seize 17 UN Peacekeepers at Cifluk

AU1404094194 Paris AFP in English 0935 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Text] Sarajevo, April 14 (AFP)—Serb forces seized 17 UN peacekeepers Thursday guarding a weapons stockpile at Cifluk, 19 kilometres (12 miles) northwest of Sarajevo, UN Protection Force spokesman Rob Annink said.

The peacekeepers—14 Canadian peacekeeping troops and three UN military observers of unspecified nationality—were taken by the Serbs to a barracks at Ilijas, Annink said.

Cifluk lies just inside the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo ordered by the United Nations in February.

Serb Forces Renew Attack on Sarajevo

AU1304182894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] The Serbian aggressor today again violated the cease-fire agreement in the (?Sarajevo) area.

[Correspondent] Shortly before 1800, the residents of Sarajevo were disturbed by powerful explosions in the area around Vrbanja Most. This was yet another provocative (?attack) by the chetniks, who used small arms and then fired several cumulative [kumulativan] mortar shells at the defense lines from the temporarily occupied territory of Grbavica. This marks the continuations of attacks by the aggressor, who attacked the [word indistinct] areas with mortars from its positions in [word indistinct] Dol [passage indistinct].

UN Soldier Hit by Sniper Fire

AU1404101394 Paris AFP in English 1003 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Text] Sarajevo, April 14 (AFP)—Serb forces seized 17 UN peacekeepers Thursday guarding a weapons stockpile at Cifluk, 19 kilometres (12 miles) northwest of Sarajevo, UN Protection Force spokesman Rob Annink said.

The peacekeepers—14 Canadian peacekeeping troops and three UN military observers of unspecified nationality—were taken by the Serbs to a barracks at Ilijas, Annink said.

Cifluk lies just inside the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo ordered by the United Nations in February.

A French UN soldier was wounded Thursday morning by Serb sniper fire, UN spokesman for Sarajevo Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Pernod said.

He said the soldier was hit while manning an anti-sniper post near Vrbanja bridge on the front line not far from central Sarajevo. He was rushed to hospital for surgery but the spokesman had no details on his condition.

Nineteen French UN troops have been killed so far in ex-Yugoslavia while more than 250 have been injured, the spokesman said.

The incidents came amid heightened tension in the capital and other points in Bosnia after NATO air strikes against Serb attackers besieging the eastern Moslem enclave of Gorazde, a UN-declared safe area.

Sarajevo was rocked Wednesday by two series of explosions that marred a two-month old ceasefire, as Bosnian Serb strongman said he had "cancelled" all accords with the United Nations after the air strikes, saying he could no longer trust the world body.

Earlier Wednesday, Radio Sarajevo said Serb forces continued an offensive against Gorazde, despite an announcement Wednesday by Russian envoy Valeriy Churkin that he had brokered a ceasefire around the enclave.

Serb Helicopters Attack Army on Brcko Front

AU1404150194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Hamiz Deronjic report from Brcko]

[Text] Suffering heavy losses in manpower and unable to break through our defense lines, the aggressor called up his air force for assistance this morning. At 0900 two enemy combat helicopters from the direction of Sumari and (?Jelina Ravan) attacked the defense positions in Vranovaca. After one of them had fired its Maljutka missiles, our antiaircraft defenses opened fire and the enemy helicopters were forced to withdraw. Then, from the direction of (?Jelina Ravan), the chetnik Gazelle helicopters carried out three bombing raids against the defense lines in Boderiste. These air raids only increased the tremendous pressure under which the aggressor's tanks and artillery have been keeping the defense lines of the free Brcko territory.

Almost 1,000 shells of all calibers have so far landed on the area of Omerbegovaca, Vranovaca, and Boderiste alone. On this part of the front the aggressor this morning attempted five tank and infantry breakthroughs. The fighters of the 108th Motorized Brigade and the 108th Infantry Brigade successfully repulsed all these chetnik attempts. The defense lines are unchanged.

During the chetnik attacks on Vranovaca, our artillery men targeted a strong enemy infantry unit near (Miladici) and destroyed the entire unit with pinpoint fire. There were some officers of the aggressor's army among the dozens of killed and wounded chetniks. Unfortunately the Serbian aggressor retaliated against civilian targets. The population has been warned to remain in their shelters by means of the general alarm, as the sudden and intense shelling of the free territory has been under way since early this morning.

Churkin: Serb Offensive in Gorazde Will End

LD1304162994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1556 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—Following his return from the Muslim-held part of Sarajevo this afternoon, Vitaliy Churkin, special Russian envoy for former Yugoslavia, told journalists in Pale that in the context of an initiative for the overcoming of the newly created situation, he had "numerous contacts in Sarajevo with the relevant factors for the entire situation in Bosnia" [as received].

We had very long and strenuous negotiations in the past 48 hours, Churkin stated, stressing that he had traveled between Pale and Sarajevo three times.

Churkin singled out as positive the fact that the region of Gorazde is more peaceful. He added that he has received assurances from the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs that no offensive actions will be continued in this area.

In return the Serbs expect adequate confirmation by the other side, Churkin said. "Apart from that, as regards the continuation of fighting in other areas, what we are going to do and what we can do here in Sarajevo is not to talk about Gorazde alone, but rather about the situation in general," the Russian envoy said.

The ultimate aim of all activities is, he said, a political agreement, and he asssessed that there are no special opportunities for success unless all sides realize that without mutual cooperation and cooperation with the international community there can be no political agreement or normalization of relations in this area.

"When I say normalization, I am thinking here of the lifting of sanctions and the return of Yugoslavia to normal international life," Churkin added. He pointed out that he made to President Karadzic "some specific proposals which include placing the warring sides under control" and that "the implementation of these initiatives on the ground could ensure stability in this area."

Stresses Need for Cooperation

AU1304161594 Paris AFP in English 1558 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Belgrade, April 13 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs and Moslems have agreed to a ceasefire around the Moslem enclave of Gorazde, Russian special envoy Vitaliy Churkin said Wednesday [13 April].

According to the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency, Churkin said after a meeting with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic at his Pale headquarters that the "accord should help lead to a general ceasefire between Moslems and Serbs."

"I received assurances from the Serb and Moslem parties that they did not intend to engage in offensive acts in the Gorazde region, where the situation seems to be calm at the moment," he said.

"I think what we have achieved in Sarajevo and what we hope to achieve in Gorazde must be applied across the whole of Bosnia," he said, declining to say whether an actual ceasefire document had been signed.

Churkin, the personal envoy of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, has been mediating between the Bosnian Serb and Moslem factions and the UN Protection Force since Tuesday [12 April]. He had earlier met Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.

The latest crisis in Bosnia, sparked by a Bosnian Serb offensive on Gorazde, was heightened at the weekend when North Atlantic Treaty Organization aircraft launched two air strikes against the besieging forces.

Churkin added: "All the parties to the conflict must understand that political accords about Gorazde cannot be implemented without their cooperation with the international community and among themselves."

Says Situation 'Better'

LD1304200794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1933 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian president's special envoy, said in Belgrade this evening that he received assurances from representatives of the Srpska republic in Pale today that they will not take any military actions against Gorazde, provided that the Muslims do not force them to do so.

Churkin described the newly created situation around Gorazde as "slightly better," but, as he said, it is still very dangerous. "Now is the moment to make decisions on which course the Bosnian peace process should follow—toward peace or war," he said.

Speaking about his talks in Pale, Churkin said that the Bosnian Serbs do not pose a threat to the international community.

The Russian envoy told journalists that he presented to Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic and then Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic some ideas and initiatives about the possible continuation of peace talks on Bosnia. Churkin did not specify which initiatives this referred to, but said that he would wait in Belgrade for Karadzic's and Milosevic's reply.

Serbs Advancing in Gorazde Area

AU1404112294

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1000 GMT on 14 April carries in its regular 21-minute newscast two reports updating the fighting in the republic.

Gorazde correspondent Mustafa Kurtovic reports on the dramatic situation in the town and says that "the Gorazde war drama continues. The chetniks are (?advancing) from all directions toward the defenseless people on the free territory. Their activities are particularly fierce from the direction of Kozara, Nekop, Ustipraca, and the Praca River valley. The situation in the town is extremely dramatic. Women and children are exposed to terrible suffering. There is no longer any space for the injured in the field hospital. The chetnik hordes are advancing mercilessly toward the town center. We have just received information that [words indistinct]. (?Under the leadership) of the well-known criminal Dragan Kuravac, alias Draga, they are setting out from the direction of [name indistinct] and are trying to kill as many Muslims as possible in this area. These (?notorious) butchers have been on all the fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and have been dominant factors in genocide against the innocent Muslim people. The latest information from the front says that Karadzic's [word indistinct] are concentrating in the Praca River valley and in the area of Ustipraca, from where they will probably launch a fierce attack on the town center. As we report this, large-caliber shells are destroying the Gorazde commune."

Hamid Deronjic reports from Brcko on the situation in the area and says that "this morning at 0450 the aggressor intensified the shelling of our positions on Omerbegovaca, Vranovaca, and Bodriste. At the same time, movements of chetnik units, the so-called Panthers, was sighted. At 0630, the enemy, using all available weapons, launched a tank and infantry attack. The chetnik attack was repelled, but the fighting is still in progress."

Attack Intensifies

AU1404145794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Report by Enes Musovic from Gorazde]

[Text] Continuing their fierce offensive on Gorazde, the chetniks have since morning been launching extremely heavy combined artillery and infantry attacks on (Borovo) from the direction of Ustipraca, and on the right bank of the Drina River from the direction of Cajnice. The aggressor has deployed very strong forces, reinforced with newly arrived units from the Uzice Corps, the Herzegovina Corps, and the Sarajevo-Mt. Romanija Corps, and special units from Nis, which are equipped with the most state-of-the-art weapons and the most lethal ones, too.

The information from these areas indicates that extremely heavy fighting is under way. The chetnik attacks on these defense lines are continuing. The aggressor is pounding every inch of these areas with mortars of the heaviest caliber. The fighters of the Eastern Bosnia Operative Group of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the unrelenting defenders of Gorazde, are withholding all the attacks by these insane killers [word indistinct] to enter Gorazde as soon as possible.

There is total chaos in the clinic and the Gorazde war hospital. Screams, cries, and the wailing of children. Several people have been killed today by shells that have landed on the town. The exact number is still unknown, but the deaths of three children and two women have been confirmed. Dozens of civilians have also been wounded, three of them children and one woman very seriously.

The chetniks are shelling the surrounding villages, but we have no information about the casualties from these areas. During the day the aggressor has also intensified attacks on all the other defense lines. The chetniks are simultaneously reinforcing their forces, and concentrating them from the direction of Foca, (Medici), and the Praca River valley .

The general alarm has been in force in Gorazde since this morning owing to the shelling of the residential areas in the region. The Gorazde defenders are putting up strong resistance to the aggressor despite the inadequacy of their weapons.

Civilians Massacred

AU1404093194

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 13 April carries in its regular 10-minute newscast three reports on the continued fighting in the republic.

Gorazde correspondent Enes Musovic reports that "the chetniks are still at the access points to Gorazde. They have fiercely begun the 17th day of their offensive on Gorazde by firing all available weapons on residential areas and defense lines. Last night and overnight, the situation was particularly dramatic in the village of Vitkovici. Attempts to kill the local population—women, children, and old people—continue this morning. The chetniks are shelling the population of (?Basnjak), Vinarici, and [name indistinct]. In the course of their butchering, fascist rampage, the chetniks yesterday set ablaze the villages of Kucine and Zmijuki and massacred the women and children. We have no information on the number of slaughtered and imprisoned. The number of villages that have been burned in this offensive alone has climbed to 30, while casualties and refugees amount to several thousand."

Mirza Sadikovic, correspondent from Bihac, says that "Karadzic's terrorists overnight continued to attack the Bihac commune. Buzim, (?Plavas), [name indistinct], and other villages in the area continue to be the target of artillery attacks. The aggressor also fired at the positions of the defenders on this part of the Bosanksa Krupa front and on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau and Grabez. Several times the chetniks attempted infantry breakthroughs in these areas, but they were decisively repelled. The members of the paramilitary forces of the Kladusa traitors also continued their activity. They attacked in the areas of Todorovo, Pecingrad, Skokovi, and [name indistinct] with chetnik [word indistinct] and artillery support. Overnight, the chetniks also shelled the Bihac and Cazin areas [words indistinct]."

Olovo correspondent Amira Salibasic reports on an extremely poor line and says that "the night was somewhat calmer on the Olovo front. However, the defense lines are still the target of destructive howitzer, mortar, and tank shells."

Muslims Launch Attacks

LD1404103794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0742 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Text] Cajnice, 14 Apr (TANJUG)—Early this morning, Muslim forces launched fresh offensive actions on the Gorazde battlefront, and according to a communique issued by the command of the Herzegovina corps, the fiercest attacks on Serb positions are coming from Gradina and Jartiste, five kilometers from Gorazde on the left bank of the Drina river.

Infantry attacks are being supported by artillery fire from the very center of the town next to the facilities with Red Cross and UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] markings. Fighting is in progress along the entire frontline on the right bank of the Drina river.

Chaos has descended on all bridges in the town. Strong Muslim forces are crossing to the right bank of the Drina, while the population is hurrying to cross to the other bank in fear of a general disarray within the Muslim troops and a counterattack by the Serb army as happened several days ago. Not even the strong police force that was deployed in Gorazde for this eventuality can secure order in the town.

Shooting can be heard in Gorazde itself this morning. It is presumed that the Muslim police are shooting at deserters who did not heed the mobilization call ups.

There are no details about possible casualties on either side in today's fighting.

The command of the Herzegovina corps links such behavior by the Gorazde Muslims with the increase in the number of NATO flights over the Herzegovina corps positions. These two things have already become a rule on the Gorazde battlefront, Serb military sources say.

Serbs Report Muslim Attacks

LD1304143194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1306 GMT 13 Apr 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Bratunac, April 13 (TANJUG)—Moslem forces from Gorazde on Wednesday continued artillery and infantry attacks on Bosnian Serb Army positions, the military sources of the army of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) have said.

The U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) commander for Bosnia, British General Michael Rose, on Tuesday said that the Gorazde Moslems are continuing unprovoked attacks on the Bosnian Serb army.

U.S. NATO jets on April 10-11 bombed Bosnian Serb positions near Gorazde, a U.N.-designated safe area which should have been demilitarized.

Instead, this Moslem enclave served as the startingpoint for a 10,000-strong Moslem offensive on Serb territories in late March.

At the same time, in northern Bosnia seven civilians were on Wednesday wounded seriously and four only slightly in a Moslem mortar attack on the city of Doboj, the Bosnian Serb military sources said.

The Moslems mounted artillery and mortar attacks on the Bosnian Serb army in the region of Mount Ozren, close to Gradiska, Orasje and Novigrad (northern Bosnia), Srbobran and Olovo (central Bosnia), Bihac (western Bosnia) and in the region of Mt. Majevica (northeast Bosnia).

In the Sarajevo area, the Bosnian Serb army repelled a strong Moslem infantry attack, while infantry fire was opened from the Moslem-controlled part of Sarajevo on the Serb parts of the city, it is said.

All these attacks are a part of a Moslem offensive on almost all parts of RS with the aim of seizing as much as possible territories before a final political solution is reached.

Muslims Attack Serb Civilian Settlements

LD1404020494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2339 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Doboj, April 13 (TANJUG)—Moslem forces on Wednesday continued attacks on Serb defence positions and settlements on all parts of the front in the region of Doboj in the north of the Serb republic (S.R.) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian Serb army sources said.

The command of the first Krajina corps of the S.R. army said on Wednesday evening that Serb defenders in the area of Teslic some 20 kilometres south-west of Doboj had repulsed an attack there and forced the enemy troops to return to their earlier positions.

The Moslems continued to bring in fresh troops from the direction of Zenica and deploy them close to Serb positions in the southern and south-eastern part of the Teslic front, the command said.

After daily defeats and major losses in manpower and weaponry along all lines of contact in the area of Ozren and Vozuca, Moslem fighters vented their anger by opening infantry and artillery fire on Serb civilian settlements.

Apart from major damage, there were no civilian casualties, the S.R. army command said.

Karadzic: U.S. Now 'Warring Faction'

LD1304183094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1753 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—"We are ready for a peace process but we are not ready to accept as negotiators those who ordered the bombing of the Serb positions," Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic said ahead of talks with David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the conference on Yugoslavia. He stressed that the Serb side would choose who will be the mediators in peace negotiations.

"The European Union was completely pushed out of the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict after Washington launched its diplomatic initiative," Karadzic. He added that now "a new crisis has been created in which the United States can be proclaimed a warring faction."

"This may be the moment for the European Union to return to the political scene in search of solutions to the current conflicts in Bosnia,". the Srpska republic president said.

Seselj: NATO Has Sided With Muslims

LD1304171194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1611 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—Following his tour yesterday of the Bosnian Serb Army positions on the Gorazde battlefront and areas devastated by NATO air strikes, Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, met with Serb President Radovan Karadzic in Pale this afternoon.

Following that meeting, Seselj told journalists that NATO air strikes against Serb positions have greatly complicated the situation on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the air strikes against Serb positions mean NATO has sided with the Muslims.

The leader of the Serbian Radical Party added that this made NATO one of the warring sides, and as a result, it will have to bear all the consequences. The United Nations, by siding with the Muslims, has also lost its elementary objectivity.

"They can no longer be mediators in this conflict. In this way they have lost a lot—not the Serbs. The morale of the Serb fighters, in my opinion, has never been better than now," Seselj stressed.

He added these air strikes have shown the war cannot be won from the air and that the Serbs cannot be defeated in this way.

Karadzic Protests Bombings to Butrus-Ghali

LD1304105294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0942 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic expressed the hope today that "a positive turn in UN behavior is still possible," if bombing and other enemy acts against the Serbs stop immediately.

"If this does not take place there is not a nation in the world that will accept the presence of UN forces on its territory," Karadzic said in a letter sent to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali.

"After this bombing, which can only be explained as involvement in the civil war on the Muslim side, our relations cannot be the same as before," the letter sent after NATO's second air attack on Serb positions near Gorazde says.

Reminding Butrus-Ghali that he himself said on one occasion that the "safe areas" were Muslim army strongholds, Karadzic cites the international law on war, according to which "safe areas" should be demilitarized and in which only the armed presence of a third side, in this case UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], is allowed.

"Muslims are constantly killing us from their 'safe areas', protected by your soldiers, and they have launched a major offensive from Gorazde against the Serbs," Karadzic stresses.

He stresses that UNPROFOR has placed itself completely on the Muslim side and bombed Serb civilian and military targets at a time when the Serbs are offering a cease-fire and the Muslim side is rejecting this.

Karadzic says that there have been many irregularities in UNPROFOR's behavior in the two years of war. Its members have engaged in illegal trading, they have smuggled arms and ammunition to the Muslims, and they have openly given them military assistance in terms of reconnaissance and other actions.

Despite this, the attitude of the Serbs toward the UN authorities has been exceptional during this entire time, Karadzic says, adding: "There have not been any serious incidents, while the other side has killed dozens of your soldiers."

"The most recent UNPROFOR command in Bosnia-Herzegovina has utterly damaged these relations, while its bombing has destroyed the last remnants of respect for your armed forces here," Karadzic stresses.

"You will understand that we can no longer cooperate with this command of yours that ordered the bombings. You will also understand our greater caution regarding the movement of members of UNPROFOR and the equipment being transported by them. All the agreements and good relations until now, which arose out of trust, have been wiped out, and we must monitor the behavior of UNPROFOR as a potential hostile force."

"I hope, Your Excellency, that a positive turnabout in the behavior of the United Nations is still possible. Of course, this implies that the bombings and other hostile acts against the Serbs must stop immediately," Karadzic concludes in his letter to Butrus-Ghali.

U.S. Officials Said Planning Fresh Attacks

LD1304152094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1459 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Belgrade, April 13 (TANJUG)—Following a Gorazde attack, NATO had already made plans to attack Bosnian Serb command posts, bridges on the Drina (eastern Bosnia), supply routes and even Pale, the administrative centre of the Bosnian Serb republic (S.R.), said Obrad Kesic, an expert on Balkan policy, who is close to Washington circles.

Speaking for the Belgrade evening paper VECERNJE NOVOSTI on Wednesday, Kesic said that a very powerful group of anti-Serb inclined Washington officials, having realized that Washington's peace initiative for Bosnia-Herzegovina had collapsed and fearing the reaction of the public opinion and media, were plotting to continue the aggression against the Bosnian Serbs.

He said that the group, which had already made plans of attacks on Bosnian Serbs, was headed by Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security advisor, and added that it was especially influenced by Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

Kesic said that the world power wielders had gone so far now that they had to launch airstrikes to prove their effectiveness. They were now, however, trying to find a way out of the horrible situation they had created themselves, knowing that if they backed up now the media would tear them apart. Kesic said that a continued aggression against the Serbs was very likely, which is supported by the fact that plans to that effect had already been made.

The bombardment of Bosnian Serb positions around Gorazde is a hot issue in Washington because the U.S. public initially backs U.S. military actions, but as soon as problems arise, it turns to fierce criticisms, Kesic said in conclusion.

U.N.-sponsored American warplanes within 24 hours (on Sunday and Monday) launched two air raids on Bosnian Serb positions around Gorazde (a Moslem enclave in eastern Bosnia), just as the Serb forces were about to crush a Moslem offensive, launched from Gorazde, a U.N.-designated "safe area", which should have been demilitarized back in 1993.

The anti-Serb lobby in Washington is preparing fresh attacks on the Bosnian Serb republic because it has realized that, after the failure of the U.S. peace initiative, Russia would become more engaged in helping settle the Yugoslav crisis and Europe would urge that the peace initiative for the former Yugoslavia be returned to Geneva.

Krajisnik Refuses To Talk to Rose

LD1304205294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2035 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Belgrade, April 13 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb Assembly President Momcilo Krajisnik said on Wednesday that Bosnian Serbs would leave the doors open to talks, but not with U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gen. Michael Rose, and others who have abused their position.

"We are particulary angry at Mr. Rose because we believe that he played an emperor and called the NATO pact without any cause. Why didn't he call NATO when Moslem shelled Serb positions on Tuesday," Krajisnik told Belgrade's television network Politika.

"In any case, Mr. Rose has ended his role in our battlefield and he must be removed from these regions," Krajisnik said.

NATO-assigned U.S. warplanes on Sunday and Monday bombed Serb positions around the Moslem enclave of Gorazde after Serbs crushed a Moslem offensive begun from this U.N.-protected area in late March.

Gen. Rose requested the NATO air strikes allegedly to protect the U.N. peace troops in Gorazde, although there were only five U.N. observers and seven British special SAS troops there, who guided the NATO planes to Serb positions.

The Bosnian Serb authorities suspended relations with the UNPROFOR, including the civilian sector, after the first NATO air strike on Sunday, assessing that the U.N. peace troops had openly sided with Bosnian Moslems.

Krajisnik also said that the Serb side was doing its best to answer the NATO attacks.

"When the NATO pact bombs us that is one evil, but it is a double evil if we attack NATO and if we answer (its attacks)," Krajisnik said, assessing that the bombing had brought harm to the Serb people, but that its effects had remained inside the borders within which it pays to be patient in the interest of peace.

"If we openly started resisting the NATO pact, downing their planes, and this will probably follow if they try to continue attacks on Serb positions, then there will be neither peace nor delimitation and many plans would fail that way," Krajisnik said.

Turkish Ambassador Views Deployment of Troops

AU1404160494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Text] The Republic of Turkey is the first country to open an embassy in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At today's modest ceremony, Sukru Tufan, Turkish ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, unveiled the sign on the embassy building, thus officially opening the embassy and marking the beginning of its work.

Ambassador Tufan spoke about the friendly attitude of his country toward Bosnia-Herzegovina and the insistence of Ankara on the implementation of all the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina. By sending in its armed forces, Turkey will be directly participating in the establishment of peace in our country. It is obliged to do so by both the deep roots and the links between our cultures and traditions. Thus the link between these two friendly and close countries is natural.

Turkey will continue to (rally) all the international forces in order to reach a just settlement to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible, Ambassador Tufan said.

Another ceremony will be held this afternoon to mark the opening of the Turkish embassy in Sarajevo.

Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, Cochairmen Discuss Events

AU1304164194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, arrived in Sarajevo today. They held talks with President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic in the presidency building.

Addressing correspondents after the talks, President Izetbegovic said the main topics touched upon were Gorazde, Sarajevo, Mostar, the possibilities for a cease-fire, and the continuation of the peace process. We presented our well-known stands, President Izetbegovic said. This implies the withdrawal of the (?enemy) forces to the positions held before 30 March. Only then could we return to the negotiating table. We accept the cessation of all military activities for a limited period of time. This would create conditions for the continuation of negotiations, President Izetbegovic said.

Lord Owen told correspondents that most of the time was spent discussing Gorazde. He also stressed that he was interested in changes in Sarajevo, where there is no more shelling. However, this is still a closed city, Lord Owen stressed. We are going to Pale from here. We will try to find more understanding there for the issues that we are discussing. We are here to try to put the peace process on the right track, Lord Owen said at end of the news conference.

Silajdzic: 'Half-Hearted' Raids Encouraged Serbs

AU1304210794 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2024 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Robert Hochner; Silajdzic in Sarajevo, Hochner in Vienna—live; Silajdzic statements in English with simultaneous German translation]

[Text] [Hochner] In the studio in Sarajevo I now welcome Haris Silajdzic, the prime minister of Bosnia. Good evening, Mr. Prime Minister.

[Silajdzic] Yes, hello.

[Hochner] Mr. Prime Minister, over the past hours we have heard reports that shooting has broken out in Sarajevo again. Do you fear that the cease-fire, which is not even two months old, may crumble in your capital?

[Silajdzic] Yes, for the first time in a month we have had shooting again, 10 to 12 shells came into Sarajevo. Of course, this is something that worries us very much, but we have expected it after the weak, limited UN warning to the Serbs, the aggressors, in Gorazde. In my view, they were encouraged by the half-hearted UN mission in Gorazde, a mission that was also delayed, because for 15 days people were being killed and attacked there, and when the UN and NATO finally intervened, this was too limited really to give them a clear message.

[Hochner] What is the situation like in Gorazde today, as far as you know? Is the town in danger of being taken by the Serbs?

[Silajdzic] Of course, there is always such a danger. As you know, we do not have any weapons, we do not have any ammunition, and the people in Gorazde.... [sentence incomplete as heard] About 200 people have died since the beginning of the attacks; 720 people have been injured, some of them are in danger of losing their lives, of course. The situation is not good at all. As I said, I think that the Serbs feel encouraged by all that they have been able to achieve with the international community. I do not think that this course of action was productive for the peace process, because the warning was not strong enough.

[Hochner] Russia's envoy to Bosnia, Churkin, said this evening that the Serbs have promised him to agree to a cease-fire. Do you know anything about this agreement, and do you believe that such a cease-fire can be achieved in your country through Russian mediation?

[Silajdzic] Permit me to say here that we are—at least I am—greatly frustrated by this very late Russian initiative, which is coming now toward the end to set a diplomatic sign. Where were they 15 days ago, or seven days ago, or just three days ago, when people were dying like flies and the Serbs were shelling not only civilians but also attacking UN troops?

We say that it was a mistake to carry out these air raids. [German sentence as heard] It was said that the Russians were not consulted. I think it was a grave mistake to let them take all these diplomatic steps whenever they want to. I think one should adopt a clear position and those who committed this crime should be punished. We are now practically the hostages of a geopolitical situation, in which one has to consult the Russians regarding all details. People are being killed—and the attackers should be punished for that. A withdrawal must take place, and as long as such a withdrawal does not take place, we will not hold talks. If they withdraw behind the line from where the attack started, then the peace process may continue.

Let me add one thing, they are now holding 58 UNPROFOR observers hostage. They have stopped all the humanitarian convoys. That behavior belongs to the Stone Age. In the end, we will probably have to talk to them, make concessions to them, go to Geneva again or somewhere else, where speeches are made then about how the Serbs became victims because of the UN and NATO troops. I believe that this farce should stop. They are fascist criminals and they must be punished.

[Hochner] Mr. Prime Minister, thank you very much for this interview. Good evening to Sarajevo.

Silajdzic Views U.S., Russian Mediation

AU1304130694 Split NEDELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Apr 94 pp 4,5

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Zdravka Soldic; place and date not given: "It Has Not Been Agreed That Zubak Will Be the Head of the Federation!"]

[Text] In Sarajevo, Mr. Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is mentioned in the context of being the future president of the federation in which the Bosniak-Muslims and Croats will make up the majority. Silajdzic is also interesting as a protagonist of the Washington agreement, while we were particularly interested in the attitude of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina toward the Serbian issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its settlement, as well as toward the question whether the new Yugoslavia that has been much talked about in the recent days is possible.

In Sarajevo, Silajdzic is considered to be a politician inclined to the West, although he studied theology in Libya. He is esteemed by the more moderate Sarajevans, but he does not enjoy the support of the Islamic community.

[Soldic] Mr. Silajdzic, since the Constitution of the federation was signed in Washington, the name of Kresimir Zubak, chairman of the presidential council of Herceg-Bosna, is being mentioned as that of a candidate for the new president of the Bosnian-Croatian federation. It is claimed that was agreed in Washington. However, in Sarajevo, I hear that it is you who is expected to be the president of the federation.

The Media Have Brought About a Lot of Evil

[Silajdzic] Who will be the president of the federation was not agreed in Washington. What was agreed is to be found in the text of the Constitution. There were discussions on that topic, but no agreements. On this occasion I have to say that the media are heating up the situation unnecessarily, and that is not good. The media have already brought about a lot of evil, and as though they cannot get enough, they seem to be craving for some more victims. Nothing has been agreed, and if they do not believe this, let them ask the representatives of the Croatian people, and they will confirm that. If the issue had been agreed upon, I would have said so.

[Soldic] According to the new Constitution, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina continues its work in the same team, while it is the president and the vice-president of the federation who will be elected. Does that presuppose the parallelism of administration? Does the Constitution clearly say what the particular authorities of those two bodies are? How are those two bodies going to function?

[Silajdzic] The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains. The federation with the Bosniak and Croatian majority is a single federal unit. The parallelism of administration is inevitable. We could not leave the federation without authorizations that are quite necessary. However, if there is no good will, everything that has been written, everything that has been established in detail, for instance, that there are no parallelisms, nothing will be implemented. We wanted to agree because we wanted that, rather than because somebody forced us to agree. Other factors helped us to articulate the will expressed, to surmount difficulties in very difficult conditions. We are certainly most thankful and indebted to the United States for all that.

[Soldic] REUTER has reported that President Izetbegovic is expected to resign within the next month.

[Silajdzic] I do not know whether REUTER has reported, and I also do not know whether Izetbegovic intends to resign, so the best thing would be to ask him personally.

[Soldic] The president of the Presidency, Mr. Izetbegovic, has been reelected as chairman of the Party of Democratic Action. Can we take that fact as an indicator that Izetbegovic still intends to relinquish his presidential office to somebody else?

[Silajdzic] The president has taken up the chairmanship of the party again, and as for his staying in or leaving the office of the president of the Presidency, as I have already pointed out, you should ask him. I am not familiar with that.

[Soldic] The elections for the federation bodies, as well as the general elections on the level of cantons, have been announced to take place in six months. How do you intend to conduct the elections when it is well-known that a large part of the population has been displaced, while many people are abroad as refugees?

[Silajdzic] The first task, the most difficult and basic one, is to ensure the return of the refugees to their homes. That is the basic precondition for everything. We shall work on that. I do not know how successful we shall be in it. Again, everything depends on good will. One must have a lot of patience and understanding for the people who really suffered so much. The level of organization must be very high, everything must be planned and controlled. The people are quite irritable, one will have to take care not to provoke new clashes. All of them have awful experiences, wounds that only time will heal.

[Soldic] If the refugees and the displaced do not return to their homes in the next six months, will that obstruct the elections?

[Silajdzic] Look, we do not know what will happen in the next six months. We shall be making efforts to ensure the return of as many refugees as possible to their homes. I do not consider myself to be an expert in the field, but I think that we shall not be able to have all the refugees back in their homes. Still, I think it is necessary to find a solution, to organize the civil authorities there, because the refugees will not be able to return to their homes if the local authorities are not functioning there.

Criminals Will Not Be Forgiven

[Soldic] At the assembly there was much talk about war crimes having been committed by both parties. How do you comment on the statement by Nijaz Durakovic: "In order to preserve a marriage of interest, witnesses and a good deal of wedding guests have to be replaced"?

[Silajdzic] I am not accustomed to commenting on other people's statements. You should ask Durakovic what he meant by that.

[Soldic] What do you think about war crimes that both sides committed in the conflict? Is that question going to be discussed particularly, or has it been made ad acta by the agreement on the federation, and forgotten?

[Silajdzic] My attitude, the attitude of this government, is that war criminals must not be forgiven. There must be no dilemmas about that issue, nor does anybody have a right to pardon any of them.

[Soldic] In this particular case, will it be the international institutions that will determine what is a crime and what is not?

[Silajdzic] I am not a judge. The international institutions will certainly be involved, though. Nobody has a right to pardon a crime.

[Soldic] President Tudjman recently talked about the accountability that the Croatian and Muslim sides share for the conflict. The president expressed himself in percentages, saying that the responsibility of the Croatian side for the breakout of the conflict amounts to 30 percent, while the Muslim share amounts to 70 percent. Do you agree with President Tudjman's estimate?

[Silajdzic] I think that one cannot speak about that in such a way. We deal here with the relations among the living people, and there is no place there for mathematics. Those whose job will be to determine the accountability for the conflict, will estimate that. However, I think that even now everything is clear, and if somebody still has any doubts about what happened, he or she should ask the international community.

[Soldic] Why did it take so much time, or precisely a year and a half, for the agreement to be signed as late as now, as if nothing had happened? Could the course of events have been avoided?

[Silajdzic] It could not have been avoided. Because, for love and peace two parties are needed, while for a conflict a single one will do. It was about an option that involved quite definite plans. It is known who triggered the conflict and where. So, everything is clear.

[Soldic] Who triggered the conflict and where?

[Silajdzic] I believe that is clear to anybody who wants to know. Unfortunately, those people succeeded in generating such an unnatural conflict. Why do I say unnatural? Because the Bosniaks and Croats lived for centuries not only in peace, but also in real friendship. Therefore, whose interest was supposed to be satisfied by that conflict? What was the goal? The goal was the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From this fact you can draw all other conclusions.

[Soldic] Right now, the establishment of the joint commander of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] is being worked on. Are you satisfied with the dynamics of the talks?

[Silajdzic] I know that the talks are going well. Generals Roso and Delic are working together. As far as I am concerned, the results achieved so far go beyond my expectations. I hope they will continue that way. I cannot tell you the details, so you should ask them.

[Soldic] What is your attitude toward the incident in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina involving Miro Lazovic and Jadranko Prlic, prime minister of the government of Herceg-Bosna?

[Silajdzic] Lazovic explained later that his behavior was not right. It was he who caused the incident, so he himself accounted for it later.

[Soldic] Can there be the federation without the confederation? The officials of Herceg-Bosna say that if the issue of confederation were to be called into question, then the issue of federation would be also called into question.

[Silajdzic] First of all, why should the issue of confederation be called into question? I do not understand that. We have to get used to viewing the things positively, and not always negatively. The war has brought about a terrible thing: Everybody is looking for trickery, wherever it is possible. Confederation is a model of cooperation between two sovereign countries, which is what both sides need. Thereby a model of very close economic cooperation is developed, which is necessary for the circulation of people, goods.... In this confederation, the two sovereign states supplement each other. There are much more reasons for the confederation to exist, rather than not to exist. The confederation, of course, must not encroach upon each country's sovereignty, and I do not understand why that confederation should not exist.

[Soldic] What was agreed upon in Washington, is the federation conditioned by the confederation?

[Silajdzic] No, it is not conditioned, but is a matter of interest. The confederation was not agreed upon because the statesmen wanted it, but rather because it is in the interests of the people, and if the people do no want it, then it will not come about.

Serbs Cannot "Take Out" Territory

[Soldic] Are you familiar with the U.S. intentions regarding the Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Will the Americans press the Serbs to join the federation, or will they let them to take out a part of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Silajdzic] The United States cannot allow somebody to take out a part of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor can anybody else allow that. Bosnia-Herzegovina remains within its borders, just like Croatia. The internal reorganization of Bosnia-Herzegovina is its internal affair. With regard to the fact that the Serbian assembly has definitely rejected the federation, it will most probably come to the creation of a federal unit in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the Serb population making up the majority. One should know that the U.S. interest is the cessation of the war in this region. They have many other problems to deal with. From their point of view, all this costs a lot of money, it is dangerous, and brings about some unprecedented things that they cannot allow, because remedying the consequences would cost much more than their current engagement. Which is to say, changing the borders is unacceptable, while genocide cannot be rewarded. It is true that the U.S. initiative has come about quite late, but better late than never.

[Soldic] If Karadzic's Serbs were to condition their joining the federation by demanding confederation with Serbia, what would the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina do in that case?

[Silajdzic] Undoubtedly, some affiliation between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia will come about. What that affiliation will be like remains to be seen. In my opinion it is normal for Serbs to have some connection with Serbia. I personally have nothing against it. If we want peace, then let it be so!

[Soldic] Is that a creation of a new Yugoslavia?

[Silajdzic] No, a new Yugoslavia is out of the question. That is the past. Any of these states have to have their sovereignty, while they will associate with one another to a degree acceptable to each of them.

[Soldic] Do you think that, after everything that has happened, the authorities will be able to function if Karadzic's Serbs accept the federation? I remember the pre-war meetings of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at which, thanks to the Serbs, it was impossible to make any decision, because they found nothing convenient enough for them.

[Silajdzic] The authorities will have to function. We cannot stop life. It is just like water, it always finds its way through. The fact is that Karadzic and his aides have largely mislead the people, they have a mighty propaganda, or rather the way of spreading lies, but we are obtaining different information from the field. Foreign journalists go there, in their territory. We hear from them that people are fed up with everything, they ask themselves what the purpose of it all is. Pressure from above is necessary to crush the existing regime, or else that will be achieved by some other methods.

Sarajevo as A Civilizational Achievement

[Soldic] We can say that the opinions about the role of the Russians in settling the crisis in the Balkans are disparate. Some people feel that Russians are working for greater Serbia, while the others believe that the Americans are using Russians to put the pressure on Serbs.

[Silajdzic] Again, we have a black-white projection. The things are different in reality, though. The Russians are doing things for Serbs, that is unquestionable, but they are also working together with the Americans. It is certain that many things are solved between Washington and Moscow. Given such a situation, we are making efforts to protect our interests. We cannot influence the presence of Moscow in the region. The very statement by Churkin, saying that Sarajevo will be divided, is making us suspicious about whether, perhaps, the new, democratic Russia stands for fascism, whether Moscow intends to build new Berlin Walls. Is such a wall supposed to be erected in Sarajevo, which is a model of multicultural, multiethnic life? Regardless of whether some will like it or not, that is a fact. Sarajevo is undoubtedly a civilizational achievement that should be cultivated, rather than destroyed. In this town there are many layers of civilization sediments that are proof that people are capable of living together.

Bosnian Official Asks Rose To Visit Gorazde

AU1204195794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Apr 94

[Statement by Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency adviser Kemal Muftic in Sarajevo on 12 April—recorded]

[Text] The statement by General Rose has caused justified dilemmas among our (population). According to his statement, which carries critical undertones, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army shelled the forces of the Serb aggressor near Gorazde. Unfortunately, and as you will see from this statement, we have many reasons to doubt the reliability of the sources of information used by General Rose. General Rose also failed to explain whether our forces merely responded to an attack, that is, fired in self-defense, or in order to defend civilians as they have a duty to.

The UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] have obviously still not undertaken adequate measures to prevent the advances of Karadzic's forces in Gorazde, and effectively to protect the lives of innocent people. Some 20 days ago we warned of the grouping of the aggressor's forces [words indistinct]. The safe haven of Gorazde was soon afterward attacked with enormous forces [words indistinct] of Karadzic's Serbs. Every day we reported on the heavy shelling of the town and the aggressor's advances into the safe haven. UNPROFOR consistently denied our reports. Finally when the situation really got out of hand, the UNPROFOR Command decided to launch air strikes of limited intensity against the forces of the attacker. However, the mere selectiveness and limits of the strikes seemed to encourage the enemy. The invasion of Gorazde has continued. Yesterday alone the aggressor's shells killed at least 23 civilians and wounded many others.

We are ready for a cease-fire, and not only around Gorazde but on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on condition that it is followed by the withdrawal of the Serbian invasion forces from the protected area of Gorazde, and that it does not predispose the final political solution. In no event will we agree to the current situation being frozen, which would perpetuate the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Because of the great differences between the information provided by UNPROFOR officials and our own reports, that is, reports by doctors and others who are in Gorazde at the moment, we believe that it is necessary for General Rose and a team of reporters to go to Gorazde as soon as possible in order to dispel any dilemmas when it comes to obvious things. We are ready to join General Rose on that trip. We also believe that UNPROFOR [word indistinct] and in accordance with the UN resolutions is obliged to provide the delivery of humanitarian aid to the many civilians in Gorazde, as the reserves of medicine and food in the town are depleted.

News Conference by New Herceg-Bosna Minister

LD1304210994 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] All Muslim-Bosniak prisoners in Mostar's Heliodrom prison, except two, today ended their hunger strike.

At his first news conference today Vlado Sojic, new defense minister of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, said, I quote, that he feels like a minister of peace rather than war as he was appointed at the time of the Washington agreement. Asked whether the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was over he nevertheless said:

[Begin Sojic recording] Unfortunately, the war is not over. [end recording]

Of course, Sojic said, the Croat side will continue to do everything, just as it has been doing hitherto, to achieve peace through negotiations. He then called on his fighters to be patient enough until a final peace, given the fact that they have managed to save Croat territories and the Croat population. Replying to a question as to who started the war and whether the Croats are the losers, Sojic says:

[Begin Sojic recording] The Croats did not start the war, nor are they the losers. As to what extent they are the winners, one can speculate in various ways. [end recording]

Minister Sojic also added that the Croats had so far always accepted every peace agreement, ranging from the Cutillero agreement to this latest Redman one. Asked whether the Croats and Muslim can live together after so much bloodshed, Sojic says:

[Begin Sojic recording] The, shall I say, memories of the war with the Muslims are still fresh, so it is hard to talk about coexistence, particularly so where there has been fighting, but I nevertheless believe that Croats and Muslims can live in a common state if it is organized in a democratic way and secures the national rights of all peoples. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Izetbegovic Letter to Tudjman on Prisoners

LD1304190894 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, has replied to the letter from Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, of 11 April. We are carrying the letter in full:

Esteemed Mr. President,

I fully agree with you and support your stand on the urgent release of all detained Bosnian from Mostar's camps, and of all HVO [Croatian Defense Council] soldiers from Zenica and Travnik military prisons. In this respect we had previously made the necessary decisions and issued the necessary orders. The exchange of prisoners would have already been completed had it not been for the stand of the HVO's Commission for Prisoners' Exchange which is incomprehensible to us. Namely, this commission insists that four persons—found to have committed crimes against civilians—be included in the exchange. No country in the world can pardon such crimes, whichever nationality commits them. You are certainly aware of the fact that last year in Sarajevo a group of our soldiers was given long-term prison sentences for murdering two Croats, and that another trial is under way of the persons suspected of killing Franciscan priests in the military monastery [as heard]. To leave these crimes unpunished will shake the foundations of the law and security that our country—despite everything—managed to preserve.

I conclude from your letter that you were not acquainted with these facts and I, therefore, beg you to do everything in your power to end the suffering of 340 people imprisoned in Mostar, Zenica, and Travnik and ensure that their fate is not linked with the fate of the four persons accused of war crimes.

Esteemed Mr. President, I assure you that the people and government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic are very keen to wipe out all disagreements between Croats and Bosnians. The last two months of peace have clearly confirmed that these two nations are capable of building a joint state and rebuilding the kind of life they enjoyed over the past five centuries, before the recent unnecessary and mutually destructive clashes had started. In this spirit, I am expecting your visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, convinced that it will strongly encourage the restoration of trust between our peoples and countries.

I beg you to accept the expressions of my respect.

Commentary Assails 'Cowardly' U.S. Air Strikes

LD1204171394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1636 GMT 12 Apr 94

[Commentary by Vjekoslav Radovic]

[Text] New York, April 12 (TANJUG)—Under NATO's "umbrella" and with the United Nations' "moral" blessing, the United States again dropped bombs on Serbs on April 10 and 11, raiding Bosnian Serb positions near Gorazde in the southeast of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Americans did it for the first time in World War II, precisely on Orthodox Easter in April 1944, when they bombed towns of their Serbian allies, including Belgrade, in order to allegedly destroy facilities of the German army.

This time they did it while Croats in the U.S. were "democratically" celebrating in their clubs and churches throughout the U.S. April 10—the day when the Nazi puppet independent state of Croatia was created under Hitler's patronage in World War II.

If one adds to this the fact that the world has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state on April 6, 1991, at the 50th anniversary of the German bombing of Belgrade, it is hard to resist the impression that someone has deliberately been playing with historical dates.

It is impossible at this point to foresee the consequences of the NATO (i.e. U.S.) raid on Serb positions in Bosnia but this heinous act should be a signal for the Serbs to sober up and give up their illusions about "the country of brave and free," as the Americans like to think of themselves.

What they did near Gorazde is a cowardly act of powerwielders manipulated by the flickering images on the TV screen who have lost the ability to form judgement under the loads of money offered by Moslem, Croatian, Jewish and who knows whose else lobbies.

Giving the "green light" for air strikes on Bosnian Serbs, the U.N. and its secretary-general Butrus Butrus-Ghali waded even deeper into the moral swamp from which they can hardly be expected to walk out clean.

Butrus-Ghali's spokesman Joe Sills said on Monday that the real objective of the air attack had been to protect the Moslem enclave of Gorazde while protection of U.N. monitors had been only "a moral framework" for the action. In other words, it was a false excuse.

Even Butru-Ghali himself clearly indicated in a report to the U.N. Security Council that Moslems had used the U.N.-declared "safe havens" for training and resting of their troops and for armed provocations against Serb positions.

The U.N. Secretary-General's Adviser Chinemaya Garrehan and current Chairman of the U.N. Security Council Colin Keating last week also confirmed that the fighting around Gorazde had been initiated by Moslem forces.

All these facts, however, were completely forgotten under the pressure of U.S. and NATO hawks, who were eager to drop bombs on Serbs and thus force them to bow to unacceptable conditions for peace.

All things considered, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) commander, British General Michael Rose, who has proved himself highly sensitive to his media image, seems to have played the most dishonest role because he requested air strikes despite the fact that he had previously given 48 hours to the Moslem and Serb sides to think again about possibilities for reaching a comprehensive peace accord.

Such an accord has been proposed by the Serb side, and rejected by the Moslem, but even that fact has been hidden from the public at East River.

After the air strikes on Serbs, Washington can expect new Moslem provocations and terrorist actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because crime is obviously worth their trouble.

Even Bosnian Moslem Deputy Prime Minister Ejup Ganic made hints in that direction when he told the U.N. Security Council on Monday that Moslems would not negotiate unless Serbs withdrew from their positions around Gorazde to the positions they held on March 30.

He called for new air strikes—including the blowing up of bridges, roads and lines of supply in the Bosnian Serb territories—in order to force the Serbs to agree to a peace solution fashioned to fit the interests of the Moslems and the West.

Profitable Trade of Ethnic Groups in War

94BA0223B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
14 Mar 94 pp 14-17

[Article by Milos Vasic, Filip Svarm, Isabelle Lasserre, Paja Rovic, and Pepi Orlov: "War and Trade: Private Initiative"]

[Text] *What is the connection between the downing of four airplanes over Bosnia and the price of a pack of cigarettes in Tesanj, Gojko Susak's fortune, poker gambling machines from Banja Luka, and oil for transformers? Is the Krajina blood money earned in western Bosnia the backing for the solid dinar? How are 10 television sets smuggled with the help of a wounded man? You can find the answers to all these—and other—questions in this article.*

Why are wars even waged? There are two theories about that: the romantic one and the realistic one. The romantic interpretation cites "historic rights," "living space," "national dignity," and "the state is more important than bread." The realists do not believe all this, but they have nothing against it: They expect wars to begin, and sometimes they even help the process along (depending on investments that have been made and the pace at which money turns over). Wars are able to turn into business at a surprising speed, and romantics are not skilled in business dealings. They are there to perish heroically or afterwards, as cripples, to marvel at the fact that they have nothing while the realists are getting rich. For example, there is a well-reasoned theory to the effect that the war in Laos (1960-75) was not waged against communist aggressors, but was instead about achieving a monopoly over the opium trade.

In order to turn war into successful business, there must be authorities who—by their very nature—impose obligations and restrictions that generally do not suit their subjects. The foundation of ruling authority lies in romantic, ideological presumptions, but miraculously there are usually realists among those in power. For example, authorities introduce various measures for patriotic reasons: universal military conscription, a prohibition on the misappropriation of weapons and military equipment, restrictions on the movement and activities of citizens of other nationalities, a prohibition on cooperation with the enemy, and similar expected and seemingly normal things. However, you cannot eat patriotism, and it is not noted for generating profits (except in some cases, to be discussed later). All the noted prohibitions and commands, it turns out, are transformable into quantities of German marks [DM], which depend primarily on the laws of the market. In a nutshell, this means: Whoever pays is exempt. The conditions for this transformation were created very quickly in the 1990 Balkan wars. Specifically, the belligerent Serb lands, the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] and the republic of Srpska, are very poor. Under the normal conditions of the old Yugoslavia, they survived exclusively as part of an economic and market entity and with state support for underdeveloped areas (aside from two or three regional exceptions). Both states made it through the first phase of the war with the help of mother Serbia and through plunder. However, as the Vikings discovered in their day, the plunder economy has one major shortcoming—something can be pillaged only once. That phase is now complete, which is reflected in the increasingly poor state of public security in these lands: Plunder has become a normal affair, so that now some people need to be reeducated, because they have gotten used to it; they have used up the effects of others and moved on to their own people. This is a critical period of history: Now, it is necessary to move on to some more organized, institutional form of business.

Market Laws

The first and traditional economic resource is the population and its elementary needs for survival: food, clothing, alcohol, cigarettes. Whoever establishes a monopoly over satisfying these vital needs is the winner. For example, a certain Zeljko Holman of Zenica has become the main supplier of food to that large city; half of the total supply has passed through his hands since the war began. He founded the HOS [Croatian Defense Force], put together a team of 30 people who never saw the front, declared himself a general (although he has a sixth-grade education), and started up the Zagreb-Zenica trade, which lasted until Easter 1993. That was when the cooperation between Croats and Bosnians ended; someone else wanted control over the food, Holman was arrested, and allegedly they are still beating him at the Zenica Culture and Education Center to find out where the money is. Serb brothers have also turned a good profit in Zenica: There are two brothers who had an exclusive monopoly over cigarettes and Cerali tractor-trailer trucks for months. A pack went for DM10 retail. Incidentally, a record in these wars was registered in 1993 in central Bosnia: A carton of Marlboros cost DM500.

This is a case of the unbending natural law of supply and demand. In Zenica, the prices at the illegal market in Gluva Bukovica, at the foot of Mt. Vlasic, where Serbs and Muslims trade were as follows in January 1994: white flour—DM20; a liter of cooking oil—DM20; a kilogram of meat—DM15; a liter of brandy—DM10, and so forth. In other places (primarily in central Bosnia), there are more luxurious items available: A gram of cocaine costs DM300 (DM150 in Belgrade); a gram of "domestic" grass DM10-12 (Belgrade: DM3-5). All of these transactions are the result of private initiative by individuals and a free black market where there is no competition. The profit margins are great, but do not even approach those realized on the state level. Because it can block free trade through administrative hurdles, the state is beginning to charge for freedom of trade. As long as the end buyer pays the state racket and as long as the dealer can endure the reduced profit margin, the state is financially stable.

State revenues from taxes, rackets, its own black-marketeering, and the exploitation of natural resources (sometimes suicidal—as in "Hadzic's barricades") can hardly cover the costs of extended warfare. After all, war is a costly pastime, and if it does not bring some sort of benefit or a stable peace quickly, the state is in trouble. For example, soldiers of the republic of Srpska are already publicly grumbling that Serbia charges them "a high price for every bullet and shell"; for months now, the armed forces of the RSK have received payments of food and basic necessities in kind instead of actual wages. The events in Banja Luka in September 1993 are the best illustration of the crisis in the republic of Srpska: Reservists rioted because their families were starving (and they, in the trenches, were too), while dealers and swindlers were growing nice and rich. Dr. Radovan Karadzic put down the rebellion, while promising protection to "business people," on whom—as he put it—"the future depends." Patriotism is patriotism, but money is money....

Because of all this, all the warring states in the Balkans are forced to enter into certain transactions that are completely understandable to realists, while among romantics they elicit confusion that sometimes borders on despair.

One Hand Washes the Other

Transactions between states also depend on supply and demand: who has something and who needs it. Thus, the Bosnians have people but no weapons; the Serbs have weapons but are short on people; the Croats, with both people and weapons, are somewhere in-between, but they have tactical and strategic problems. These things vary from region to region, just as tactical interests vary. Because of that, we have seen all possible alliances between two parties against a third. This began back during the war in Croatia, when the Bosnian police of Alija Delimustafic cooperated fraternally with the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]; then the JNA fraternally armed the just-established HVO [Croatian Defense Council] in Kiseljak; then the Bosnians and Croats fraternally clobbered the Serbs, the Serbs and Muslims clobbered the Croats (Herzegovina, Kupres), and the Serbs and Croats seriously united against the Bosnians (although they regularly supplied ammunition to them in Herzegovina), all the way up to several days ago, when yet another Croat-Bosnian pact was signed.

The best reflection of this in practice can be found in central Bosnia, i.e., the Kiseljak-Kresevo front. This began in the summer of 1992 with the renting of artillery to HVO forces (with or without crews and ammunition); it continued through the renting of tactical services (artillery support), and concluded with the sale of major weapon systems and ammunition. At one point in 1993, the Serbs sold the HVO one T-55 tank, one "Praga" (a two-barrel 30-mm antiair gun on a tank chassis), and 2.5 million rounds of various ammunition for a sum that was later disputed. Specifically, the HVO contends that it paid DM4.5 million, while the Serbs contend that they received DM4 million; one Serb source says that he believes the Croats and wonders where the half a million marks went.

Case of Bihac

It is not only the Serbs and Croats who are doing business. The example of Cazin Krajina and Fikret Abdic's autonomous province of western Bosnia [APZB] shows that local tactical circumstances result in realistic alliances. As Miroslav Lazanski writes in his new biweekly ARGUMENT, there is fierce fighting around Bihac between units of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the command of Atif Dudakovic and Fikret Abdic's forces, which include Serbs. "The probable goal of operations by the Serb army and

Fikret Abdic's forces in this region is... to break out to the banks of the Una River, whereupon this region would be territorially divided between the republic of Srpska and the autonomous province of western Bosnia." VREME has learned from independent sources in the field around Bihac and from our special reporter who stayed in Bihac that at least since the end of 1993, entire military units of the Serb armed forces of Krajina [SVK] and of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Krajina have been fighting for Fikret Abdic. Legend has it that Babo asked his friend from Bijeljina, Zeljko Raznatovic, whether he could take Bihac for him; when he heard that Arkan was demanding DM8 million, Babo reportedly concluded that for that amount of money he could take Bihac himself, and he turned to Captain Dragan. The bulk of the aid from the RSK is provided by the people of Capt. Dragan Vasiljkovic from his "Alpha" training center, while the rest is filled in by SVK soldiers and special units of the MUP of Krajina. It appears that authorities in Serbia are familiar with the entire operation, because weapons and equipment are allegedly received through them. The people fighting in the APZB are listed in Serbia as being on leave. The operation is organized on-site in Velika Kladusa by a certain major with the SVK. The going rate for this fighting is as follows: DM2,000 for five to seven days of action; DM1,000 for one day of reconnaissance inside enemy territory; DM200 for a prisoner; special rewards for each occupied town (DM1,000-2,000 per person). Renting fire support and other services costs the following: DM50 for each day at the RSK military hospital in Vojnic; DM50,000 per day for three T-55 tanks with crews; DM50,000 per day for a battery (six pieces) of 122-mm howitzers plus DM1,000 for each fired shell if the artillery is on APZB territory, but if it is fired from Serb territory, then only the ammunition (between DM1,000 and DM3,000, depending on the type of ammunition); one day of antitank support from a "Gazela Gama" helicopter costs DM100,000.

VREME's reporter in Bihac says that "Gazela" helicopters fired on the towns of Srbinje and Sokolac during her stay there (in early March), and also reports continuous artillery fire against Bihac from the Grabez and Golubic plateau. French Colonel Legrillet of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] has confirmed this activity. The 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina presented an ultimatum to Abdic to surrender by 10 February, or else it would move on Kladusa; four days before the ultimatum ran out, the Serb offensive against Bihac and the forces of the 5th Corps began, so that the pressure was taken off of Abdic. At the same time—interestingly enough—UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb was systematically ignoring and downplaying events on the Bihac front (the situation is normal, an occasional mortar shell here and there...).

Where does Fikret Abdic get the money to pay for all these services and goods? It has long been known that Abdic imports from Croatia into the APZB much more food, fuel, and other goods than the local population needs. Also, a large part of the "Agrokomerc" capital has been successfully turned over abroad (purchasing arms for Croatia), while it is felt in Zagreb that a large part of the capital of the powerful Herzegovinan war-mafia lobby is moving by way of Babo and his friend Alija Delimustafic. Thus, Babo is buying for the Serbs what they need and charging them both in cash (trade) and in services (warfare). At present, this suits the Croats in tactical terms; UNPROFOR has closed its eyes (and that costs money), while Serbia is making a political point out of Fikret Abdic: He is a model of exemplary "coexistence" and ethnic tolerance....

Sad Ending

However, everything changes if the Washington Bosnian-Croat agreement by some chance goes into effect. In that case, two important players in the Balkans become superfluous, or even detrimental: Fikret Abdic and Gojko Susak. If the Bosnians and Croats actually, sincerely enter into a new alliance, without the usual back-stabbing (as has happened many times in the past), Abdic is left all alone: The Croats do not need him, and he is left without oil and food, and in that case the 5th Corps quickly grows stronger; nor do the Serbs need him any more, because he has neither money nor goods. If the Croats have really decided in favor of an alliance with the Bosnians, it will not work, nor will anyone believe them, as long as several Herzegovinan political figures are a visible presence at Jelacic Square. Gojko Susak sensed this immediately, given the fact that two weeks ago he started grumbling about "swallowing a bitter pill": The Serbs say that "he has a bee in his bonnet," i.e., that thought is being given to him. Specifically, Dr. Tudjman was wrong to enter the war in Bosnia at Herzegovinan insistence, and the entire adventure went awry. Now he must acknowledge that he made a mistake; someone must pay for this, and Dr. Tudjman would rather not be that someone. The list of other candidates is not a long one....

Here we arrive at one interesting political speculation of a completely hypothetical nature, although it is quite reasonable. In the event of a successful Bosnian-Croat alliance, it is not only Abdic and Susak who are superfluous and detrimental; the logic of Realpolitik says that Mile Martic will also not be as desirable as he is today. He has the least money, and in that case his state is the most threatened; in any attempt to abandon Krajina to Croatia (because in that case defending its sovereignty would be too costly), Martic is superfluous. The same is true of Herceg-Bosna; Mate Boban is already on thin ice in Zagreb, even though he still holds real power.

When all of the above is considered, we arrive at a natural junction of interests: Who is most interested in undermining and subverting the Washington accord? Susak, Boban, Martic, Palama, and Abdic, more or less in that order. If that is true—and it appears to be—then nothing is impossible, especially since everything has already happened in the past. It is known that the RSK air force has already conducted combat missions in

Bosnia (bombing and helicopter support) for the VRS [armed forces of the republic of Srpska], but also for the HVO and APZB forces, for monetary compensation. Relations between the RSK and UNPROFOR are so poor that neither side was interested in insisting on this: UNPROFOR would not know what to say (it is tied up anyway), while the RSK would have to explain why its airplanes are flying over Bosnia but did not fly against the Croats during the offensive at Medacki Dzep. The very fact that all sides continue to refuse to take responsibility for the bombing of Novi Travnik and Bugojno and for the four ill-fated airplanes is clearly disturbing here; the romantics have perished, while the realists are not foolish enough to acknowledge it. It is unknown whether the Herzegovinans paid for it while Serbs from the two states did the flying in order to subvert the Bosnian-Croat alliance, but it will be learned sooner or later.

Catch-22

No war is pretty, on the contrary. However, these wars of ours have managed in record time to degenerate into cynical business dealings and ordinary plunder as the main motives. Since the motives and interests of all sides are similar (which is not to say identical), mutual understanding is somehow inevitable: If the momentary ally is in trouble, we will sell him a pack of cigarettes for DM10, or a tank, shells, and so forth for the price that he is able to pay. Thus, the "Border 94" campaign in the republic of Srpska revealed that there is a great deal of trade going on with "the enemy" (tanks, ammunition, weapons, vital strategic materials). Everyone aims at transformer stations (which are repaired by UNPROFOR) because a lot is earned on oil for transformers; wounded Serbs being treated in Serbia have the right to a television set, so that as many as 10 plundered television sets are smuggled in for each wounded person and his permit. Strategic installations of the military industry, such as "Kosmos-Cajavec" in Banja Luka, produce electronics for poker gambling machines—a serious business that yields serious money (and heads roll because of those machines, too) supplying the significant Eastern European market.

Avramovic's solid dinar has been introduced in the republic of Srpska and the republic of Serbian Krajina (20 million have been issued); if each dinar is backed by foreign exchange—and Martic and Karadzic swear that such backing exists—then where are the marks coming from? Certainly not from the economy and exports. What remains is rentals of personnel and military technology, money from the Herzegovinan political lobby, the remainders of the pillaged stashes of money and [trange-frange] with Serbia (importing food and vital necessities and sucking foreign exchange out of the populace). Who is whose "enemy" now? The answer is offered in the classic study of all warfare—*Catch-22*, by Joseph Heller. There, Milo Minderbinder offers an interpretation of why he has agreed with the Americans that they first bomb an overpass, and also agreed with the Germans to defend it. "The Germans are not our enemies. True, we are at war with them, but Germans are prominent members of our syndicate, and I must protect their rights...." Later Milo agrees with the Germans to bomb his own air base, because he has run out of cash. A scandal results, the newspapers bluster, mothers of recruits protest (which we know something about), but Milo has the impeccable logic of a war realist: "In a democratic state, the people are the government. And are we not a people? So why should we not hold on to our money and eliminate the middle-men? Quite frankly, I would like most of all for the governments to give up war and turn this entire field over to private initiative." If war has become the only branch of the economy that can turn a profit—why not?

Serbs Remove Heavy Weapons From Storage

LD1404162394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Excerpt] According to still unconfirmed reports, Serbs from Sector East have taken several heavy weapons from storage, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] spokesman Matthew Nerzig said in Zagreb. It is allegedly a small quantity of weapons.

Serb rebels fired toward Croatian police control points near Pakrac last night. The Croatian police did not respond to the provocation. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Receives International Mediators

LD1304140294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Excerpt] Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman today received in Zagreb Geert Ahrens and Kai Eide, ambassadors to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the president's office has announced. They are discussing the resumption of talks with local Serbs. President Tudjman again stressed that these talks could not be held outside Croatia. [passage omitted]

RSK President Against UN Deployment on Border

LD1304133494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1144 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Knin, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, the president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], sent a letter today to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] Commander General Bertrand de Lapresle expressing his surprise after being informed of UNPROFOR's intentions to deploy UN troops along the state border between the RSK and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia [APWB].

Such a deployment, Martic says in his letter, is absolutely unacceptable and out of the question for us. The same goes for other RSK borders except those along demarcation lines with the Republic of Croatia, in accordance with the Zagreb agreement.

Reminding UNPROFOR Commander de Lapresle that he was one of the signatories of the Zagreb cease-fire agreement, in his letter Martic also points out: The governments of the RSK and the APWB have signed an agreement on friendship and cooperation; there have been no incidents in the border area and there is no need for your presence in this area, Martic says in conclusion.

RSK President on Economic Talks With Croatia

LD1104202394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1938 GMT 11 Apr 94

["Pool" item]

[Excerpt] Knin, April 11 (TANJUG)—President of the republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.) Milan Martic said the R.S.K. accepted talks with Croatia on economic relations, but on an equal footing.

After talking with U.S. Zagreb Ambassador Peter Galbraith Monday [11 April], he assessed that the plan for economic cooperation of the international community, that is, the conference on former Yugoslavia and Croatia offered contained [as received] a number of elements with which the R.S.K. agreed and with which it could agree.

At the beginning of the talk with Galbraith, Martic issued a strong protest to the U.S. Government and U.S. President Bill Clinton because of, as he put it, "unprecedented bombing of Serb positions" around Gorazde in southeastern Bosnia.

This act of force did not contribute to peace and must not be repeated, said Martic, recalling the mutual commitments of the R.S.K. and the Srpska republic (R.S.) on joint defense.

Galbraith told newsmen NATO action around Gorazde was justified and that the U.S. has responded to commitments to the allies in NATO, the international community and the U.N.

The U.S. NATO planes bombed Sunday and Monday (April 10 and 11) positions of the Srpska army near Gorazde, a Moslem enclave and U.N.-declared safe area, which should have been demilitarized last spring.

Galbraith stated satisfaction with the talk on Monday and stressed he expected complicated talks between the representatives of the R.S.K. and Croatia and believed in its success if both sides, as he said, showed flexibility. The R.S.K.-Croatia accord on cessation of hostilities, signed on March 30 at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb, was being implemented successfully. [passage omitted]

Granic Returns From Visit to Greece, Turkey

LD1304225994 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2110 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Interview with Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, by unidentified announcer; from the "Slikom na sliku" program—live]

[Text] [Announcer] Mr. Granic good evening.

[Granic] Good evening.

[Announcer] You have returned from Greece where you had talks with Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias. According to news agency reports, you obtained support for the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas. A visit by European Union [EU] ministers to Knin has been announced. What does this mean in concrete terms?

[Granic] Greece supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia and the resumption of talks with the local Serbs. In this it sees a chance for the final normalization of Croatian-Serb and Zagreb-Belgrade relations. I put forward a proposal that a European troika should visit Knin, and as Greece currently holds the EU presidency, Mr. Papoulias accepted this, and he will join peace efforts to continue the peace process. Greece has a great interest in the normalization of Croatian-Serb relations and in this respect it will do everything it can.

[Announcer] Today you also discussed Croatia's admission to Partnership for Peace, aid for reconstruction, and its membership of international political and financial institutions. What would you single out as particularly important from these talks?

[Granic] A very interesting thing is that totally identical support was given both by Greece and Turkey as regards the demands of the Republic of Croatia toward the European Union, both in connection with an agreement on cooperation with the European Union, aid for the reconstruction of the Republic of Croatia, and its admission to certain concrete projects, such as the PHARE [Poland-Hungary—Actions for Economic Reconversion] project. We also discussed Partnership for Peace and Croatia's admission to it. Both countries lent their strong support for this.

[Announcer] You returned from an official visit to Greece and Turkey, two countries having strong links with events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. How much were the talks determined by this current Turkish support for the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Greek closeness to Belgrade?

[Granic] It is indisputable that Turkey has a significant influence over the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but a very positive one. Throughout the entire war it has been a positive influence. We have always had very good and excellent contacts with Turkey, in the course of the entire past period, and naturally, especially now.

On the other hand, Greece has good relations with Belgrade. Greece wants a final normalization of Croatian-Serb relations. We do not see any obstacles to the positive development of relations both with Turkey and Greece.

[Announcer] Greece was one of the rare countries that condemned the latest NATO air strikes around Gorazde. There is a demand for a cease-fire and the resumption of negotiations between the Croatian- Bosniak federation and the Serbs. How did they assess the latest developments, particularly NATO air strikes on Gorazde?

[Granic] Well, we discussed that, of course. Greece believes that nothing that would prevent the process of negotiations should be carried out. I pointed to the fact that this was, nevertheless, an aggression on Gorazde launched by the Bosnian Serbs, and that NATO had reacted in a legal and legitimate way. However, we agreed that it was of primary importance to halt all conflicts, achieve a cease-fire, and organize negotiations between the Bosnian Serbs and the [Croat-Muslim] federation.

[Announcer] How do you view the latest developments? I know you have just returned from Greece, but as you are here I am availing myself of the opportunity to ask you, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is again being complicated. News has come about a fresh violation of the cease-fire in Sarajevo. It seems that shooting has again started there, that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is restarting.

[Granic] The Bosnian Serbs' reactions have been edgy. But, still, the Serbs were surprised by the NATO action. They had not believed it would take place. There are considerable differences among the Serbs themselves in their approaches. This was discussed today in talks with Minister Papoulias. Greece is ready to do everything to achieve a cease-fire and for negotiations to start.

I would like to point to one more thing: Croatia's reputation in both Greece and Turkey, and particularly President Tudjman's reputation. It is interesting that both countries emphasized this, both ministers, especially President Demirel who said that Turkey has always maintained good relations with Croatia, particularly after the Washington agreement was signed.

[Announcer] Mr. Granic, thank you very much for finding time to be a guest in our Slikom na sliku program.

[Granic] Thank you.

Discusses Talks With Papoulias

LD1304212394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, has returned to Zagreb following a visit to Greece today and Turkey yesterday. In Athens he had talks with Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias. After the talks both ministers concluded that it is possible to extend cooperation between the two countries. Andjelko Perincic reports on Minister Granic's visit to Athens:

[Perincic] Ministers Granic and Papoulias agreed that interstate treaties on industry, traffic, protection of investments, and the prevention of double taxation would soon be signed, and that business transactions should begin immediately.

At the meeting the two delegations also discussed military cooperation, Croatian-Greek cooperation in the sphere of security in southeast Europe and in the Mediterranean, and international military cooperation within the United Nations. Croatia obtained Greek support for its admission to NATO's Partnership for Peace. In this regard, Greece wants the same kind of friendship with Croatia as with all other countries of former Yugoslavia, it was said.

The Greek hosts also supported Croatia's efforts to reintegrate occupied Croatian areas in a peaceful way, adding, as Minister Papoulias himself stated at a news conference, that peace in that area and in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a basis for peace in the entire region. Papoulias said that fighting should be halted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is endangering peace processes, and that negotiations in which Serbs should also be included ought to be initiated.

As regards Bosnia-Herzegovina, Minister Granic stated for Croatian Radio:

[Begin Granic recording] Our joint conclusion is that a cease-fire agreement, and after that, the inclusion of the third party, the Serb party, into negotiations with the federation [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] are the most important things at the moment. Greece ought to take an even more active part, as the European Union [EU] chairman, in the peace process, the process of negotiations, together with the United States and the Russian Federation. [end recording]

[Perincic] The talks in Athens were also useful because Greece is currently the EU chairman. Therefore, its support for Croatia to join the EU PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program is not insignificant. Greece lends its support to Croatia for other forms of cooperation with the European Union and for our efforts to obtain aid from the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and other international financial institutions for the reconstruction of our country.

Zhirinovskiy To Visit Zagreb

LD1304200094 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy intends to arrive in Croatia tomorrow, (Aleksey Vedemkin), Zhirinovskiy's envoy, has told HINA. The Russian Embassy in Croatia is in no way involved in Zhirinovskiy's visit to Zagreb, a representative of the embassy has stated, adding that the embassy knows nothing about Zhirinovskiy's reasons for the visit or its schedule, and does not know who invited him.

The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Croatia has announced that no official body has invited Zhirinovskiy to Croatia. Given that his possible visit is of a private nature, the Croatian state authorities will proceed in accordance with legal regulations determining the conditions of entry for foreign nationals and their stay in the Republic of Croatia.

Assembly Chairman Condemns Removal of Manolic

AU1404112394 Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 4 Apr 94 pp 6,7

[Interview with Stipe Mesic, chairman of the Chamber of Representatives of the Croatian Assembly, by Heni Erceg; place and date not given: "Stalinism Is Being Restored in Croatia"]

[Text] [Erceg] Did you expect that in one moment it is precisely Josip Manolic who would become an item on the agenda of your party's Council?

[Mesic] The Council of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], just like the leadership of any other party, can and must discuss all problems in foreign and domestic policy. And it is not strange at all that the Council analyzed some of Manolic's performances. However, the debate did not give a single indication that the exclusion or punishment of Manolic might be demanded. Only three members demanded that Manolic be excluded. Everything else was within the limits of a principled debate.

[Erceg] Who are those three members?

[Mesic] Antun Vrdoljak, Ivan Milas, and Ivic Pasalic. At the end, President Tudjman concluded that the Manolic case should still be brought up in the Court of Honor. Even that could be accepted as a part of the democratic procedure, and a right of the party's chairman to make such a decision.

[Erceg] What was the debate at the meeting of the Council like? Did you support Manolic's attitudes?

[Mesic] I referred in my speech to the attitude that the issue of Bosnia was a difficulty for both the great powers and the European Community, but now, when we have the Washington agreement, everybody has to take the consequences for his or her earlier policy, and that is it. When the president demanded that Manolic go to the Court of Honor, I thought that would be the end of the issue. Moreover, President Tudjman invited us all to a lunch. I did not join them for the lunch, because a meeting of the Assembly was to start at the same time. And then everything, which is so far away from any democracy, started.

Lunch at Tudjman's

[Ercog] When did you realize that the invitation to the lunch was actually an invitation to something completely different?

[Mesic] At the time when Manolic and I reached the Assembly, the action of his removal from the office of chairman of the Chamber of Counties was already going on, despite the conclusion of the Council that the Court of Honor was supposed to meet only later! When we arrived at the Assembly, we heard that some signatures were being collected, and who was collecting them.

[Ercog] Who was collecting them?

[Mesic] Vrdoljak and Milas were engaged from the beginning, and then Pasalic and Jure Radic joined them. The issue is about an action that reminds me of a sort of enlightened bolshevism, and I cannot accept that. For it means that, while we were sitting in the Council, somebody sent a message that the action should start.

[Ercog] Somebody means President Tudjman, does not it?

[Mesic] I do not know that, but if he had been against it, he could have stopped it. He still can stop it, and call to account those who took to themselves a right to ignore the Court of Honor. Of course, the question is raised how that group in the Assembly came to know what the HDZ Council had decided, since there are no letters, written statements.... This means that an underground connection provided the information, and all that has nothing to do with democracy.

[Ercog] It is being claimed that 36 signatures have been collected against Manolic.

[Mesic] Which method did they use to obtain those signatures? Who charged them with doing that, and on whose behalf? The Council did not make such a decision, while the HDZ club is not the place where the policy of the party is designed. Everything that was done is illegal, and somebody has to take the consequences for that!

[Ercog] Do you share the opinion that there is a parliamentary crisis in Croatia?

[Mesic] Basically yes, although it does not necessarily have to continue, unless it is insisted upon. The cause of the crisis is to be found in the fact that the internal conflict in one party has reflected itself in the work of the parliament. Of course, that may cause a deeper parliamentary crisis. Because, look, a meeting of the Assembly has been announced for Thursday, but prior to the meeting we have to get the approval from the Chamber of Counties with regard to certain laws. If the Chamber of Counties fails to meet, or its work is blocked again, then neither will the Chamber of Representatives be able to function, and the entire work of the parliament will be called into question.

Early Elections?

[Ercog] In that case, will early elections possibly be taken into consideration?

[Mesic] If the crisis continues, early elections will be inevitable.

[Ercog] Milas persistently maintains that the majority of the parliamentarians lost their confidence in Manolic a long time ago.

[Mesic] Everybody has a right to struggle for his or her opinion, and to disagree with Manolic's opinion. A right of the parliamentarians is also to say and undertake whatever actions they want, but regardful of the Assembly procedure. However, we have reached the stage where a university professor is used, namely Smiljko Sokolj, who publicly, in front of the TV audience, does not speak the truth, who misconstrues the essence of the dispute. I am a jurist as well, and I have checked out the document that the group demanding the removal of Manolic brandished all over the place. All that is stated there is a demand, written in a commanding manner, that a commission should be called, while everything else are illegible signatures. Civility, rather than law, demands that it should be written as follows: We would appreciate it if a meeting of the Commission were to be called... we propose that the following issue be put on the agenda... and also that the deputies who make that demand should put their signatures next to their typed names, so it can be seen that those are authentic signatures. We are not living in a dictatorship, for God's sake.... Instead, scandalous violence has been applied that discloses the uniformity of opinions. I said already 100 times that I shall never accept to put up with the uniformity of opinions again, and now it is being imposed on me again. And when I only think about who is doing that....

[Ercog] Was it not natural, and what was obviously expected by Manolic himself, that after the Washington agreement, those who are responsible for the breakout of the Muslim-Croatian conflict should be removed from political functions?

[Mesic] It would be normal if everybody were to take the consequences for his or her earlier policies, because the people are neither mentally retarded, nor are they politically ignorant. The people know all too well which policy any of us supported. I still stick to my principle that names should not be publicly named, but I have a right to perceive certain occurrences, and consequently, those who brought about those occurrences as well.

[Ercog] Do you think that it is his public disagreement with the policy of President Tudjman, particularly with the policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina, that was fatal for Manolic? Do you personally agree with Manolic?

[Mesic] Manolic is a man who had entered politics as a principled fighter for democracy and the lawful state. If the lawful state does not function, somebody has to be called to account. The same attitude is also toward the Croatian policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Manolic rightfully raises the question of who made the decision on the opening of the concentration camps in Bosnia. It is not sufficient to say that the other warring faction also had such camps. That is no justification. Let us see who made the decision. Who passed the regulations on the behavior in the camps, who is to blame for the conditions there? Who made decisions on that? Somebody had to make decisions on that, as well as the decision that a conflict with Muslims should be triggered. And when the conflict broke out, why was not a way out sought in negotiations? No, the efforts were made only to make the conflict escalate. All these questions urged Manolic to demand that accountability for that policy be established, and that the names of the guilty parties be made public. He has never been in a personal conflict with Gojko Susak, but all Manolic demands is that occurrences and their protagonists be identified, and that they be called to account.

Vrdoljak's Announcement

[Ercog] Did you expect this attack against, until yesterday, the second most important official in the country to happen?

[Mesic] First I have to say that Manolic is so independent that he never consults with anybody. So it is first you and your newspaper that learned about his latest performance, while as for myself, I knew there would be reactions as soon as I read the interview in the FERAL TRIBUNE. In the first place because President Tudjman often emphasized that Susak is his best HDZ member, and one of the best ministers. I supposed that the president would try to protect Susak. However, the way in which that group tried to make use of Manolic's criticism equals the most magnificent moments of bolshevik persecutions at the time of Stalin.

[Ercog] Why did not President Tudjman ever defend you and your dignity from the attacks by your party colleagues in the way he is defending Susak now?

[Mesic] You know, Branimir Glavas said of me that I was a personification of evil, while—conditionally said—Vrdoljak said, following my warning at a parliamentary meeting that he ought to calm down, that he did not talk with the politically dead. And nothing happened! Nobody calls him to account, although I am the chairman of the parliament. Is that not interesting? Which means, an entire group of HDZ members is involved in the defense of one man by attacking Manolic, while in view of everything else that other people were told—and many offensive things were said—nothing has ever been done about it.

[Ercog] Will the issue result in the creation of some more room for hawks, and even for the possible continuation of purges?

[Mesic] I expect that the supporters of Manolic will be the main target now. All those who want to square accounts with somebody will be finding Manolic's supporters in their towns, firms, neighborhoods,.... Just like at the time of the most rigid communism. I am afraid of that, and it would be really good if that could be possibly avoided.

[Ercog] Do you think that the time for doing away with you has come?

[Mesic] I think it has. Particularly in view of the fact that Vrdoljak has already announced that by calling me a politically dead person, and he is usually very well informed.

Many Are Intimidated

[Ercog] If Manolic still offers his resignation, will you stay in the office of the chairman of the Assembly?

[Mesic] Manolic is not going to resign, and therefore I am remaining in office.

[Ercog] There are many other mechanisms of elimination.

[Mesic] Yes, there are, but the democratic ones, and that process is quite long, you know....

[Ercog] Do you believe that President Tudjman will stick to his attitude in this situation, or is he going to make yet another of his political turns?

[Mesic] I want to believe that the president will call to account all those who have gone for such a vulgar way of squaring accounts with opponents, and that the tensions will ease off. If that were not to be that way....

[Ercog] Would you then join the party the foundation of which has been announced by Manolic?

[Mesic] Manolic is a co-founder of the HDZ platform that suited me at the time. If Joza [Manolic] proposes a new platform that proffers much more, I will certainly think about that.

[Ercog] What has been the reaction in the world to this sort of onslaught on the Croatian Parliament?

[Mesic] I have received many inquiring letters from many colleagues from the European parliaments, as well as from our citizens from abroad. For all of them it has been quite unexpected, and many feel intimidated. I told them the same as I have told you. I repeat that a vulgar, bolshevik-style attack has been undertaken against Manolic. I do not know who approved it, but do not worry, I shall bring that issue up for discussion at the next meeting of the HDZ Council.

[Ercog] Are you afraid of a possible turn toward dictatorship?

[Mesic] I shall bring the issues we have talked about up in the Council, and after that you shall see what kind of conversation we shall be carrying on, and if we shall be able to carry on any at all.

Tudjman Criticized

AU1104143194 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Mar 94 pp 5-6

[Article by Zeljko Kruselj: "Tudjman's Message to the 'Elimination Candidates'"]

[Text] Admittedly, the commentators who have been trying to justify Tudjman's "elimination" of Josip Manolic [president of the Chamber of Counties] in every possible way are not having an easy time. One of them has, thus—perhaps to make this reckoning seem a "historical inevitability"—compared Manolic to "Macek in

1941, when the creator of the Bannat of Croatia established that the antifascist coalition would win the war." He said that the estimate was good, but Macek did not benefit too much from it in 1945. Manolic would have fared the same way at present with his story about the "integral Bosnia-Herzegovina" if President Tudjman had not helped the Croats there in their defense against Serb aggression.

If we neglect the fact that it was Tudjman, rather than his opponent, who was obsessed with the idea of the Bannat, which is one of the reasons that the Croat-Muslim conflicts escalated, the basic question remains: Who does Croatian President Franjo Tudjman represent in this analogy? There is only one logical, but also historically acceptable, answer: Josip Broz. More precisely, he became so only after the Washington agreement, while at the beginning of the Bosnia-Herzegovina plot he seemed more like a "poglavnik" [reference to Ante Pavelic—wartime Croatian leader], convinced that the Muslims must accept the Croat-Serb squaring of accounts regarding "the most complicated country in the world."

Who Is "Rankovic" and Who Is "Tito"?

However, if Tudjman is Tito in this analogy, who has after all always fascinated him with his style of ruling, then Manolic can only be the personification of the protagonists of the Croatian spring, Savka [Dabcevic-Kucar, president of the Croatian National Party] and Miko [Tripalo], his parliament colleague. Namely, Tito overthrew the Croatian leaders after they had correctly identified the "carcinoma" of the Yugoslav federation of the time. The Croatian "pair of oars" had to fall; although Tripalo had been "predestined" to be Tito's successor, a radical constitutional reform, as they conceived it, could not be avoided. A similar thing has been happening with the reestablishment of Manolic's view of Croatian policy toward Bosnia, as well as the problems of the internal strengthening of the legal state.

This is why the claims, formed by the "right" faction in the party in power, about Tudjman in fact removing "the Croatian Rankovic", are somewhat tragicomical. Namely, Manolic's political trouble started the moment he started to support the democratization of Croatia—too loudly and on the recognizable antifascist basis—rather than its transformation into a police state. The problem was also that the former "number-two man" had, during his "Udba" [Yugoslav State Security Service] career, when he did not bother Tudjman at all, created too wide a circle of political enemies for himself, mostly in the top state circles. Eventually the "anti-Manolic coalition" became so numerous and influential that it was much easier for the Croatian president to say goodbye to his old friend than to directly oppose those whose politics have been seriously shaken by the Washington change.

The worst thing for Manolic in all this was that, until the last moment, he could not believe that the rule of unquestioning obedience also held true for Tudjman's closest associates, and even for those who made his breakthrough to power possible, which his opponents had been making good tactical use of all the while. They will verbally support the Croatian president as long as he keeps them in their present positions, that is, until they raise the issue of his responsibility for joint mistakes.

Be that as it may, the key question at the moment is how the departure of the leader of the "left" within the ruling party [Croatian democratic Community—HDZ] will be reflected on the Croatian political scene. The answer cannot be unambiguous, but Manolic's departure will surely incite new political regrouping as well as a clearer profiling of the HDZ from a movement into a party of the proclaimed Christian democratic orientation. This aim ensues from the conclusions of the Second General HDZ Congress, when the intraparty conflict was temporarily "conserved," but in the new circumstances there is no reason not to start implementing it.

Naturally, the precondition for this is Tudjman reestablishing the balance of his "left" and "right" factions—concealed behind whose ideologized names there are, in fact, radically opposed views on the democratization of state power—or getting rid of all their leaders as soon as possible. More precisely, it is a public secret that "Susak's faction" will now try to remove Stipe Mesic, with whom it "waged a war" in a more open way than with Manolic until the Second General Congress. If Mesic falls, the fate of the other "Manolic followers" who hold important positions within the parliament is also sealed—primarily Degoricija and Boljkovac—after which the purge of the "technomanagerial" faction will follow, ranging from Franjo Greguric to the present Prime Minister Nikica Valentic.

Valentic's Threat "Frozen"

The "lobbyist" information on Valentic's recent threat to resign, which would have disastrous consequences on the final success of the economic reform, speaks of how important Manolic's departure is in this disturbance of relations. Tudjman has temporarily "frozen" this threat by promising some—still insufficiently known—personnel "abortions," but it is clear who it is in the party in power who bothers Valentic the most in implementing the further stage of restructuring the Croatian economy.

If Tudjman opts for the policy of balance, it is inevitable that he will not only have to prevent more departures of "soft" HDZ members, but also to listen to Manolic's swan song and get rid of Defense Minister Gojko Susak, for whom it is not difficult to find something "incriminating" regarding the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In these complex combinations, Vladimir Seks, the government person most responsible for the poor functioning of the legal system, is in the same danger as lower parliamentary officials such as Ivan Milas and Luka Bebic. The claim of the "right" that it had already bled because of Vice Vukojevic's departure from the information service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not satisfy the opposite side, because his intraparty influence has not decreased significantly. Involving the "retired" Mate Boban in this story would be even more absurd, considering the fact that he is a politician from a neighboring country.

If the current international situation is taken into account, which, after the Croat-Muslim agreement, is much more favorable than in the period when the conflict between the HDZ factions culminated, it is certain that Tudjman will keep an eye on the intraparty balance, but in the way that he will gradually get rid of both the "left" and "right" factions. The most important thing in these politics, which could most easily be described with the proverb regarding drinking half and giving the other half to the horse, is perhaps the fact that a start was made by eliminating Tudjman's best known friend and fellow fighter, so that the other "elimination candidates" could be informed that their political future will cause even fewer dilemmas. Naturally, political wit will not allow Tudjman to make such replacements in a "package," considering the fact that, in such circumstances, there is a danger of a mass escape of members to competitive parties. The "certificates of withdrawal" will arrive individually, equally on both sides, and after each the pulse of the electoral body will be felt with great care.

Tudjman has the whole of two years to "renovate" the party in power, which is how far ahead the following parliamentary elections are, so it is to be supposed that the written-off officials, including Manolic, will not be capable of causing a serious parliamentary crisis or a paralysis of the political system, let alone of threatening a coup. Of the protagonists in the current intraparty conflicts, the only faction spared will be the above mentioned "technomanagerial" one, which Tudjman needs to shape a modern market economy. On the other hand, all the important instruments of power will be held by the representatives of the Christian Democratic faction, primarily Jure Radic and Mate Granic, who will, at the lower level, rely on the "subsequent" HDZ members not burdened by the present ideological conflicts. The only winner in that period will, all in all, be President Tudjman, so that at the next elections there could be a test of how interesting the party, redesigned in terms of personnel and program, is to potential voters.

During this two-year HDZ "cleaning up," the chances of Manolic and those who will soon follow him making a political career are slim. If Manolic's positions are analyzed, it is evident that they are already contained in the programs of some Croatian parties, primarily in the Liberal and Social Democratic parties, so that, in the case of a new party being founded, he could not expect too many members joining. It would be more realistic for the future "renegades" to join related parties, unless the leaderships of the latter establish that the HDZ "early guerrilla fighters" are too great a weight around their necks.

No One Needs Losers

As far as Manolic is concerned, he immediately felt what it meant to be a political "renegade." After he sought the support of the parliamentary parties and the general public for the replacement of his opponent Gojko Susak, the leadership of the main opposition party spoke up, but in defense of the defense minister. Namely, Liberal leaders Drazen Budisa and Damir Zoric estimated that it was a good opportunity for improving their relations with the Herzegovinian lobby, as they intended to cover the Bosnia- Herzegovina areas too. Manolic was thus tricked here too, and Tudjman had no more reason to hesitate. The later support of the Liberals in preventing Manolic's abdication at the Chamber of Counties bears no special significance, because it is known in advance how the HDZ "machine" will vote next time. Evidently, no one needs political losers, even when the events confirm their premature "cock's crow."

Peterle Cited on 'Italian Blackmail'

AU1404090994 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0500 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Text] Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle took part in the Radio Villa Opicina contact program last night, answering questions on relations between Slovenia and Italy and analyzing the political situation in our country. Here is a short report by Andrej Pirkovic:

[Begin Pirkovic recording] When asked whether Slovene-Italian relations could be complicated with the possible appointment of the new Italian Prime Minister Designate Berlusconi, Minister Peterle replied that one should first wait for the official stance of the new government. He is convinced that it would not be in Italy's interests to strain the mutual relations.

We shall see it as an act of goodwill, Peterle said, if relations will develop the way we want them to, which is something we have been striving for all the time. In his words, Slovenia will insist on the observation of the legal bases that have already been laid and here the Osimo agreements are a fact that cannot be negated. He assessed positively the work of the negotiating teams for the update of the Osimo agreements.

The fact is that Slovenia and Italy need each other in this region and that this is the only way in which we can envisage the realization of the plans for Trieste and the border provinces.

Regarding Slovenia's integration into the European Union, Foreign Minister Peterle stated resolutely that we would not tolerate any possible Italian blackmail.

Asked about the protection of the Slovene minority in Italy, he replied that our state will continue to take care of the Slovene minority and demand the observation of the European standards by Italy. [end recording]

ΩImpact of Jansa's Departure on Political Scene

94P20624A

[Editorial Report] Following the dismissal of Defense Minister Janez Jansa on 28 March, his Social Democratic Party of Slovenia [SDSS] left the governing coalition, raising the prospect of a political crisis in Slovenia. Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek tried to discount this possibility in an interview published by the Brussels LE SOIR on 31 March. In response to a question about the governing coalition (comprised of Drnovsek's Liberal Democrats [LDS], the Christian Democrats [SDK], the United List of Social Democrats [ZLSD], and Jansa's Social Democrats) now being "threatened" by Jansa's removal, Drnovsek said that his party was prepared to rule with the Christian Democrats alone, because "above all, the entire country first needs continuity and stability." Drnovsek minimized the possibility that other parties would demand a new election, saying he was convinced that the LDS, his own party, would emerge with a majority if "elections were held today."

According to 31 March Ljubljana Radio reports, the LDS discussed future relations with its coalition partners at a closed meeting in which Drnovsek remarked that the coalition agreement would probably have to be "redefined." The SKD, led by Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle, discussed two possibilities: immediate departure from the government or continued cooperation. The SKD leaders decided to remain, stating that in "times of political crisis" the cooperation of the two parties was necessary to establish a "new political balance," and recommending to Drnovsek that the ZLSD, a coalition of leftist parties, leave the government.

A commentary in the 28 March issue of the right-of-center Ljubljana daily SLOVENEC strongly criticized Jansa's removal, characterizing it as "a putsch" organized by the leftist forces, and predicted further polarization of the Slovene political scene—the strengthening of the right-wing opposition parties in their fight against "corruption and neocommunism" on one side and attempts by the leftist parties to "restore old political structures" in all spheres of public life on the other.

The liberal Ljubljana daily DNEVNIK of 28 March expressed concern about the impact of Jansa's dismissal on the military readiness of the armed forces, emphasizing that the army must remain depoliticized. Indicating that there might be further personnel changes in the Defense Ministry and in the armed forces, the paper says that military personnel "carry the largest burden" and must prove that "the army serves the country and does not take part in politics in this critical political situation." In this context, DNEVNIK sees Colonel General Albin Gutman, the armed forces commander, having a "special responsibility," because it depends largely on him how much impact political developments might have on his subordinates.

On 29 March Ljubljana Radio reported that the State Chamber of the Slovene Assembly had confirmed Jansa's removal as defense minister by a vote of 49 in favor and 39 opposed and approved Jelko Kacin, Prime Minister Drnovsek's choice to replace him, by a vote of 48 to 39. In an interview published in DNEVNIK on 25 March, nominee Kacin stated that "recent events" had damaged the reputation of the military, which must try to restore its positive image. He said that as defense minister he would strive to restructure Slovenia's Territorial Defense Force into a modern army composed of highly trained personnel and equipped with sophisticated technology. His goal, he added, was to create a "depoliticized, professional" army whose members would be sought as specialists in the civilian economy when their military careers were concluded.

DNEVNIK's 28 March prediction of further personnel changes appears to have been borne out by Kacin's replacement of Anton Krkovic, commander of the "Moris" 1st Special Brigade, with Vojko Pavlin, former head of the School for Noncommissioned Officers, reported in the 31 March issue of SLOVENEC. According to the 29 March issue of Ljubljana MLADINA, a pro-LDS weekly, "special" units are subordinate directly to the defense minister rather than to the armed forces' chain of command.

Federal

Assembly Declaration Condemns Air Strikes

AU1404110894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 14 Apr 94

[Text] The session of the FRY Assembly Chamber of Citizens that was interrupted about 20 days ago has resumed. Here is Mirjana Protic reporting from the Assembly building:

[Begin Protic recording] Fifteen minutes ago, the Federal Assembly Chamber of Citizens adopted the Federal Assembly declaration concerning the air strikes on the Serbian positions in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Yugoslav Assembly declaration states: The Federal Assembly of the FRY resolutely condemns the NATO armed attacks under UN auspices that caused destruction and casualties among the civilian population. Having carried out these armed attacks, the United Nations has abandoned its impartial peaceful role and openly sided with the Muslim side in the civil war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Federal Assembly expresses extreme concern about the (?unselective) consequences these attacks may have on ending the civil war and on reaching a just political solution in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is known that the clashes have escalated because the protected zones, particularly the one in Gorazde, were used by Muslims for attacking Serbian positions. The United Nations has not ensured disarmament within the protected zone which it was obligated to do, nor did it react to Muslim military actions coming from the protected zones, nor did it exert influence on the Muslim side to stop armed activities.

Behaving in that way the United Nations has taken on itself the risk and responsibility for all possible consequences that cannot be predicted at the moment.

It is regretful that the very United Nations that is obligated by its Charter to keep peace and international security is taking a step that causes the war to escalate and threatens the peace process.

The Federal Assembly warns that the policy of pressure, ultimatums, and armed attacks against the Serbian side does not lead to a peaceful solution of the civil war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Federal Assembly calls on the United Nations to stop immediately aggressive actions against the Serbian people, to abandon double standards toward the participants in the civil war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, to resume dialogue on ceasing all military activities, and to seek a solution exclusively in a political way, through negotiations, respecting the interests of all sides.

The FRY will continue its hitherto constructive policy of active participation in the peace process. However, the FRY will not and cannot be indifferent toward actions that represent armed attacks on the Serbian people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and will continue to monitor closely the further development of the situation. Thus concludes the Federal Assembly declaration that has just been adopted at the session of the Chamber of Citizens. [end recording]

Defense Minister on NATO 'Aggression'

LD1304131894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1238 GMT 13 Apr 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, April 13 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Defence Minister Pavle Bulatovic on Wednesday described NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions as an act of aggression against the Serb people, which could have unconceivable consequences.

In a statement to the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG, Bulatovic said that the United Nations had sided with the Moslems and thus discredited its peacekeeping role and moral prestige.

No one may use "arms to deny anybody's right to defend themselves and the Serb people have a legitimate natural right to self-defence, guaranteed them by the U.N. Charter," he said.

The defence minister said that NATO bombing of Serb positions around Gorazde had hit "not only all the Serbs, but also the conscience of every man opting for peace and ending of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [no closing quotation mark as received]

Said Bulatovic: If NATO's aim had been to persuade all warring sides to start negotiating it produced nothing but an exactly opposite effect—it encouraged those favouring a war option, and worried those well aware that peace cannot be reached by the force of arms.

He went on to say that, after an impartial justice show, representing an act of aggression against the Serb people, which could bring about unforeseeable consequences, one should expect and hope that NATO would give up the law of the stronger and enable the warring sides to lay their arms and return to negotiating a peaceful settlement.

FRY Severs Ties With UN, Demands Strike Ban

BR1304145594 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 13 Apr 94 p 5

[Report on interview with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Frank Westerman in Belgrade on 12 April: "United Nations Must Ban NATO Air Strikes"]

[Text] Belgrade—Following in the footsteps of the nonrecognized Srpska republic in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro are now also severing their ties with the United Nations. Belgrade is demanding that the United Nations impose an immediate ban on NATO air strikes. This was reported on Tuesday by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic in an interview with DE VOLKSKRANT. "I do not see how we can continue to cooperate with the United Nations in the same way," he said.

Until Sunday evening, when at the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] request, NATO fighter jets brought the Serbian offensive on the eastern Bosnian town of Gorazde to a standstill, Belgrade had cooperated closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees "on the execution of its noble task of helping people," Jovanovic claimed.

However, in the wake of "this unforgivable outrage perpetrated by the United Nations," as he described the action, "it is difficult to imagine that our attitude would not change."

Four out of six sites designated as "safe areas" by the United Nations, including the Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, are provided with supplies from Belgrade.

The minister listed a number of requirements which the United Nations must fulfil. Only then, according to the minister, can the peace talks be resumed. "First of all, UN envoy to the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi must state that no further NATO air strikes will take place."

The UN secretary general's special envoy has just threatened to call for more air strikes if the besieging Serbian forces continue to threaten the densely populated city of Gorazde, whose population numbers 65,000 or so, and the aid workers who remain there.

Step two will involve launching a study that Jovanovic believes should result in "self-criticism" by the UN forces. "The United Nations must admit, even if it is too late, that it has made a terrible mistake," the minister dictated.

Because NATO had bombed targets just 20 km from the border, Jovanovic warned of the "possible dangers" of combat aircraft dropping bombs on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro by mistake or violating the country's airspace.

According to him and Western observers, the latter would happen on a regular basis, simply because Gorazde is too close to the border for aircraft to swoop down without leaving Bosnian airspace. Minister Jovanovic suggested that such violations could unleash a response by the Air Force of Serbia and Montenegro. "We have already had to restrain ourselves several times," he said.

Although Jovanovic is lending his full support to the Bosnian Serbs, who are continuing to refuse to speak with UN Commander in Bosnia Michael Rose, he does not believe that the prospects of peace have been lost for good. "However, at this moment in time, the war option has the upper hand. The consequence of the NATO action is that the Muslims and Croats now believe that they can win the war on the battlefield."

Meanwhile, he does not trust the proposal submitted by Russian negotiator Vitaliy Churkin, to station 800 Ukrainian UN troops, who are already on hand, in the enclave as soon as the Serbs have withdrawn. "The Russians have good ideas, but no power," he said. According to him, the presence of Russian UN troops in Sarajevo and Tuzla had not managed to restore the "impartiality" of the United Nations.

The minister, who was a career diplomat who wrote poetry in the evenings, believes that the United Nations has played itself out. "Long before the air strikes, it had abandoned its impartiality by taking the side of the Muslims," he said.

He pointed out that Gorazde never was a "safe area," because the United Nations has not yet started disarming those people who are defending the enclave. "Worse still, under the knowing gaze of UN observers, Bosnian Government troops have used the hills around Gorazde to prepare for a spring offensive," he continued.

The push by Muslim troops, which should have started three weeks ago, was met with a counterattack by the Bosnian Serbs. "Just when they seemed about to overrun their enemy, the United Nations once again suddenly started shouting murder," the minister said. Jovanovic, who describes himself as a humanist, democrat, and socialist, believes that there is a conspiracy.

It has been claimed that only two mortar bombs have landed in Gorazde over the past few days, not the "eight per minute" reported by UN observers. Apparently, UNPROFOR Commander Rose, who initially dismissed the reports by his staff as "emotional" and "exaggerated," later received an order from Washington to clear the way for a NATO air strike.

According to him, the use of combat aircraft had just one objective: "To guard the Muslims against defeat." Mr. Jovanovic believes that Mr. Butrus Butrus-Ghali, his envoy Akashi, and Lieutenant General Rose have gone over the head of the UN Security Council, "thereby losing the United Nations any prestige it might have had."

UN Envoy 'Strongly Condemns' Air Strikes

LD1304093794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0814 GMT 13 Apr 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] New York, April 13 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Ambassador to the United Nations Dragomir Djokic on Tuesday accused the United Nations and NATO of getting involved in civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the side of the Moslems when they bombed Bosnian Serb positions at Gorazde on Sunday and Monday.

Speaking at a press conference at U.N. headquarters, Ambassador Djokic read out a statement by the Yugoslav Government about the NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions around the Moslem enclave. The Yugoslav stands were communicated also to Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

The Yugoslav Government strongly condemns the decision of the United Nations to engage the NATO air force, which represents their direct involvement in the civil war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina on the side of the Moslems, the statement said.

Djokic told reporters that Bosnian Serbs had not tried to seize Gorazde and that U.N. officials on the ground had confirmed that the Moslems had provoked the fight. It is only to be expected that those attacked should defend themselves, there is not an army in the world that would react differently, said Djokic.

He explained the Yugoslav position that there was absolutely no reason to use force in this case and that, instead, the Moslems should have been warned to stop their provocations. However, now a very dangerous situation has been created, where it is not clear who will take the next step and what it will be, he said.

The air strikes have only encouraged the Moslems, who have been trying to provoke a foreign intervention from the start. The Serbs are committed to peace, but if the Moslems continue to attack, the Serbs will be forced to respond, as they will also in the case of possible new NATO air raids, said Djokic.

He added that Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) as well as the Bosnian Serbs had from the start insisted that a solution should be sought in peace talks, and not in the battlefield. However, somebody came up with the idea that Bosnian Serbs should be excluded from the talks, and they were not invited to Moslem-Croat federation consultations in Washington in mid-March, nor have they been told specifically what is expected of them, stressed Djokic.

The Serbs cannot accept a solution agreed in their absence by the Moslems and Croats. If anybody should try to force it on them, there is no doubt they will be repulsed. Serbs want peaceful talks as equal partners, said Djokic.

Government To Require Visas for UN Personnel

LD1304172494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1646 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—At this evening's session, presided over by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, the federal government considered current questions of cooperation with the UN peacekeeping forces and decided that prior permission of the Yugoslav Government is necessary for the entry and movement of UN Protection Forces' [UNPROFOR] vehicles on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. Visas from the competent Yugoslav authorities will also be necessary, from 20 April, for the entry and residence of every member of the "Blue Helmets" in the FRY, the Federal Information Ministry has announced.

The federal government assessed that the UN peacekeeping forces, with their invitation to NATO to bomb Serb positions around Gorazde, have completely sided with the Muslim side in the civil war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and ignored the vital fact that it was precisely the Muslim forces, exploiting the safe zone, which attacked Serb positions first.

The federal government stated these facts with regret and once again condemned in the sharpest terms this behavior by UNPROFOR and the armed action of NATO. In the assessment of the federal government, these acts directly threaten the peace process and could lead to the escalation of the conflict, not only in this area but in a broader region.

In its cooperation with UNPROFOR hitherto, the Yugoslav Govenment was guided by its interest in the cessation of combat operations as soon as possible and in the reaching of a just solution through negotiations. It worked to the best of its ability and within its limited capabilities, to make it easier for UNPROFOR to perform its functions. The federal government did this, it was concluded, with huge sacrifices and efforts under the conditions of the unjustly imposed UN Security Council sanctions against the FRY, which contravene the UN Charter.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been tasked with informing the UNPROFOR main headquarters about the conclusions of the federal government, a statement by the Federal Ministry of Information says in conclusion.

Government Withdraws AFP, CNN Accreditations

AU1304184794 Paris AFP in English 1823 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, April 13 (AFP)—The Yugoslav government officially withdrew press accreditations from AFP correspondents here Wednesday [13 April], accusing them of waging a "media war" against Belgrade.

The information ministry withdrew accreditations from bureau chief Nicolas Miletitch and three other journalists to cover events in Serbia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], but not for Serb-held areas of Croatia and Bosnia.

On Tuesday the ministry accused AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE and Cable News Network (CNN) of "waging a merciless media war against Yugoslavia, from its territory." [passage omitted]

The AFP journalists whose accreditation was withdrawn can continue to coordinate coverage of events in Macedonia and Albania.

Correspondents Expelled

LD1204183094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1804 GMT 12 Apr 94

[Text] Belgrade, 12 Apr—The Federal Yugoslav Information Ministry said in a statement this evening that accreditations would be withdrawn from the French AFP news agency correspondent and the correspondent of the American CNN TV network.

The statement reads:

"Federal Information Minister Slobodan Ignjatovic has decided to take legal measures against the correspondents who have been waging a fierce media war against Yugoslavia, and this on the territory of Yugoslavia. This practically means that accreditations will be withdrawn from the AFP and CNN correspondents and they will not be permitted to do any further work from tomorrow, 13 April.

"Acreditations will also be withdrawn in the next few days from other foreign media correspondents who have been demonizing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb people for months, and some of them for years," the statement says.

AFP 'Strongly' Protests

AU1204204194 Paris AFP in English 1951 GMT 12 Apr 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, April 12 (AFP)—The Yugoslav information ministry said Tuesday [12 April] it was withdrawing press accreditation from AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE [AFP] and Cable News Network (CNN), accusing them of waging a "media war" against Belgrade.

The exact reason for the move was not immediately clear.

AFP management strongly protested the measure, calling for the decision to be reversed. [passage omitted]

An AFP management statement said: "AFP has followed the ethical rules of the profession rigidly and in all areas, over the several decades it has been in Yugoslavia."

The cause of the Yugoslav action was not immediately clear. It came after NATO air raids on Bosnian Serb forces besieging the eastern Bosnian Moslem enclave of Gorazde.

CNN does not have a permanent bureau in Belgrade.

Assessment of NATO's Role, Aims in Bosnia

AU1204195694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1525 GMT 12 Apr 94

[Commentary by Jovan Lakicevic from the "An Argument More" program]

[Text] After the cowardly, repeated attack by U.S. aircraft from NATO formations on medical vehicles and civilian targets of the Bosnian Serbs, many things remain unclear and puzzling, especially regarding the real, undeclared aims of the inspirers of the aforementioned pirate action. It is, therefore, too early to draw any conclusions on the political and military effects of this act, which can be considered criminal in every respect. In other words, it is too early to judge what was gained and what was lost lost by different sides.

Nevertheless, one could say that all those who believed in a peaceful and quick settlement of the Bosnian conflict are the losers. Moreover, all those who thought that the U.S. involvement in the forced creation of some kind of Muslim-Croat federation serves the peace process are also disappointed. Even the last skeptics must now be clear that this was a simple camouflage for a quick renewal of an anti-Serbian coalition so the Serbs could be militarily pressed and forced, with NATO's help, to accept the dictate of the Western alliance.

Those who believed in the impartial and peaceful role of the United Nations also feel deceived. What can be said about those who thought for at least one moment that the belligerent and anti- Serbian hawks in NATO would play peace pigeons here under the trade mark of the United Nations? In other words, that they would keep aside of the interethnic war in Bosnia.

The Russians could also be considered political losers. With these unilateral actions by the Americans, they—to put it mildly—lost a step on the way back to the Balkan region. Subsequent, unconvincing anger by Russian leaders—because they were allegedly not informed about NATO's intentions—was directed more toward, as the U.S. President said, the public at home rather than Washington and Brussels.

The only winner appears to be NATO, which, without major upheavals in the international public and, so far, without Serbian revanchism, won a chance to go a step further in its offensive on neutral territory.

For the first time in its history, NATO attacked ground targets (?in Europe) from the air. The fact that this was done with a limited, relatively small number of aircraft indicates that this was a trail balloon and yet another forced precedent. This is paving the way for similar actions by NATO in the future in this and some other regions.

It would not be superfluous to recall that it was precisely in Bosnia's case that NATO, with the decisive role of the United States, first succeeded in becoming something of an extended hand of the United Nations in the peacetime military operations, then in becoming a protector of the United Nations Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] from the air, and finally in bombing targets on the ground. The right to make decisions on air strikes, which was first given to Butrus-Ghali, then to Yasushi Akashi, ended with the one who Washington and NATO headquarters in Brussels wanted to have it right from the very beginning—with one of NATO military commanders. Since all these variations were peformed almost without any criticism, let alone resistance by the instrumentilized and deceived international public, and without any reaction by the corrupted and immature politicians, one can rightly expect NATO's next move to be according to the U.S. dictate. This would be the landing and intervention by ground forces that will carry out not only the UN tasks but the orders of the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance.

It is not impossible at all that this precedent-variation will be tested and endorsed by the public in Bosnia. Regarding this, the report that the landing of planes with weapons and NATO forces for rapid intervention on Bihac airport is indicative. If this report turns out to be correct, then this would undoubtedly be the beginning of the last, the hitherto untested, but the most dangerous variation of NATO formations' involvement.

The Serbs have suspected for a long time, and have now finally seen, that their opponents in the Bosnian war are not only the Croats and the Muslims, but also, to the same extent, NATO and the United States for their own reasons. They finally revealed themselves in the true light of friends of the Serbian enemies. Of course this fact is not easy to take, but it must be faced.

If the rest of the world does not realize in time that NATO military involvement in Bosnia is not only a matter or a problem that exists between the Bosnian Serbs and NATO formations, but playing out of all types of possible interventions by NATO for some future actions and some new territories, so much the worse for the rest of the indifferent world. The world will very soon face a military monster that will be a merciless punishing whip for the unsuitable and disobedient peoples in the hands of the protagonists of the new world order.

Therefore, the U.S. bombs that were dropped on Serbian targets in Bosnia not only represent an act of aggression and crime toward the Serbian people, but have a much more dangerous and foreboding meaning.

Serbia

Churkin in Belgrade on 'Surprise Visit'

LD1304183594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1818 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 13 April (TANJUG)—Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian president's special envoy, arrived from Pale in Belgrade late this afternoon, where he was received by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Their strictly confidential talks were held behind closed doors but there is no doubt that the main reason for Churkin's surprise visit to Belgrade is the newly created situation in Bosnia following NATO air strikes on Serb positions around Gorazde. [passage omitted]

Peace Initiative Discussed

LD1304184894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1824 GMT 13 Apr 94

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic this evening again received Vitaliy Churkin, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's special envoy, who arrived in Belgrade following talks in Sarajevo and Pale.

As the Serbian president's office has announced, the talks focused on the current situation, while particular attention was paid to the initiative for reaching a general agreement on the cessation of all hostilities on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Serbian president stressed in talks that abandoning the practice of discriminating between the warring sides in former Bosnia-Herzegovina represents an unavoidable precondition for reaching a final peace.

Akashi Says Meeting With Milosevic 'Productive'

LD1304134794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1300 GMT 13 Apr 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, April 13 (TANJUG)—U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) chief for the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi said on Wednesday that he had agreed with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic that "the current crisis in Gorazde should be used as a chance to secure a lasting peace and ceasefire in the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Asked about his current contacts with the Bosnian Serb leadership, who suspended all links with UNPROFOR after the NATO air attacks on Serb positions near Gorazde (Moslem enclave in southeast Bosnia), Akashi said he had received assurances from Milosevic that he can continue the talks with the Bosnian Serb leaders.

"I intend to fly to Sarajevo to resume the talks regarding the ceasefire and peace, not only in connection to Gorazde but also linked to all other situations and I am very satisfied by such prospects," Akashi said.

He described the hour-and-a-half meeting with the Serbian president, held on Wednesday morning, as "very useful and productive."

"I appreciate his understanding of the complexity and urgency of these issues," Akashi said.

Commenting on the possibility of additional air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, Akashi underscored his hope that the situation would not deteriorate to such an extent to force UNPROFOR to defend itself and the staff of humanitarian organizations with the minimum of weapons.

U.S. NATO jets on April 10-11 bombed Bosnian Serb positions near Gorazde, a U.N.-designated safe area which should have been demilitarized. It served as the starting point for a 10,000-strong Moslem offensive in late March on Serb territories. After a strong Serb counter attack, which threatened to defeat the Moslems, the United Nations called for NATO air strikes on Serb positions allegedly to protect U.N. observers in Gorazde.

At last Saturday's negotiations with the Moslems, the Bosnian Serbs proposed a ceasefire in the entire Bosnian territory, but the Moslems rejected this suggesting a partial ceasefire and focusing only on the issue of Gorazde.

Criticism of Ministers in Assembly Session

94BA0237B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 21 Mar 94 pp 10-14

[Article by Milan Milosevic and Dragoslav Grujic of the Documentation Center: "The Dunces' Corner"]

[Text] *Vuk Draskovic: "I like Professor Avramovic, he drafted a rather interesting economic and monetary program, but the minister of police represents continuity and is the pivot in the country of Serbia. That is what the prime minister-designate has told us!"*

Our public, tired of this performance, will perhaps discover that last week's session of the Assembly brought the Serbian parliament closer to the role which every parliament has: to suspect, abuse, and criticize the ministers. This suits the Serbian deputies better than the declamations we have heard up to now.

Dr. Miroslav Neskovic took as his point of departure that in selection of the government "there have been cases in which we have ministers and people in high-ranking posts with a pedestrian psychology and knowledge to match, people of doubtful morality, people whose behavior smacks of corruption and black-marketeering, avaricious people without scruples, people who have brought with them only scandal, investigation, and ridicule": "The consequences of installing ministers, chiefs, and coordinators like this are disastrous. An inefficient, undefined, and chaotized state of affairs in all areas: monetary policy, trade policy, tax policy, business policy, and health care policy."

Prime Minister-designate Marjanovic listened to those challenging salvos with a sour smile, refreshing himself from time to time with lemonade at the bar near the entrance or coolly chatting with the journalists in the corridor (which is unusual for prime ministers, who usually slip away into the elevator). Some of the ministers would put an arm around his waist as a sign of support (as Radulovic did when the VREME reporter was in the vicinity).

Public Vices

Judging by the assessment it pronounced of him, the opposition would like to give him a term considerably longer than four years, in Mitrovica, not in Belgrade. Someone said from the speaker's stand in the parliament that Progres, of which he is the director, is a "typical state enterprise which has a state monopoly over imports of natural gas, immense state privileges, and secret funds," that "Marjanovic finally entered the administration and became president of the Partizan Society, which brings together the military elite, the business elite, the party elite, and the UDBA [State Security Administration] elite, by the same principle, which is that of being associated with UDBA" (Vesna Pesic)..., that the territory of the former Soviet Union, where Progres did its business, is not a market anyway, but a "speculative kind of realm." The deputies were amazingly well-prepared in asserting that people very close to the prime minister-designate are co-owners of a domestic quasi-private firm Progres Gas Trading, representing business taken away from the Serbian Petroleum Industry, that a villa is being built for him on Dedinje, that he has property estimated at 40 million dinars, that he financed the campaign of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and the rebellion against Yeltsin in order to return the Communists to the Kremlin (Aleksandar Cotric), that he based his campaign largely on discrediting the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] and accusations lodged against the humanitarian organization Spona [Link] (Aleksandra Jankovic); that the representative office of Progres in New York, which is called Interprogres, reregistered as a private firm under the same name at the expense of Progres and that this is the property of Mirko Marjanovic; and even that Mr. Marjanovic's secretary, Adrijana Jankovic, is employed in the Progres representative office in Frankfurt, although there are better-trained people for that job, that he sent the incompetent retired director of Trepca to Moscow.

A question was put as to the prime minister-designate's state of health, because he said that for reasons of health he traveled exclusively by Concorde planes between Paris and New York; he is reproached for having done business with Agrokomerc, for having done business with Senad Arslanagic of Progres Sarajevo, who had shady business dealings with the Swiss firm Tuson, that he did risky business by investing in the Zenica Foundry and Steel Mill just before the war, perhaps because of the prime minister's closeness to Branko Mikulic (Zoran Subotic), that he had deceived the knitwear mill in Batocina concerning goods exported to Russia (Slavoljub Filipovic).

Up to the point when this article went to press (Thursday afternoon), the Socialists had not taken the trouble to deny these assertions, perhaps because some of them were happy that the opposition "remembered" these figures. One exception was the intervention of Dusan Matkovic, who in reference to the "insinuations about the firm Progres" called for "light to be shed on the other side as well": "Let it be stated that in the last year and a half, in the worst time for supplying Serbia with gas, Progres worked to employ plant capacity in Serbia and to export Serbian goods to those markets from which the gas comes!"

Kidnappings, Copper, and Poaching

The man who represents continuity, Police Minister Sokolovic, fared worse than Prime Minister-Designate Marjanovic. They called him Zoran (Jerotije) Sokolovic, they recommend that he not resign out of revenge because he resembles Nusic's heroes, and they remind the public that Police Minister Sokolovic's apartment has been broken into and robbed no less than three times, and the thieves have not been discovered.

The prime minister-designate praised him briefly, giving him credit for having guaranteed "a stable security situation under the extremely complicated conditions of being surrounded by war" and for what he had done to modernize the service.

The response he got was assertions that Mr. Sokolovic is a minister in whose police a number of abuses of official position have been committed, including one case in Jagodina where the police killed a retarded young Gypsy lad. Borivoje Borojevic said that the police had arrested 15 people because of a murder in Budva, that all of them "were bestially tortured, beaten, and sent to Montenegro, criminal proceedings were conducted against five, and they were all acquitted."

"He had the honor of celebrating when his subordinates in Belgrade beat a retired actress in the bread line...," Miodrag Brankov recalled. A few speakers put on his scoreboard the events of 1 June last year, when the police beat the opposition leader Vuk Draskovic and his wife Danica and a sizable number of other individuals.

It was stressed that our country has been utterly criminalized, as indicated by the statistics which the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the police have themselves been reporting, that there is more and more crime, that in Belgrade alone there are 54 unsolved murders at the moment.

"I expected the minister in charge to have submitted his resignation on his own a long time ago..., what he is responsible for seems to be getting worse and worse. I do not precisely understand the logic—why this continuity is continuing.... I might cite the kidnapping in Strpci..., a number of things have happened," Dr. Zarko Korac said.

Milisav Petkovic asserted that 20 people were kidnapped from Zvornik alone and that he has information indicating that our police even took part in all of that. A man who was registered in the Military Department for 10 years, who is a citizen of the Republic of Serbia, was kidnapped and abducted, some information suggests that he is in a school in Derventa, where training was conducted for seven days. Then they made them sign statements that they are volunteers, Petkovic asserted, seeking aid from Marjanovic so that someone would not one day kidnap him as a man born in Knin.

The assertion was made several times that the police have been protecting criminals. One deputy said that no fewer than two-thirds of the firms have been giving bribes, that Sokolovic's son has been selling precious metals and that the father has a duty to say whether he is influencing the business of his son; that Jezda got away from him and that Dafina is laughing at him because he cannot do anything to her.

The Radicals supplied the information that the smuggling of a sizable quantity of weapons was discovered on 3 March on the highway between Nis and Pirot in a traffic accident, but the affair was covered up because it allegedly involved a former relative of the deputy minister of internal affairs. Assertions were made that police chiefs, Sokolovic's people, are the main poachers in the Morava Valley. Slavoljub Filipovic called attention to the datum that an arms cache had been found in Topola, but the police have been silent, that the "chief" in Jagodina had been selling stolen automobiles from Vukovar, that weapons permits are being distributed through connections.... On the assertion of Aleksandar Cotric, 34 Golf cars stolen from a factory near Sarajevo were sold on the territory of Loznica Opstina, driven to Serbia, where the top leadership in the opstina government and their friends bought the cars for the trifling price of about 5,000 marks. The opstina has four times requested information on this from the MUP and Mr. Sokolovic (on 22 October, 5 November, 22 November, and 9 December 1993). It has not received a response to this day.

UDBA and the Merchants

If vague epithets are neglected to the effect that this is not a government of ethnic unity, but a "government of mafioso unity," the other ministers fared somewhat better, and the government was described the way import-export firms were once described—"UDBA and the Merchants." Dusan Vlatkovic, candidate for finance minister who was previously governor of the National Bank, was called upon to provide an explanation to all the savings depositors who were deceived (Slobodan Vuksanovic).

The ministers coming from the Associated Left were welcomed with rejoicing—Who is composing the government, the president of the republic or his wife? One deputy even said of Dr. Leposava Milicevic that she had become a minister "only because she had taken Mrs. Mirjana Markovic's blood pressure."

"Mr. Andrija, the famous Andra, known as Eva Milosavljevic of Zagubice, former president of Zagubice Opstina, was the main organizer of the spree at the source of the Mlava in Zagubice (Zivorad Jeremic)."

It was said of Mr. Radovan Pankov that he helped to falsify the election in Krajina and was rewarded for that with a ministerial post; that he is well-known in Krajina not for having bound the Serbian people together, but for having bound the top leadership of the SPS and the State Security Service of Serbia with the Krajina State Security Service. ("I apologize for having been redundant when I said the top leadership of the SPS and the State Security

Service of Serbia!" said Aleksandar Vucic). As for binding the people together, he is not a favorite at all....

Several deputies reproached the future ministers and even the prime minister himself for their intention to remain the managers of their firms, which is prohibited in parliamentary systems in the West: "Half of the government consists of managers who have no intention of leaving their positions (Velimir Simonovic)."

"It is obvious that the post of director of the Belgrade import-export firm Progres is stronger than the post of prime minister of Serbia. Or, the post of director of the Belgrade commercial firm Centromarket, held up to now by Mr. Slobodan Radulovic, is stronger than the post of deputy prime minister of Serbia (Milovan Konstantinovic)."

"There are people in the government who are not men of principle—not only were they recommended earlier as members of the government, but they could not wait for their parties to take a position, and when they saw that their parties would take a position they did not like, they became members of the government. I simply do not trust such people (Miodrag Brankov)."

The reference was to two officials of the Democratic Party [DS] (Radulovic and Djukic), who became part of the government against the will of their party. Radulovic, it seems, is refusing to give up his mandate and is complicating relations with the Democratic Party and announcing an appeal of the expulsion decision. Djindjic has let it be known that he is still hesitating on whether the Democrats will vote for the government or against it, although a majority in his caucus were against voting "for" (the top leadership of the party was mostly in favor of supporting the government). Djindjic has met with Milosevic, but that new meeting did not yield a result. The president of the Democratic Party observed during the debate that a government of national unity had not come about, but that it would one day. That unity, according to him, cannot occur just by the Socialists taking a few ministers from some party (they could have taken several more, we have plenty of them!), but that the condition is discontinuation of what has been the policy up to now, on which there has to be an agreement in principle among the parties.

The Program

Marjanovic's program, which is more a letter of intent, takes for granted a return to the sound dinar, balancing budget revenues and expenditures, and financial discipline. Many Socialists have been cheerfully repeating this as a general phrase, but they have not gone into the meaning of it.

Marjanovic says frankly that the foreign exchange reserves are larger than was assumed and are "sufficient if the program is carried out consistently," which means that he does not hide his intention to commit them somehow.

His government has the intention of extending the tax system over the gray economy. His message to the large firms is that they not wait for government subsidies.

He announced that the government would insist on the export orientation of the economy and on "resolute and wise opening up to the world."

He announced optimization and reduction of public expenditure, removal of social welfare policy from the business firm so that expenditures do not have to be made to maintain production in unprofitable firms. Although he stressed that at this point "it is not a question of laying off the unutilized and redundant workers," but of "respecting the fact that some of those who are not employed have their own capital, land," the Serbian Radicals and Kostunica's Democrats, and in a considerable number of discussions the deputies of the SPO as well, openly expressed doubts about the government's intentions, lodging the charge that it wants to lay off more than a million workers, but it is not going to chase managers who have private firms.

"This government is a government whose task is to squeeze that last drop from the organism of Serbia's state and people, which is already as dry as a bone," Vuk Draskovic said.

They described the program as "the system of the leech, only slightly updated, with the same purpose as the loan, Dafina and the like" (Mihajlo Svilar).

The Socialists did not answer this criticism of the government, whose point of departure was social demagogy, sensing that they themselves might soon be attacking Avramovic's "penzos." It turned out that they nevertheless have a hard time thinking about a radical break with wartime policy and the wartime economy.

When Vesna Pesic asked how the prime minister-designate intends to cover the deficit of $1.5 billion when we "have had occasion to hear President Milosevic say that Serbia should be militarily the most powerful state in the Balkans," there was the usual uproar and mention of Zimmermann and the U.S. Congress.... Paying no attention to that uproar, she continued: "I ask the question Why? What kind of plan is there for us to be the most powerful state in the Balkans, how many tanks and artillery guns (above Sarajevo) will we continue to pay for them so that they can sit there and fire on the civilian population!" "With what will the Serb defend himself, gentlemen, if not with a cannon?" was the response she received the next day from Belic, a deputy of the SPS, a farmer of whom Kostunica said in the last convocation that even that could be a deputy. Raka Radovic and Prof. Ratko Markovic, author of the constitution and a new minister, were "dying with laughter" all the while.

The day before the session the Socialists had a tumultuous "all-evening" and "all-morning" meeting of the caucus during which the prime minister- designate's list underwent essential changes. This indicates not only the "nervousness about personnel," but also, per usual, as we have seen in all previous attempts at reform, the main resistance to reform comes from the government apparatus itself.

"The atmosphere in Serbia in which this program is being carried out is unfortunately such that it cannot succeed. I believe that it will not be long before even the Socialists renounce both Avramovic and that program; I am afraid that the opposition will again stand behind their [the Socialists'] candidate, just as was the case with Cosic, just as was the case with Panic" (Borivoje Radic).

Not knowing exactly what to do with a program which is basically acceptable to it, the opposition took a fierce grasp of what was so obviously within its reach—it disputed the credibility of the people in power. In Serbia, that is not an issue without importance.

Serb Construction Plans for 'Kolos' Supercannon

94BA0222A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian
18 Feb 94 pp 2-3

[Article by Mate Basic: "Serb 'Kolos' Supercannon, With Range of 60 Kilometers, Threatens Zagreb and Sarajevo!"]

[Text] *Based on the plans drawn up by Canadian engineer Gerald Bull, the designer of the Iraqi supercannon who was assassinated in Brussels by Mossad, the Serbian military industry has developed a giant 203-mm cannon with a barrel measuring 12 meters in length, with which Zagreb can be hit from Petrinje and Sarajevo can be shelled without violating the NATO ultimatum.*

Mate Basic uncovers one of the most strictly guarded Yugoslav secrets. Illustrations by Zdenko Svircic.

The withdrawal of Serb artillery to a distance of 20 km around Sarajevo will not prevent the destruction of the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina!

The majority of the Serb artillery can launch destructive projectiles at two or even three times the distance established in the ultimatum on the withdrawal of Serb heavy arms. But the greatest danger is a hitherto unknown weapon, guarded as one of the biggest state secrets—a Serb 203-mm howitzer! This weapon was developed under the code name KOLOS!

The investment program to develop a Serb 203-mm supercannon ended back in 1985, but the medium-term plan for the period from 1985 to 1990 included a program for additional production of 90,000 155-mm and 203-mm shells, a completely new type with a significantly greater range!

The financing plan for the all-Yugoslav "Kolos" project was concluded in 1987: Investments were approved for the Slovene steel works in Store and Ravne na Koroskem (new furnaces and new presses for forging barrels), for the "Bratstvo" factory in Novi Travnik (forging and deep drilling of barrels), for the factory in Vogosca, near Sarajevo (forging and machining of 120-kg shells), for the "Ivo Lola Ribar" factory in Zeleznik, near Belgrade (computer control systems for processing gun breeches and for robots).... Besides these major plants, more than 500 factories all over the former Yugoslavia were involved in the overall project. "Kolos" was only the main beneficiary of the investment, since the machines were also used to produce other weapons or parts of them. The total value of the investment at the time was more than $2 billion!

Reliable information indicates that even after 1987 the Serbs were working on realizing the "Kolos" project! In early 1993, "14 October" in Krusevac presented a finished transporter tank whose chassis was intended as a carrier for the Serb supercannon! Then, at the newly opened weapons testing range across the border from Prevlaka on the Montenegrin coast, tests were conducted in the fall of 1993 on a long-range system to record on radar screens the movements of ships from the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO that were enforcing the blockade on Montenegrin harbors! Thus, the threats previously expressed by General Zivota Panic, the former chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia, and chetnik duke Vojislav Seselj concerning attacks against targets in Europe with long-range missiles must in fact be regarded as extremely dangerous. Specifically, these threats were expressed only as sheer disinformation, because the attention of the world public was supposed to be directed toward the development of Serb missile systems (which they cannot do, just as they cannot start up production of the "Orkan"), while in reality intensive work was being done on developing a long-range artillery gun!

Shells for Only $800

Qualified missile experts who are well-acquainted with the technological scope of the Serb military industry responsibly assert that the "Orkan" missile with a range of 50 km constitutes their maximum capability in developing surface-to-surface missile projectiles. Any increase in the range of missile projectiles requires the development of completely new, high-energy rocket fuels (which they do not have!) as well as the development of projectile-guidance systems if they want to achieve firing accuracy. Serbia lacks both the material and the personnel for such essentially new technological ranges, especially under sanction conditions.

Moreover, the cost of firing missile projectiles is much greater than the cost of firing artillery shells.

Specifically, according to the price list of the Commission for JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] Property Succession, one launcher-vehicle for a 262-mm M-87 "Orkan" multibarrel rocket launcher costs $540,000 and one launcher-vehicle for a FROG-7 "Luna" also costs $540,000, while one launcher-vehicle for a 128-mm M-77 "Oganj" multibarrel rocket launcher costs

$360,000. Right now, a 130-mm M-46 cannon costs $228,000, while a 152-mm M-84 "Nora" howitzer costs $280,000.

There are also large differences in the price (which Serb military-equipment experts too are certainly keeping in mind) of missile projectiles and artillery shells: While the price of one missile is $2,600 for the "Oganj," $6,000 for the "Orkan," and $15,500 for the "Luna," a shell for the 130-mm cannon costs (only) $180, with $260 for the "Nora," while it would cost only around $800 for the long-range 203-mm cannon ("Kolos")!

The final argument on behalf of the development of a Serb supercannon is the complete technological independence from foreign partners! With the production capacity and machinery of special-purpose industry at its disposal, the former Yugoslavia was able to produce all the elements necessary for the production of artillery guns and ammunition of calibers 130 to 203 mm.

After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, some parts of special-purpose industry also disintegrated, and the Serbs lost control over certain important factories. For example, the "Bratstvo" heavy artillery factory in Novi Travnik, which had an annual capacity of around 300 heavy artillery guns.

But although they lost this factory, the Serbs retained enough capacity to regenerate almost the entire previous production of artillery guns: At the "Prva Petoletka" factory in Trstenik, there is machinery for deep drilling of barrels and for superfinishing (honing) them to a depth of 16 meters and a diameter of 400 mm; at the "Cer" factory in Cacak furnaces are produced for heat treatment of barrels; and several other large and small Serbian or Montenegrin factories can also be included in the overall system ("I.L. Ribar" in Zeleznik, "Zeljezara" and "Aluminijski Kombinat" in Niksic, and so forth). Steel to produce Serb supercannons can be easily procured on the market. This commercial type of steel is called "maraging" (an abbreviation for "martensite generation"), and its only drawback is that it is expensive. Specifically, one kilogram costs $100! Moreover, all the equipment for producing ammunition has remained in Serb hands.

This equipment was previously tested at the firing range in Prevlaka, one of the most modern ranges in the world: It is known that the Germans have conducted target practice there while testing the 30-mm "Gepard" antiair gun. Today, a similar firing range has been set up on the Montenegrin part of the coast, across the border from Prevlaka. There is also a testing range in Syrmia, near Nikinci. It was created by seizing farmland from Croats and expelling them after World War II, and is also exceptionally well-equipped. This is confirmed by the fact that the Swedes used it to test their antitank missiles....

Secret Cooperation With Iraq

The crucial role in launching the "Kolos" project was played by Dr. Gerald Bull, a Canadian known throughout the world as the designer of Saddam Husayn's never-completed "Babylon cannon" (the powder for which was produced in Vitez), with barrels measuring one meter in diameter and 52 meters in length. The range of this gun was supposed to be around 600 km. Bull began official cooperation with the Military Technology Institute (VTI) in Belgrade in 1984, by way of the Federal Directorate for Trade and Commodity Reserves (SDPR) and SRC (Space Research Corporation) in Brussels, of which he was the founder and owner. At the same time, Bull was cooperating with Iraq (which was a scrupulously guarded secret), but also with South Africa, Canada, and even China. He was engrossed with the idea of creating a cannon that could shoot down satellites, and he called the project HARP (High Altitude Research Program).

After he was assassinated in Brussels by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, his associates published a book entitled *From the Paris Cannon to HARP*, in which they described exhaustively the genesis and development of the new cannon project. Specifically, Bull began by studying the 210-mm "Paris cannon," with a range of 130 km, with which the Germans shelled Paris in 1918. He then proposed an improved version to the Americans, and after they turned him down the Canadians sent him a million dollars for his annual expenses, as part of the long-range "Barbados cannon" project. When that contract expired, he became an honored guest of VTI in Belgrade, but also of other institutions and factories involved in the production of artillery. With his team of experts, he offered everything that he had—his know-how—but in return he gained the opportunity to use one of the world's most modern artillery testing ranges, the one in Prevlaka. Still, his work in Iraq continued to be classified top secret, although people knew about the 210-mm "Iraqi cannon" (the same caliber as the "Paris cannon" with barrels of 52 caliber (210 mm x 52), and thus a length of 10 meters. This was only the transitional phase preceding the construction of the planned "Babylon cannon"....

Besides gaining use of modern testing equipment for all calibers between 130 and 203 mm, Gerald Bull, through the SDPR, also sold his highly modern shells, produced according to his plans. Thus, the government of the former Yugoslavia, through the SDPR, was one of the biggest suppliers of Bull's products. For each sold shell produced under his license, the military industries who used his services paid Bull 10 percent of the value. Logically, part of the debt-servicing costs were settled through barter transactions....

What did Bull work on in Yugoslavia? Yugoslav military researchers managed, independently of Bull's license, to increase the range of the "Nora," using the TF152 projectile, from 23,932.9 meters to 28,893.1 meters, and through later, additional testing they increased the range of that gun to a total of 39.5. Bull also participated in the startup of production of the ERFE-BB long-range projectile, with calibers of 130 mm, 155 mm, and 203 mm. Besides increasing the range of the projectile, Bull also helped solve certain design problems in the cannon itself. Based on his ideas, conversion of the famous 130-mm Russian M-46 cannon was carried out. A completely new 155-mm barrel was placed on the old pedestal, which made the shells significantly more deadly, and their range was increased to 39 km. The cannon bears a new name: M-46/84. But a special shell with a greater range was also developed for the old caliber (130), so that now it launches projectiles at a distance of 38,000 meters instead of 27,490 meters. The development of the M-87 "Nora" (an abbreviation of New Artillery Weapon) project lasted two years, until the advent of Bull and his associates. It was only after their expert intervention that the project was completed under the name M-84....

Gerald Bull's main associate, to whom he passed on his knowledge, was a full professor at the School of Engineering in Belgrade with the rank of general, Dr. Anastas Paligoric, the director of the artillery section at the VTI, and also the designer of the 152-mm howitzer, better known as the "Nora." Based on the knowledge transferred from SRC, the entire team of military scientists conducted further research into increasing the range and improving the design of artillery ammunition, and on the design of the gun itself, with a barrel length of 52 caliber.

Zorica Subotic and Slobodan Jarmaz published work on the *Projection of Gas Generators to Increase Artillery Range,* Milojko Ignjac and Slobodan Jarmaz analyzed *The Selection of Fuel Characteristics for Gas Generators to Increase the Range of Artillery Projectiles,* and Dragoslav Negoicic and Toni Arsic published the results of the study *Gas Generator Lighter to Increase the Range of the TH 152-mm NORA Artillery Projectile.*

What is remarkable about the Bull projects? This ingenious designer devised a way to enormously increase the range of artillery pieces by reducing the resistance of the artillery projectile.

Indeed, the biggest problem was how to reduce the resistance created by the projectile itself, as a result of the turbulent air current caused by the motion of the projectile itself (so-called background resistance, which accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total resistance). This problem was solved through the revolutionary introduction of the "Base Bleed" natural gas generator. The innovation here is that during the flight of the projectile the gas generator released gas at the rear of the projectile, the volume of which filled the vacuum behind the projectile, thus almost completely eliminating the biggest share of resistance.

Just as the introduction of the jet engine revolutionized aviation, the introduction of the gas generator revolutionized artillery. Indeed, it involves an extremely complicated chemical process, which Serbia was unable to achieve alone. That is why the Croatian chemicals industry was involved, especially research teams at Ina [Petroleum Refining and Sales Enterprise]. This was the biggest military secret at that enterprise. The technology for producing high-level polymer materials was studied—hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB). Today, based on the results of that research, Serbs at "Miloje Zakic" in Krusevac can product HTPB, the key raw material for the gas generator.

By applying additional improvements (higher-quality steel for the barrels, use of better powder, greater barrel length), the range of artillery weapons was increased almost twice over.

In this way, the Serbs have produced much cheaper and more deadly artillery pieces, with much greater accuracy! According to some data, this product would pay for itself if 18 units were sold abroad....

Menacing Shell Weighing 100 Kg

According to the final plans, the "Kolos" itself was supposed to be a self-propelled 203-mm howitzer modeled after a similar Russian weapon known as the "Piton." Two variants were developed: the towed version with the option of independent movement on the battlefield, and the self-propelled version on the chassis of the known tracked vehicle. Initial testing was conducted on a sample of the U.S. "M 110" howitzer, but the concrete results are not known. All that is known is that in the joint project between SRC, Yugoslavia, and Iraq, Saddam Husayn's howitzer achieved a range of 57 km with its caliber of 210 mm! At that range, the cannon known as "Al Fao" launched a projectile weighing 109.4 kg, the kind produced at the factory in Vogosca....

What is bewildering, however, is the fact that top officials at NATO are uninformed of the real possibilities of the Serb cannon's range. Or is this once again a game of compromise with the Serbs, whereby Sarajevo is removed from mortar range but left within range of heavy artillery? For now, we can expect that shells weighing 100 kg will be arriving from a distance of 60 km away from Sarajevo, or from any other target in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia. However, if the production of artillery pieces with a range greater than 100 km (like the "Babylon") is allowed, territory outside the former Yugoslavia will also come under Serb attack! For now, it is known reliably that the Serbs have the original powder for producing a supercannon like the "Babylon"—made for that purpose in Vitez—together with enough know-how to begin implementing a new and deadly project.

Kosovo

Rugova Calls For U.S. Intervention

94AE0095A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 6 Apr 94 p 7

[Article by Jamil Rufa'il: "Albanian Leader of Kosovo Province Tells AL-HAYAH: Our Goal, Independence; We Call on Americans to Intervene to Resolve Our Issue"]

[Text] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Kosovo Province's Albanians, who are striving for independence from the Serbian Republic, declared that he rejects any solution to the Kosovo problem that takes into consideration the plan being followed in the Krajina region, with its Serbian majority, which is aimed at keeping it within a federation with Croatia. Rugova called on the Americans to intervene in Kosovo, "because that would be a natural thing to do, after the biased Russian intervention."

Rugova talked with AL-HAYAH by telephone from the headquarters of the Albanian Democratic Alliance [Democratic Alliance of Kosovo], which he heads in Pristina. In his capacity as president of the Kosovo republic, elected by the Albanian majority in accordance with a popular plebiscite held in the region two years ago, Rugova said: "Kosovo is an independent neutral country. I cannot bow to pressures and agree to self-government within the Serbian Republic, even if it were to a maximum extent."

Albanians, who constitute 90 percent of Kosovo's population, consider Rugova president of the republic, which they unilaterally proclaimed. Rugova went on to say that "independence is the best solution for our problem. We shall not retreat from this position, after the experience we have had with the Serbs for more than 80 years, during which they practiced every form of arbitrary behavior, persecution, and ethnic cleansing against us."

The Albanian leader considers the situation in Kosovo as different from Krajina during the previous Yugoslav regime, "because Krajina was a autonomous unit within the Yugoslav Federal Union, which gave it the right to self-determination, just like parts of the other federation."

Rugova would not object to studying general ties within the scope of the Balkan region, "on condition that this were to come about after Kosovo is freed from direct Serbian domination and can determine its own fate."

Violence and Terror

Rugova described the current conditions in Kosovo as distressing. "There is no open warfare, but there is violence and terrorism toward Albanian citizens. This makes it necessary to prevent a tragic catastrophe as occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially since we lack any internal or external protection, including even the presence of international observers, after the Serbian Republic demanded their withdrawal at the end of last year."

Rugova considers the heavy Serbian military presence in Kosovo, especially the internal security force that implements the state of emergency, as most dangerous, an ominous indicator that an eruption or outbreak of real war could happen at any moment, "despite the fact that we are still trying not to react to provocations and violence, in order to avoid conflict or even worse consequences."

Rugova revealed a plan he had submitted to the United States and several European Community nations to resolve this very sensitive issue in stages, "beginning with temporarily placing Kosovo under international protection. We would prefer U.S. forces under UN supervision. During this period, Kosovo's future can be studied with the parties involved in this issue."

He stressed that during his meetings with American and European officials, he called for "linking the present international embargo against Yugoslavia (Republics of Serbia and Montenegro) with a settlement of the issue of Albanians in Kosovo."

Partition of Kosovo

Rugova has rejected all plans aimed at partitioning Kosovo into Serbian and Albanian states, especially since this idea was first presented by the Serbian opposition. It was then endorsed by the previous Yugoslav (Republics of Serbia and Montenegro) president, Dobrica Cosic, and repeated by many others at other times. "However, it is unacceptable, because there is no clear ethnic Serbian part of Kosovo, with the exception of certain villages. The other parts are Albanian. One should note that Serbian plans are to gain mastery over those areas that are rich in resources." He added that partition would not solve the problem, "because a million Albanians would remain in Serbian areas, which would result in a continuation of the present situation and the absence of a permanent solution."

Regarding negotiations with authorities in the Serbian Republic, Rugova emphasized that they stopped when contacts failed a year ago concerning studies in Albanian schools. "We want to resume them and continue the dialogue, but the Serbs present crippling conditions that have previously been submitted, in order to get us to relinquish our goal of independence and recognize Serbian authority over Kosovo in all political areas in the region."

Russians Are Biased

Rugova criticized Russia's totally biased position vis-a-vis the Serbs. He considered the Russian delegations' visits to Kosovo as a kind of direct provocation against the Albanians, since the Russian parliamentary (Duma) delegation, which came to Kosovo last week, showed outright extremism, to such a degree that it tried to spread fear and panic among the Albanians. "However, we made it clear to them that we no longer feared anyone, after we *dhqna al-amrin* [words as transliterated] from the Serbs."

Rugova explained that American intervention in the Albanian issue in Kosovo would be natural after the Russian activities. "We made our position clear to both sides. We call for direct American intervention in this issue." He indicated that the Kosovo Albanians would welcome any agreement in the Balkans that would contribute to relieving the tension in the region. "At this point, we salute the federation between Bosnian Muslims and Croats."

Bukoshi Rejects Autonomy Within FRY

AU1304092494 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 12 Apr 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Invitation to Democratic Governments To Recognize the Will of the Albanian People"]

[Text] Istanbul, April—*Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the republic of Kosova, spoke at the Balkan Conference held in Istanbul on 7-10 April. We publish here the closing section of his speech at this meeting that was attended by many statesmen from the Balkan countries and at which the main topics were Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Kosova.*

"... What do the Kosovars want? Nothing more and nothing less than to be allowed to freely exercise their will as a people. The Kosovars ask to realize their aspirations in a peaceful way. A peaceful movement of this kind is something new in the Balkans and, if it brings results, can only increase the hopes of the Balkan peoples for a brighter future. It will be a clear and fair sign that conflicts even in the Balkans can be solved in a civilized manner before resorting to force.

"Many people suggest that the Kosovars should accept autonomy, similar to that created in 1974. Those who support this idea seem to forget that such a thing was tried in the past. It did not work. The Serbian regime succeeded in revoking Kosova's autonomy even at a time when Yugoslavia possessed a complex structure that all the constitutive people might have hoped would protect them. Autonomy would now be entirely in the hands of Serbia."

To Ask For Autonomy for the Kosovars Is To Ask Them To Remain Under Greater Serbia

"To suggest autonomy for Kosova is as if to ask Slovenia to return to what used to be called Yugoslavia, to ask Croatia to forget the war visited upon it by the Serbian aggressor, its cities turned to dust and ashes like Vukovar, the bombardment of Dubrovnik, and the forced migrations, and to return to Yugoslavia. To ask Kosova to accept autonomy is as if to ask Bosnia to forget its 200,000 dead, its thousands upon thousands of women raped, and the millions of people ethnically cleansed, and to return to Yugoslavia. Those who suggest autonomy for Kosova must realize clearly that this is the same as asking the Kosovars to remain under Greater Serbia, under Serbian dictatorship, always oppressed, persecuted, harassed in every possible way, and treated as a colony. Those who suggest autonomy only show that they are not ready to grapple with the regime of a dictator.

"The people of Kosova are not asking for independence just like that. Their case is not simply one of secessionism. The state of which they are once a part has disintegrated and no other state that may subsequently arise can incorporate them within its borders against their will. When the problems in Yugoslavia started, Kosova asked simply for equality. All that Kosova asks now is to enter as an equal partner into negotiations and for a satisfactory solution to be found. What is wrong with equality? The Serbs should never be frightened of equality. The demands of the Albanians of Kosova are in no way directed against the Serbs, and are not directed against Serbian cultural monuments, or against Serbian civilization, in spite of the fact that it has been these same Serbs who, in the last two or three years, have mercilessly destroyed the civilization of non-Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, and elsewhere.

"The Albanians of Kosova do not possess the argument of force. They cannot compel the international community to take sufficient measures against Serbia. Nevertheless, we insist on certain steps that the international community should urgently take.

"One step that must be taken immediately, in our view, is to tighten the international sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and to make the eventual lifting of these sanctions conditional upon achieving a satisfactory solution for all the problems of the Yugoslav crisis, including Kosova. This is in the spirit of the decisions of the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. It must be underlined that Kosova is suffering the effect of these sanctions for no fault of its own.

"The people of Kosova are nevertheless ready to continue to endure these sanctions, although they are an additional difficulty, in the hope that these sanctions, however inadequate they may be, may have some effect in halting Serbia."

Kosova Is a Regional Problem

"Kosova must then be demilitarized and its democratic institutions restored. A form of international protectorate must be established in Kosova. Because Kosova is a regional problem and not Serbia's internal affair, the neighboring Balkan countries must play a more constructive role, because peace is endangered in these countries, too. The worst thing that can happan is for Balkan countries to take the side of the aggressor.

"The presence of observers and the maintenance of sanctions can only normalize the situation and reinforce the people's constant belief that their situation can be alleviated only by peaceful means. This is the only way in which the necessary conditions can be created to enable us to take part as equals and without preconditions in negotiations on Kosova. Otherwise, the future will be unsure and unpredictable. Let me underline once again, on behalf of the government of Kosova, that we have a mandate to act upon the will of the people, and we will continue to do this. Self- determination is not an exclusive right of the Serbs, but a principle applied throughout the world. In this context and in this spirit, we appeal to the United Nations Security Council, the CSCE, the United States, and Russia, and all democratic governments, to help Kosova to avert conflict and to achieve a normal life for its people.

"We invite all democratic government to recognize the will of the people of Kosova for a free and self-determined existence. Only justice can be eternal," Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the republic of Kosova, said in conclusion.